Colman-Egan School Dist. No. 50-5 v. Jones, COLMAN-EGAN

• Decision Date: 24 March 1994
• Docket Number: COLMAN-EGAN,No. 18516,18516
• Parties: 93 Ed. Law Rep. 919 SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 50-5, Appellant, v. Jeffrey D. JONES and Amy L. Jones, Appellees, and John Bonaiuto, Secretary of South Dakota Department of Education and Cultural Affairs. . Considered on Briefs
• Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Page 890

520 N.W.2d 890

93 Ed. Law Rep. 919

COLMAN-EGAN SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 50-5, Appellant, v. Jeffrey D. JONES and Amy L. Jones, Appellees, and John Bonaiuto, Secretary of South Dakota Department of

Education and Cultural Affairs.

No. 18516.

Supreme Court of South Dakota.

Considered on Briefs March 24, 1994.

Decided Aug. 17, 1994.

J.B. Lammers of Lammers, Lammers, Kleibacher & Parent, Madison, for appellant.

John A. Shaeffer, Flandreau, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Colman-Egan School District No. 50-5 (the District) appeals the reversal of its disapproval of the petition of Jeffrey D. and Amy L. Jones (Jones) for a minor school district boundary change. We reverse.

FACTS

This case involves the school districts serving the communities of Flandreau, Colman and Egan, South Dakota. In 1990 or 1991, proceedings began to merge the separate Colman and Egan school districts into a single Colman-Egan School District. Within the old Egan School District, were several "islands" of property that could not be made a part of the new Colman-Egan School District due to state rules concerning contiguous property within school districts. ¹ Those properties, as well as several other outlying parcels, were written out of the plan for the new Colman-Egan School District. As a result, a little over five million dollars worth of property that formerly belonged to the Egan School District was not included in the plan for the new Colman-Egan school district. The majority of that property ended up in the nearby Flandreau School District.

In March 1991, an election was conducted to approve the plan for formation of the Colman-Egan School District. Preparatory to the election, many public meetings were held to discuss the formation of the new school district and members of the public were given an opportunity to provide their input or to make any requests they might have in regard to the formation. The election was ultimately successful and the new Colman-Egan School District came into being on July 1, 1991.

Jones resided for approximately eleven years in Flandreau. During that time, Jones' ten year old child attended the Flandreau School for all six years of his education (i.e., through the fifth grade and, at the time of this decision, presumably the sixth grade). In December 1991, Jones purchased a residence approximately four and one-half miles outside of the Flandreau city limits where they moved in January 1992. At the time they purchased the property, Jones were aware of the recent school district reorganization and were also aware the property they had purchased was in the newly reorganized Colman-Egan School District. Nevertheless, they assumed and believed there was a good possibility they would be able to have their property transferred from the Colman-Egan School District into the Flandreau School District.

In January 1992, Jones filed a petition for a minor school district boundary change with the Colman-Egan Board of Education (Board). Jones' petition sought to transfer their new property from the Colman-Egan School District into the Flandreau School District. A hearing on their petition was conducted during a regular meeting of the District's Board on February 13, 1992. During the hearing, Jones were afforded a full and fair opportunity to present their arguments and evidence in support of their requested minor boundary change. The Board unanimously voted to disapprove the petition. A formal letter informing Jones of the reasons for the disapproval was issued by the Board.

Jones appealed the Board's disapproval to the State Secretary of Education and Cultural Affairs. A hearing on the appeal was conducted by the Secretary's representative. ² The Secretary's representative entered his findings of fact, conclusions of law and order determining the Colman-Egan School Board acted arbitrarily and capriciously and also erred as a matter of law in disapproving Jones' petition. Therefore, the representative's order reversed the Board's disapproval of the petition.

The District appealed the representative's order to the circuit court. Based upon its review of the pleadings, the transcript of the hearing before the Secretary's representative and the representative's decision, the circuit court entered an order adopting the representative's findings of fact and conclusions of law and affirming his decision on September 13, 1993. The District now appeals to this Court.

ISSUE

WAS THE BOARD'S DISAPPROVAL OF JONES' REQUEST FOR A MINOR SCHOOL DISTRICT BOUNDARY CHANGE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS, ARBITRARY,

CAPRICIOUS, OR AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION?

In denying Jones' boundary change petition, the Board made no extensive findings of fact or conclusions of law. The only written records of the Board's deliberations are a few sentences from the minutes of its meetings on February 13 and 20, 1992 and several brief paragraphs in its formal letter of disapproval dated February 21, 1992. However, an evidentiary hearing was conducted before the Board and Jones were given a full and fair opportunity to present their arguments and evidence in support of their petition for the boundary change. An extensive hearing on Jones' petition was also conducted by the representative of the Secretary of Education. The hearing was tape recorded and later transcribed, witnesses were sworn and evidentiary objections were made. The representative entered findings of fact and conclusions of law.

The entire record was reviewed by the circuit court in considering the legality of the Board's decision. Given this extensive record and the lack of additional de novo testimony before the circuit court, the following standard of review is applicable in this case:

[T]he scope of review [in the instant case] is limited to determining the legality of the school board's decision. Moran v. Rapid City Area Sch. Dist., 281 N.W.2d 595 (S.D.1979).

' "[T]he trial de novo required by SDCL 13-46-6 permits an independent inquiry into the facts, but only for the purpose of passing on the legality of board's decision." ' "The circuit court must determine (1) whether the board possessed the administrative power to make the decision (which is not in issue here), and (2) whether the board acted unreasonably or arbitrarily, or whether the board manifestly abused its discretion."

* * * * * *

"In determining whether the school board's decision was arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion, the circuit court must ascertain whether there is substantial evidence to support the school board's decision." Moran, 281 N.W.2d at 599. (emphasis added). Substantial evidence means such relevant and competent evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Id. We must determine whether Board was clearly erroneous by examining the evidence supporting its decision.

Oldham-Ramona School Dist. v. Ust, 502 N.W.2d 574, 580-81 (S.D.1993) (quoting Maasjo v. McLaughlin School Dist. 15-2, 489 N.W.2d 618, 620-21 (S.D.1992) (citations omitted).

Having defined the applicable standard of review, we turn our analysis to the board's decision on [Jones'] petition. Substantive factors we have previously looked to in evaluating decisions concerning minor boundary changes include: (1) whether the petitioners are more closely aligned to the economic, social and religious life of the community into which they are being transferred; (2) whether there is bus service to the residence; (3) whether the district line which places their property in the...