Collision Chiropractors LLC v. Collision Injury Chiropractic PLLC

• Decision Date: 08 November 2022
• Docket Number: CV-20-01897-PHX-SMB
• Parties: Collision Chiropractors LLC, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Collision Injury Chiropractic PLLC, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Arizona

Collision Chiropractors LLC, et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
Collision Injury Chiropractic PLLC, et al., Defendants.

No. CV-20-01897-PHX-SMB

United States District Court, D. Arizona

November 8, 2022

ORDER

Hon. Susan M. Bronovich United States District Judge

Before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (“MPSJ”). (Doc. 54.) Plaintiffs filed a Response (Doc. 60), and Defendants filed a Reply (Doc. 62). Because the MPSJ has been fully briefed, the Court exercises its discretion to vacate oral argument on November 17, 2022 as it would be unnecessary. See LRCiv 7.2(f) (“The Court may decide motions without oral argument.”). Specifically, Defendants seek partial summary judgment on Count I, cybersquatting under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) and Count II, common law trademark infringement. (See Doc. 54 at 1.)

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Dr. Papamatheakis owns and operates a chiropractic practice, Collision Chiropractors LLC, under the trade name “Collision Chiropractors.” (Docs. 54 at 2; 60 at 3.) Defendant Dr. Quackenbush owns and operates “www.collissioninjurychiropractors.com,” a patient referral website for injured autoaccident consumers. (Docs. 54 at 2-3, 60 at 3-4.) The website refers consumers to participating chiropractic providers. (Id.) Plaintiffs do not advertise or receive referrals

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from Defendants' website. (Doc. 60 at 4.) Plaintiffs argue that Defendants' website and domain name infringes on their protected trade name “Collision Chiropractors.” Plaintiffs also argue that Defendants' operation of “Collision Injury Chiropractors” amounts to cybersquatting under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d).

Dr. Quackenbush purchased his domain name “Collision Injury Chiropractic” for his referral website in September 2016. (Docs. 54 at 3; 60 at 3.) Dr. Papamatheakis first contemplated the name “Collision Chiropractors” for his practice in November or December 2016. (Docs. 54 at 3; 60 at 3.) Dr. Papamatheakis testified that he began marketing his business as Collision Chiropractic by “at least” February 2017. (Doc. 60 at 3.) Dr. Papamatheakis registered his domain name, “www.collisionchiro.com” in March 2017. (Doc. 54 at 3.) However, Defendants assert that no evidence exists of Plaintiffs' hosting a website under www.collisionchiro.com until August 2018. Plaintiffs allege that although Dr. Quackenbush registered his domain name shortly before Plaintiffs began operating, “Defendants did not get that site up and running until two and a half months after Plaintiffs were operational.” (Doc. 60 at 3.) Dr. Papamatheakis publicly registered “Collision Chiropractors” as a trade name in September 2018. (Doc. 54 at 3.)

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A material fact is any factual issue that might affect the outcome of the case under the governing substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute about a fact is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Id. “A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by . . . citing to particular parts of materials in the record” or by “showing that materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A), (B). The court need only consider the cited materials, but it may also consider any other materials in the record.

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Id. at 56(c)(3). Summary judgment may also be entered “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

Initially, the movant bears the burden of demonstrating to the Court the basis for the motion and “identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. at 323. If the movant fails to carry its initial burden, the non-movant need not produce anything. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 2000). If the movant meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the non-movant to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 1103. The non-movant need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor, but it “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The non-movant's bare assertions, standing alone, are insufficient to create a material issue of fact and defeat a motion for summary judgment. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 247-48. “If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Id. at 249-50 (citations omitted). However, in the summary judgment context, the Court believes the nonmovant's evidence, Id. at 255, and construes all disputed facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 2004). If “the evidence yields conflicting inferences [regarding material facts], summary judgment is improper, and the action must proceed to trial.” O'Connor v. Boeing N. Am., Inc., 311 F.3d 1139, 1150 (9th Cir. 2002).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Trademark Infringement Claim

“Marks are generally classified in one of five categories of increasing distinctiveness: (1) generic, (2) descriptive, (3) suggestive, (4) arbitrary, or (5) fanciful.” Zobmondo Ent., LLC v. Falls Media, LLC, 602 F.3d 1108, 1113 (9th Cir. 2010). It is a

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question of fact whether a mark belongs in a particular category. Id. “Suggestive, arbitrary, and fanciful marks are considered ‘inherently distinctive' and are automatically entitled to federal trademark protection because ‘their intrinsic nature serves to identify a particular source of a product.'” Id. (quoting Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992)). On the other hand, generic marks do receive trademark protection. See id. Lastly, “[m]erely descriptive marks are...