Colo. Cnty. v. Staff

• Decision Date: 03 February 2017
• Docket Number: NO. 15–0912,15–0912
• Citation: 510 S.W.3d 435
• Parties: COLORADO COUNTY, Texas, R.H. "Curly" Wied, In his Official & Individual Capacity, Petitioner, v. Marc STAFF, Respondent
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

510 S.W.3d 435

COLORADO COUNTY, Texas, R.H. "Curly" Wied, In his Official & Individual Capacity, Petitioner,

v.Marc STAFF, Respondent

NO. 15–0912

Supreme Court of Texas.

Argued October 4, 2016

OPINION DELIVERED: February 3, 2017

Jason Eric Magee, Colorado County, Texas, Wied, R.H. Curly, Austin TX, for Petitioner.

Daniel A. Krieger, Staff, Marc, League City TX, for Respondent.

Justice Guzman delivered the opinion of the Court.

Chapter 614, Subchapter B of the Texas Government Code provides covered peace officers certain procedural safeguards to help ensure adverse employment actions are not based on unsubstantiated complaints of misconduct.¹ Under Subchapter B, a covered peace officer cannot be disciplined based on a "complaint" unless the complaint is (1) in writing, (2) "signed by the person making the complaint," and (3) presented to the employee "within a reasonable time after the complaint is filed."² Moreover, ultimate disciplinary action (indefinite suspension or termination) may not be "based on the subject matter of [a] complaint" of misconduct absent an investigation and some supporting evidence.³

The statutory-construction issues raised in this employment-termination dispute concern the events necessary to trigger and satisfy Chapter 614, Subchapter B's procedural requirements. The issues presented include whether Subchapter B's disciplinary procedures apply to at-will employment relationships; whether those procedures apply to any complaint of misconduct or only citizen-generated complaints; and whether a complaint must be signed by the "victim" of the alleged misconduct and presented to the employee some time before discipline is imposed.

We hold that (1) Chapter 614, Subchapter B does not alter the at-will relationship, but prescribes procedures that apply when the employer elects to terminate employment based on a complaint of misconduct rather than terminating at will; (2) the statutory phrase "the person making the complaint" is not limited to the "victim" of the alleged misconduct; and (3) in this case, a signed disciplinary notice provided to the employee contemporaneously with suspension of employment was sufficient to meet Chapter 614, Subchapter B's notice requirements and allowed the officer ample opportunity to defend himself to the final decisionmaker. We therefore reverse the court of appeals' judgment and render judgment in the employer's favor.

I. Background

After serving as a Colorado County Deputy Sheriff for nearly five years, Mark Staff's employment was terminated. Contemporaneously with Staff's dismissal, he received a "Performance Deficiency Notice (Termination)" signed by his supervisor, Lieutenant Troy Neisner (Deficiency Notice). Though the County is an at-will employer with "the right to terminate employment for any legal reason or no reason," the Deficiency Notice identified and provided details about three specific incidents in which Staff's interactions with the public were characterized as "rude," "unacceptable," "unprofessional," "grossly unprofessional," and contrary to departmental policy. Per the Deficiency Notice, these incidents did not constitute a "complete record" of Staff's performance deficiencies or "an exhaustive list of the reasons for [his] termination," but were merely "recent [performance] deficiencies."

While other unspecified performance issues may have impacted the termination decision,⁴ the Deficiency Notice identifies the impetus for Staff's dismissal as an internal investigation initiated after County Attorney Ken Sparks informed Sheriff R.H. "Curly" Wied that Staff's behavior during a recorded traffic incident was "inappropriate and needed to be addressed." Sparks suggested the Sheriff review a DVD of dash-cam footage of the event, which Staff had provided to support criminal charges he filed against the motorist. According to Sparks, assistant county attorneys had also viewed the recording and "felt [Staff's] conduct and/or behavior was inappropriate and concerning enough to bring it to his attention."

Sparks gave the DVD to Sheriff Wied, who immediately forwarded it to Lt. Neisner. Lt. Neisner and two other officers, Sergeant Girndt and Sergeant Edman, independently reviewed the video footage. As recounted in the Deficiency Notice, Staff's behavior toward the motorist was "demeaning" and involved "screaming," "taunting," and "apparent rage" that "escalated" the incident and "resulted in an arrest for an accident in which ... no damage to any vehicle" had occurred. Based on the video depiction of Staff's conduct, "it was determined without question that [Staff's] behavior was unacceptable and unprofessional" on the occasion in question.

As a result of that incident, Lt. Neisner and Sgt. Edman conducted "spot checks" of Staff's dash-cam videos to evaluate his performance and found his behavior to be unacceptable on at least one other occasion. The Deficiency Notice states that, during a traffic stop that occurred shortly before the inciting incident, Staff was "argumentative," "scream[ed]" at a "calm" and "compliant" motorist, repeatedly asked questions that had already been answered, and "continued to escalate the incident higher by threatening to take the subject to jail several times for not cooperating, although there was no evidence of her not cooperating on video." Lt. Neisner and Sgt. Edman deemed Staff's behavior "rude," "unacceptable," and "grossly unprofessional."

In addition to the foregoing events, which occurred in the weeks preceding Staff's termination, the Deficiency Notice recalled a nearly five-year-old incident involving similar behavior. About a month after Staff was hired, he reportedly displayed his badge during an off-duty traffic stop and "cussed, ranted, and raved" at a motorist for "speeding up and slowing down [,] preventing [him] from passing." The Deficiency Notice states that Staff was formally reprimanded for his conduct and admonished that further misconduct could result in termination of employment.

Lt. Neisner informed Staff that all three incidents violated section 22 of the Colorado County Sheriff's Office Policy Manual, Conduct: Unbecoming an Employee . Lt. Neisner therefore "recommended" immediate termination of Staff's employment and terminated Staff's employment "effective immediately." However, Lt. Neisner also advised Staff that he had 30 days to appeal the termination to Sheriff Wied for a "final" decision on the matter. The signed Deficiency Notice was provided to Staff at the time of termination, which was two days after Sparks had reported his concerns about Staff's conduct to Sheriff Wied.

Staff timely appealed the termination decision to Sheriff Wied, seeking reinstatement. In an exchange of initial letters, Sheriff Wied advised Staff to "articulate all of his responses to his termination and the reasons for his appeal" prior to the appeal deadline. Each incident had been identified in the Deficiency Notice with factual details and objective criteria such as case number or date and time, and the Sheriff's office had produced copies of the video recordings and other relevant documents at Staff's request. However, rather than contesting the substantive grounds for termination or attempting to contextualize his behavior, Staff's appeal to Sheriff Wied complained of procedural irregularities in the process leading to his discharge. Citing sections 614.022 and 614.023 of the Texas Government Code, Staff asserted he could not be disciplined absent a written complaint signed by "the person who was the subject of the alleged misconduct," that no such document had ever been provided to him, and as a result, he had no opportunity to respond to the complaint or explain his actions.

After Sheriff Wied summarily upheld the termination decision, Staff sued the sheriff and Colorado County (collectively, Sheriff Wied) for declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. Staff alleged the Colorado County Sheriff's Department violated Government Code sections 614.022 and 614.023 by terminating his employment without obtaining and giving him a copy of a signed complaint and without allowing him an opportunity to respond to the allegations before he was disciplined.

In cross-motions for partial summary judgment, the material facts were not disputed. Nor was there any dispute that Staff was covered under Chapter 614, Subchapter B.⁵ However, in seeking summary judgment on liability, the parties relied on conflicting constructions of the relevant statutory provisions. The parties' summary-judgment positions diverged as to whether the circumstances attending Staff's termination triggered the statutory process and, if so, whether Sheriff Wied complied with the statutory requirements.

Staff's summary-judgment motion asserted Chapter 614, Subchapter B applied because his employment was terminated based on an investigation that originated with Sparks's complaint; Sparks did not sign a written complaint against Staff; Colorado County's investigation of Sparks's complaint was "ex parte" and did not afford Staff an opportunity to respond to the allegations; the Deficiency Notice Lt. Neisner signed did not satisfy the statutory requirement of a signed complaint because "the investigation into the complaint did not begin internally, but was generated as the result of an external communication with the Sheriff's Office"; and even if the Deficiency Notice would otherwise be sufficient, Staff had no opportunity to defend himself against the allegations because he did not receive the notice until discipline was imposed. The central theme of Staff's summary-judgment motion was that an internal report based on an external complaint alleging misconduct is insufficient to satisfy the statutory requirements.

Sheriff Wied's motion for partial summary judgment argued that Chapter 614, Subchapter B did not apply to Staff's termination because Staff's employment was terminable at will; termination "was not based on a specific complaint"; and the grounds for...