Collins v. United States

Citation20 F.2d 574
Decision Date10 June 1927
Docket NumberNo. 7133.,7133.
PartiesCOLLINS v. UNITED STATES.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit)

E. D. O'Sullivan, of Omaha, Neb. (W. N. Jamieson and C. J. Southard, both of Omaha, Neb., and J. J. Hess, of Council Bluffs, Iowa, on the brief), for plaintiff in error.

Frank F. Wilson, Asst. U. S. Atty., of Mt. Ayr, Iowa (Ross R. Mowry, U. S. Atty., of Newton, Iowa, and Ray C. Fountain, Asst. U. S. Atty., of Des Moines, Iowa, on the brief), for the United States.

Before WALTER H. SANBORN and BOOTH, Circuit Judges, and KENNAMER, District Judge.

BOOTH, Circuit Judge.

This is a writ of error to a judgment of conviction of plaintiff in error, hereafter called defendant, under an indictment charging him with violations of section 194 of the Criminal Code (Comp. St. § 10364). The charging part of count 1 of the indictment reads as follows:

"That one Keith Collins, on or about the 13th day of November in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and twenty, did at Council Bluffs, in the Western division of the Southern district of Iowa, and within the jurisdiction of this court, unlawfully, willfully, and feloniously take, steal, and carry away, and aid and assist in taking, stealing and carrying away, from an authorized depository for mail matter, to wit, the United States railway mail car of the Chicago & Council Bluffs railway post office, one certain mail bag, which said mail bag is more particularly described as follows, to wit: Mail bag bearing label `From San Francisco, California, to Washington, D. C.,' closed by rotary lock No. D3789-29, contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the United States."

The other counts, four in number, are similar, except as to the mail bags specified. Section 194 Criminal Code, so far as here material, reads as follows:

"Whoever shall steal, take, * * * from or out of any mail, post office, or station thereof, or other authorized depository for mail matter, * * * any letter, postal card, package, bag, or mail, or shall abstract or remove from any such * * * bag, or mail, any article or thing contained therein, * * * or whoever shall * * * receive, * * * or shall unlawfully have in his possession, any * * * bag, or mail, or any article or thing contained therein, which has been so stolen, taken, embezzled, or abstracted, as herein described, knowing the same to have been so stolen, taken, embezzled, or abstracted, * * * shall be fined not more than $2,000, or imprisoned not more than five years, or both."

A special demurrer was interposed to the indictment, and overruled. A plea of former conviction was presented, to which the Government interposed an answer denying the same. In support of the plea there were offered from the records of the court in the former case, the indictment, arraignment, plea of guilty, and judgment. The plea of former conviction was overruled. The defendant refusing to plead further, a plea of not guilty was entered and the trial proceeded.

At the close of the government's case, and again at the close of all the evidence, a motion for directed verdict was made by defendant. It was denied. Motion was also made to dismiss the indictment, on the ground that it was not returned against defendant until more than three years had elapsed after the offense charged was committed. The motion was denied.

Defendant was found guilty on each count of the indictment. Motion in arrest of judgment was made and denied. Sentence was imposed of five years' imprisonment on each count, to be served consecutively. Eight specifications of error are relied upon.

One of them challenges the overruling of the demurrer. Various grounds were set out in the demurrer: One was that the indictment did not allege the offense in the same language as the statute. The words "and carry away" are pointed out as not being contained in the statute. This is true, and those words are no part of the offense denounced by the statute. They might properly be disregarded as surplusage; and so the court held and so charged the jury. There was no error here. United States v. Noveck, 271 U. S. 201, 46 S. Ct. 476, 70 L. Ed. 904; Mathews v. United States, 15 F.(2d) 139 (C. C. A. 8).

Another ground of the demurrer was that the indictment did not state who was the owner of the mail bags; nor did it state that they were property of any value. This was not necessary. Bowers v. United States, 148 F. 379 (C. C. A. 8).

Another ground of the demurrer was that the indictment was not sufficiently definite in describing the mail car, and the exact place where the mail bags were stolen. That the indictment was sufficiently definite to advise the defendant of the particular offense charged, appears conclusively from the affidavit interposed by him in connection with his plea of former jeopardy. The affidavit reads:

"I, Keith Collins, being first duly sworn, depose and say that I am the defendant in the above-entitled case, which is known as case No. 2529, pending for trial in this court; that I am one and the same person as the Keith Collins mentioned in the certified pleadings attached to the plea of former conviction filed in this case, and that the matters appearing of record in the Western and Central divisions of said court, entitled `United States of America v. Keith Collins,' have reference to me, and I am the party who was previously convicted of a violation of section 194 of the Criminal Code of the United States for that district, which case is known and designated as criminal No. 2574; that the facts which constitute the basis for the indictment now pending are parts of the same continuous state of facts, or alleged criminal acts, inspired by the same alleged criminal intent upon which the former indictment was returned and are the same transactions covered by the indictment to which the plea of guilty was entered. Further deponent sayeth not."

Still another ground of the demurrer was that each of the counts of the indictment was duplicitous (a) in that it charged that defendant did both take and steal the mail bags; and (b) in that it charged that defendant did both steal the mail bags and did aid and assist in stealing the same. There is no merit in this charge of duplicity in either respect. Under section 194 it is proper to charge a defendant with doing several of the acts denounced, and, if any one is proven, it is sufficient. Crain v. United States, 162 U. S. 625, 636, 16 S. Ct. 952, 40 L. Ed. 1097; Ackley v. United States, 200 F. 217 (C. C. A. 8); Simpson v. United States (C. C. A.) 229 F. 940; Jacobsen v. United States (C. C. A.) 272 F. 399; Rowan v. United States (C. C. A.) 281 F. 137.

Furthermore, there is but one offense charged, though defendant is alleged to have stolen the mail bags, and also to have aided and abetted the stealing. It is optional with the pleader whether an aider and abettor shall be charged as such, or as a principal under the aider and abettor statute, section 332 Criminal Code (Comp. St. § 10506). All are principals, and the offense of each is the same. Ruthenberg v. United States, 245 U. S. 480, 483, 38 S. Ct. 168, 62 L. Ed. 414. It may be repetitious to charge one as a principal, and also as an aider and abettor, in the same count; but this does not make the count duplicitous.

Another specification of error challenges the overruling of the plea of former conviction. A comparison of the indictment in the former case with the indictment in the case at bar clearly demonstrates that the offenses charged in the two indictments were entirely distinct, though all grew out of one transaction.

On a plea of former jeopardy, the test is whether the same evidence would be sufficient for conviction in both cases. Morgan v. Devine, 237 U. S. 632, 641, 35 S. Ct. 712, 59 L. Ed. 1153; Gavieres v. United States, 220 U. S. 338, 31 S. Ct. 421, 55 L. Ed. 489. It is clear from reading the indictment that the same evidence would not suffice in both. Counsel for defendant concedes this when he says that the evidence in the case at bar would be the same as required under the first indictment, "with a few additions."

Another specification of error relates to an illustration used by the court in its charge to the jury. While the illustration might better have been omitted, yet we think no reversible error resulted.

Another specification of error is based on the refusal of the court to give a requested instruction relative to locus poenitentiæ. The request was properly refused. The evidence was not such as to make the requested instruction pertinent.

One of the specifications of error raises the question of the statute of limitations. The offense was charged to have been committed on the 13th of November, 1920, in the Western division of the Southern district of Iowa. The indictment was returned in the Central division of the same district on May 11, 1921, but was not filed in the Western division until more than three years had elapsed from the 13th of November, 1920. We hold that the indictment was returned in time. The fact that it was returned in a division different from the one where the offense was committed is not of importance. Such practice is common and valid. Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U. S. 224, 235, 44 S. Ct. 519, 68 L. Ed. 989; Biggerstaff v. United States, 260 F. 926 (C. C. A. 8).

Nor is there any merit in the contention that defendant's constitutional right to a "speedy trial" was infringed. There is no showing that he demanded an earlier trial than was afforded him. Phillips v. United States, 201 F. 259, 262 (C. C. A. 8); Worthington v. United States (C. C. A.) 1 F.(2d) 154. See, also, Frankel v. Woodrough, 7 F. (2d) 796 (C C. A. 8).

Another specification of error challenges the validity of the sentence on account of its form. The sentence was that defendant should "serve five years on each count at the federal prison at Atlanta, Ga., and that they shall be served...

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