Colman v. Shimer
Decision Date | 23 June 1958 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 3227. |
Citation | 163 F. Supp. 347 |
Parties | Robert D. COLMAN, Ancillary Administrator of the Estate of Thomas Webb, Deceased, Plaintiff, v. Uyleau SHIMER, Executor of the Estate of Elizabeth Kehlman, Deceased, Elsie Hunt, Margaret Krumer and David Anderson, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan |
Eric V. Brown, Kalamazoo, Mich., for plaintiff.
Dorothy M. Hunt, Chicago, Ill., and Schmidt, Smith, Howlett & Halliday and Walter K. Schmidt, Grand Rapids, Mich., for defendants.
This action was begun in the circuit court of Van Buren county, Michigan, by plaintiff Robert D. Colman as ancillary administrator of the estate of Thomas Webb, deceased, against Uyleau Shimer, executor of the estate of Elizabeth Kehlman, deceased, and David Anderson, Elsie Hunt, and Margaret Krumer as defendants. Plaintiff Colman and defendants Shimer and Anderson are citizens of Michigan, defendant Hunt is a citizen of Illinois, and defendant Krumer is a citizen of Ohio. In his complaint plaintiff alleged that Thomas Webb prior to his death was aged, senile, and mentally incompetent and that he was induced by the false and fraudulent statements and representations of his sister, defendant Elsie Hunt, and her attorney, to execute and enter into an inequitable and fraudulent agreement dated October 21, 1955, with defendant Elsie Hunt and his sister Margaret Krumer for the division of certain property which the three of them were to share equally as legatees under the will of their mother, Elizabeth Kehlman, deceased. In his complaint plaintiff asked that the agreement of October 21, 1955, be declared null and void and that defendants Hunt, Shimer, and Anderson be restrained from distributing or otherwise disposing of certain property in the estate of Elizabeth Kehlman described in the complaint, pending the further order of the court.
Defendant Hunt has removed this action from the circuit court of Van Buren county to this Federal district court on the ground of diversity of citizenship. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441. It appears from the record that the action has been discontinued as to defendant Anderson and that defendant Krumer has not been served with process or entered her appearance. Plaintiff Colman has filed a motion to dismiss the petition for removal and to remand the action to the circuit court on the ground that defendant Shimer is an indispensable party to the action and that, as plaintiff and Shimer are both citizens of Michigan, there is no diversity of citizenship and, therefore, no Federal jurisdiction. On the other hand, defendant Hunt contends that defendant Shimer is not an indispensable party to this action but is only a nominal party, or a stakeholder, whose citizenship should not be considered in determining this court's jurisdiction.
Counsel for plaintiff and defendant Hunt have filed a stipulation of the facts to be considered by the court in its determination of the plaintiff's motion to remand, and have also agreed that the motion may be determined on briefs filed, without further hearing or oral argument. It is clear that under the facts and circumstances involved this court would have had original jurisdiction of this action. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332. The Federal statute relating to removal of actions, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441, provides:
The law is well established that in determining whether or not the requisite diversity of citizenship exists for the removal of an action to a Federal court, the courts will consider only the citizenship of the real parties in interest and not that of merely formal or nominal parties. As stated in 2 Cyclopedia of Federal Procedure, 3d Ed., § 3.57:
In Spalding v. Southern Pacific Company, D.C., 19 F.R.D. 413, 414, the court said: "The authorities are legion that it is the duty of the District Court in ascertaining its jurisdiction to realign and disregard defendants who are dispensable in order to fix its jurisdiction on the ground of diversity of citizenship."
See also Lee v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 267 U.S. 542, 45 S.Ct. 385, 69 L.Ed. 782; General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corporation v. Smith & Oby Company, D.C., 148 F.Supp. 126; Kopitko v. J. T. Flagg Knitting Co., D.C., 111 F. Supp. 549; Leadman v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York, D.C., 92 F.Supp. 782.
Under the Federal law a party whose role in a law suit is that of a depositary or stakeholder is a formal or nominal party and not an indispensable party. In Salem Trust Company v. Manufacturers' Finance Company, 264 U.S. 182, 189, 44 S.Ct. 266, 267, 68 L.Ed. 628, the Supreme Court said:
In Farmers' Bank v. Hayes, 6 Cir., 58 F.2d 34, 36, the court said: "A garnishee or stakeholder is a merely nominal party whose citizenship will not affect the question of jurisdiction." In Cothren v. Evans, ...
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