Collins v. Town of Derry
| Decision Date | 24 September 1969 |
| Docket Number | No. 5917,5917 |
| Citation | 256 A.2d 654,109 N.H. 470 |
| Parties | William COLLINS et al. v. TOWN OF DERRY et al. |
| Court | New Hampshire Supreme Court |
James A. Sayer, Jr., Salem, for plaintiffs.
Grinnell & Bureau, Edward D. Bureau, Derry, for defendant Town of Derry.
This is an appeal under RSA 31:77 by thirteen property owners and voters of the town of Derry who are contesting the validity of certain amendments to the zoning ordinance purported to have been adopted at the annual town meeting March 14, 1967. There was a hearing before a master (Fred W. Hall, Jr., Esq.) who recommended that the action taken at the town meeting on the amendments be declared null and void because the notice of the second public hearing required by RSA 31:63-a (Laws 1965 318:1) contained only the changes in the original proposal set forth in the notice for the first public hearing and did not contain all the amendments that were being proposed. The master's report was approved by Leahy, C.J. and the exceptions of all parties were reserved and transferred.
We hold that the proposed amendments included in the notice for the first hearing in which there has been no change need not be republished in the notice for the second public hearing and that the notice of the second hearing complied with the statute. No complaint is made regarding the notice of the first hearing which contained all the amendments then being proposed by the planning board.
Laws 1965 318:1 (formerly RSA 31:63-a (supp)) in force at the time with which we are concerned required * * *'
Since the planning board had proposed all the amendments contained in the notice for first public hearing the 'proposed amendments' which they were required to consider, accept, or reject must refer to changes proposed at the first public hearing. And the 'amendments accepted by the board' which must be included in the notice for the second hearing must refer to those changes proposed at the first hearing which were accepted by the board. This is made clear in the rewritten RSA 31:63-a (supp) which became effective August 21, 1967 (Laws 1967 216:1) which reads in part 'the notice of the second public hearing must include either the text or an adequate statement of all changes in the proposed ordinance or amendments considered at the first hearing which were subsequently accepted by the zoning commission or the planning board. * * *' (Emphasis supplied). While this is not the language which was in effect at the time of the events with which we are concerned it is some evidence of legislative intent. See 50 Am.Jur. Statutes s. 337.
It is not for us to pass upon the wisdom of not requiring a republication of the proposed changes contained in the notice of the first hearing. We cannot say that a failure to republish in the notice of the second...
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Delano v. City of South Portland
...P.2d 1345, 1353 (1974); Inexco Oil Company v. Oil and Gas Conservation Com'n, Wyo., 490 P.2d 1065, 1067 (1971); Collins v. Town of Derry, 109 N.H. 470, 256 A.2d 654, 655 (1969); Crosby v. Barr, Miss., 198 So.2d 571 (1967); General Realty Improvement Co. v. City of New Haven, 133 Conn. 238, ......
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...of that language in Laws 1972, ch. 584, is some indication of a legislative intent not to enact a criminal statute. Collins v. Derry, 109 N.H. 470, 256 A.2d 654 (1969); Gagne v. Greenhouses, 99 N.H. 292, 109 A.2d 840 (1954). Generally the presence of some penal features in statutes concerne......
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Roy v. Transairco, Inc.
...intent with respect to the original statute and may serve to make clear the original legislative intent. Collins v. Derry, 109 N.H. 470, 472, 256 A.2d 654, 655 (1969); 1 Sutherland, Statutory Construction s. 1930, at 416; s. 1931, at 418 (1943). That the sections might require different pro......
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...to state its reasons in writing. it could be found that the reasons were adequately communicated to the council. Collins v. Derry, 109 N.H. 470, 473, 256 A.2d 654, 656 (1969). The ambiguous provision of the definitionary section of the ordinance (26A C.J.S. pp. 958-959 (1956) required no di......