Colombo v. Bd. of Educ. for the Clifton Sch. Dist.

• Decision Date: 31 October 2016
• Docket Number: C/w: Civil Action No.: 12-cv-7132,Civil Action No.: 11-cv-785
• Parties: DAWN COLOMBO, Plaintiff, v. THE BOARD OF EDUCATION FOR THE CLIFTON SCHOOL DISTRICT, MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF EDUCATION FOR THE CLIFTON SCHOOL DISTRICT, in their official capacity, CLIFTON HIGH SCHOOL, & JIMMIE WARREN, in his official capacity, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

DAWN COLOMBO, Plaintiff, v. THE BOARD OF EDUCATION FOR THECLIFTON SCHOOL DISTRICT, MEMBERSOF THE BOARD OF EDUCATION FORTHE CLIFTON SCHOOL DISTRICT, in theirofficial capacity, CLIFTON HIGH SCHOOL,& JIMMIE WARREN, in his official capacity, Defendants.

Civil Action No.: 11-cv-785

C/w: Civil Action No.: 12-cv-7132

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

October 31, 2016

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

OPINION

CECCHI, District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court upon (1) the Motion to Dismiss Counts One through Five of Plaintiff Dawn Colombo's ("Plaintiff") Complaint by Defendant Jimmie Warren ("Warren"),¹ and (2) the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint by The Board of Education for the Clifton School District, the Members of the Board of Education for the Clifton School District, and Clifton High School (collectively, the "Board Defendants").² The Motions are decided without oral argument pursuant to Rule 78 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.³ For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' Motions to Dismiss are granted in part and denied in part.

I. BACKGROUND

This dispute arises out of the alleged pattern of sexual harassment directed at Plaintiff by Defendant Jimmie Warren. Compl.⁴ ¶ 17. Warren was the Principal of Clifton High School, which Plaintiff's minor children attended. Id. ¶¶ 8-9. In the Fall of 2008, Plaintiff's son, B.C., was suspended from Clifton High School. Id. ¶ 13. Plaintiff contacted Warren to discuss her son's disciplinary problems, and eventually met with him. Id. ¶15. Following their initial meeting, Plaintiff alleges that Warren engaged in a "continuing pattern of extremely inappropriate, unwelcome, harassing, and sexually suggestive communications," including "unwanted, inappropriate sexual touchings." Id. ¶ 17. Plaintiff alleges the harassment took place during meetings where Plaintiff sought to discuss her son's academic performance and behavior. Compl. ¶ 18. Warren is alleged to have deliberately changed some of Plaintiff's son's grades, and told Plaintiff he would protect her son from disciplinary charges in the hopes that Plaintiff would acquiesce to his sexual advances. Id. ¶ 23-24.

Plaintiff alleges that, on several occasions, Warren exposed his penis to her. Compl. ¶ 26. Additionally, Warren once snuck behind Plaintiff while she waited in his office, "put his hands under Plaintiff's breasts, and fondled them." Id. ¶ 32. On or about June 2010, Plaintiff alleges she told Warren she intended to report his unwanted advances and touchings to the police. Id. ¶ 34. Warren told Plaintiff her son would not receive any further protection if she reported him. Id. Additionally, Plaintiff alleges Warren gave her a $1,000 purse and "directed Plaintiff to keep their 'secret' between them." Id. ¶ 35. Four months later, in September 2010, Plaintiff's son was suspended for a period of 21 days, and Plaintiff contacted Warren to discuss her son's disciplinaryinfraction. Id. ¶ 36. According to Plaintiff, Warren ignored her for four days, then demanded that they meet in a hotel. Id. ¶¶ 37-38. Plaintiff was assured by Warren that her son's suspension would be lifted if they met, and she reluctantly agreed. Id. At the hotel, Plaintiff attempted to discuss her son's suspension, but to her dismay, Warren removed his pants and lay on the bed. Id. ¶ 40. Plaintiff refused to have sex with Warren, who retaliated by refusing to lift her son's 21 day suspension early. Id. ¶ 42. Plaintiff alleges that members of the Board of Education and other administrators and employees of the District were aware of Warren's misconduct. Id. at 25.

Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that Warren's behavior has led to harassment of her minor daughter, N.C. Compl. ¶ 44. Plaintiff claims N.C. has been the subject of name-calling and threats of physical harm by other students while attending Clifton High School. Id. She alleges that the Defendants have taken no action to address her daughter's social and academic needs. Id.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To survive dismissal, a complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007)). In determining the sufficiency of a complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008). Additionally, in evaluating a plaintiff's claims, generally "a court looks only to the facts alleged in the complaint and its attachments without reference to other parts of the record." Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, the "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a rightto relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Furthermore, "[a] pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal citations and quotations omitted).

The burden of proof for showing that no claim has been stated is on the moving party. Hedges v. U.S., 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1409 (3d Cir. 1991)). During a court's threshold review, "[t]he issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims." In re Rockefeller Ctr. Props., Inc., 311 F.3d 198, 215 (3d Cir. 2002). In general, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should be construed liberally so as to encourage ruling on the merits instead of technicalities: "This liberality is expressed throughout the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and is enshrined in a long and distinguished history . . . . An inadvertent mistake in pleading will not be held against the pleader if another party has not been misled by the mistake or otherwise prejudiced." Lundy v. Adamar of New Jersey, 34 F.3d 1173, 1186 (3d Cir. 1994). Further, courts will not dismiss for failure to state a claim merely because the complaint mis-categorizes legal theories or does not point to an appropriate statute or law to raise a claim for relief. See Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 909 n. 10 (1990).

III. DISCUSSION

This Court exercises jurisdiction over Plaintiff's Federal claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Additionally, the Court exercises jurisdiction over Plaintiff's State law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Plaintiff's Complaint asserts six counts against Defendants. Compl. at 16-31. Plaintiff's claims include: (1) an equal protection claim under the Federal and New Jersey Constitutions; (2) Federal and State First and Fourteenth Amendment violations of Plaintiff'sfreedom of speech, freedom of association, and right to petition; (3) violations of Article VIII, Section 4, Para. 1 of the New Jersey State constitution, which provides for "thorough and efficient" public education; (4) violations of Plaintiff's substantive due process rights under the Federal and State Constitutions; (5) violations of Plaintiff's rights under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972; and (6) violations of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination. (Compl. at 16-31).

Defendants raise various arguments in support of their Motions to dismiss each count in the Complaint. The Court will address each argument in turn.

A. The Board Defendants' Liability Under Section 1983

The Board Defendants argue that § 1983 liability cannot be imposed under a theory of respondeat superior, and that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim that Warren's actions implement or execute a municipal "policy or custom." Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 713 (1978); (Board Defs. Br. Supp. at 24-27). The Court agrees with Defendants.

A municipal government may not be sued under Section 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employee. Monell, 432 U.S. at 694. To state a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must "demonstrate that the municipality itself, through the implementation of a municipal policy or custom, cause[d] a constitutional violation." Foster v. Twp. of Hillside, 780 F. Supp. at 1046. A municipality's failure to act may constitute a policy where the municipality has knowledge of the need to act, and the failure to act "rises to the level of 'deliberate indifference' which causes a constitutional injury." Bair v. City of Atl. City, 100 F. Supp. 2d 262, 268 (D.N.J. 2000) (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989)). The necessary involvement may be shown through allegations of personal direction or "actual knowledge and acquiescence." Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1478 (3d Cir. 1990). The existence of actual knowledge or acquiescence must be pled with specificity. Id.

The Court finds that Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a Section 1983 claim against the Board Defendants. The Complaint alleges a pattern of sexual harassment lasting from 2008 to 2010. (Compl. ¶¶ 13; 35). However, the Complaint is devoid of specific allegations that Plaintiff informed anyone of Warren's inappropriate conduct and similarly does not contain specific allegations to support a claim based on deliberate indifference. Plaintiff alleges that she threatened to report Warren to the police on June 28, 2010. (Compl. ¶ 34.) However, she does not allege that she ever reported Warren's conduct to any of the Board Defendants between 2008 and 2010. Plaintiff's allegations that the Board Defendants "were aware of Warren's activities and took no action," (Compl. ¶...