Colon v. Anglikowski
| Decision Date | 08 July 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:20-cv-00036 (ERIE) |
| Parties | CARLOS COLON, Plaintiff v. ERIC ANGLIKOWSKI, JOHN WETZEL, MARK CAPOZZA, DEBRA HAWKINBERRY, MELANIE NAGY, ADAM KNEPPER, SCOTT RIDDLE, SETH ERICKSON, MICHAEL CLARK, DAVID RADZIEWICS, and TRICIA BASHOR, Defendants |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania |
MEMORANDUM OPINION ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS (ECF NO. 41)
Plaintiff Carlos Colon (Colon), proceeding pro se, commenced this civil rights action against ten employees of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (Defendants), all of whom worked at the State Correctional Institution at Albion, where Colon was previously incarcerated.1 See ECF No. 15 (Complaint). His original Complaint alleged that one of the defendants, Corrections Officer Anglikowski, sexually assaulted and harassed him during his incarceration and that the other defendants were somehow complicit in or responsible for Anglikowski's misconduct. Id.
In response to Colon's Complaint, the Defendants filed a Motion for More Definite Statement pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 10. See ECF No. 29, ¶ 3. Because the Complaint did not disclose the factual basis underlying Colon's claims against any defendant other than Anglikowski, the Court granted the Defendants' motion and ordered Colon to file an Amended Complaint. ECF No. 32. Colon complied with that order and filed an Amended Complaint. ECFNo. 38 (Amended Complaint). Thereafter, Defendants filed the pending Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and a supporting brief. ECF Nos. 41, 42. Colon has filed a Response in opposition to the motion. ECF No. 46. All parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636. Defendants' motion is ripe for disposition.
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). In deciding a motion to dismiss, the court is not opining on whether the plaintiff will be likely to prevail on the merits; rather, the plaintiff must only present factual allegations sufficient "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-236 (3d ed. 2004)). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)). A complaint should only be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12 (b)(6) if it fails to allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (). In making this determination, the court must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint and views them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. U.S. Express Lines Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 2002).
While a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must provide more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id. (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Moreover, a court need not accept inferences drawn by a plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts as set forth in the complaint. See California Pub. Employee Ret. Sys. v. The Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902,906 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor must the Court accept legal conclusions disguised as factual allegations. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. See also McTernan v. City of York, Pennsylvania, 577 F.3d 521, 531 (3d Cir. 2009) ().
Expounding on the Twombly/Iqbal line of cases, the Third Circuit has articulated the following three-step approach:
First, the court must 'tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.' Second, the court should identify allegations that, 'because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.' Finally, 'where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.'
Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010)). This determination is "a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. When ruling upon a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must "generally consider only the allegations in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, and documents that form the basis of a claim." Lum v. Bank of Am., 361 F.3d 217, 222 n.3 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997). A court may take judicial notice of documents filed in other court proceedings because they are matters of public record. Liberty Int'l Underwriters Can. v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 955 F. Supp. 2d 317, 325 (D.N.J. 2013).
Finally, because Colon is representing himself, the allegations in the Amended Complaint must be held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521 (1972). If the court can reasonably read a pro se litigant's pleadings to state a valid claim upon which relief could be granted, it should do so despite the litigant's failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax and sentence construction, or unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982); United States ex rel.Montgomery v. Bierley, 141 F.2d 552, 555 (3d Cir. 1969) (). Thus, the Court may consider facts and make inferences where it is appropriate. But "any pleading must still contain sufficient factual allegations that, when accepted as true, 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Heffley v. Steele, 2019 WL 5092127, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 11, 2019), aff'd, 826 Fed. Appx. 227 (3d Cir. 2020) (citations omitted). See also Baez v. Mooney, 2021 WL 816013, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 8, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 808726 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 3, 2021).
Colon's Amended Complaint is a 28-page verified pleading. An amended complaint "supersedes the original and renders it of no legal effect, unless the amended complaint specifically refers to or adopts the earlier pleading." W. Run Student Hous. Assocs., LLC v. Huntington Nat'l Bank, 712 F.3d 165, 171 (3d Cir. 2013). Colon's amended pleading includes no such incorporation and therefore is the operative pleading under consideration.
Generally, Colon claims he was deprived of his "Federal Constitutional Rights as named by the 5th, 8th, and 14th Amendments, namely his rights to due process and freedom from cruel and unusual punishment and though unprovable at this time sexual abuse and sexual harassment at the hands of correctional staff." ECF No. 38, ¶ 90. The claims against all defendants appear to arise out of, or relate to, an incident of alleged sexual abuse by Anglikowski during a body search onMay 18, 2018, and alleged sexually harassing comments Anglikowski made to Colon after the incident.
According to the Amended Complaint, on May 18, 2018, Colon was "singled out by COI Anglikowski while in a re-routed inmate movement." Id., ¶ 4(A). Anglikowski told Colon to "assume the position, which refers in common prison lingo (vernacular) to empty all pocket[s] and spread arms and legs in preparation for a body search." Id., ¶ 4(C). Anglikowski then commenced a body search on Colon that "became abusive and finally intrusive as he stopped patting me down and then started rubbing me." Id., ¶ 4(C)-(D). Specifically, Anglikowski "placed his fingers and thumbs of both hand[s] within the area of my gluteus maximus muscles (cheeks) on my posterior (buttoks) (sic) in an unprofessional manner." Id., ¶ 4(E). Upon returning to his housing unit, Colon reported the incident on the Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA) hotline. After Colon submitted his PREA report, Anglikowski began to verbally harass Colon with comments such as "can't we just get along," "lookin' good," "I'm gonna get some of that," and "hey baby boy." Id., ¶ 6 (A)-(D).
On July 12, 2018, while Colon was in line for medication, Anglikowski again singled him out for questioning. Id., ¶ 7. Anglikowski attempted to provoke an argument about Colon's work schedule, and then terminated the conversation, telling Colon to "drive safe sexy." Id., ¶¶ 10, 15. Colon also reported this incident on the PREA hotline and sent a letter to the "BCI/PREA coordinator." Id., ¶ 16.
On July 25, 2018, after meeting with counselors and the institution's employment officer, Colon met with Lt. Barner and Ms. Cheek. Id., ¶ 29. Colon was asked to "sign off" on his previously filed grievances "with the condition that CO Anglikowski is moved off his post." Id. Later that day and despite the separation agreement, Colon encountered Anglikowski in the west yard of the prison but did not enter the west yard "out of fear and anxiety." Id., ¶ 30. Colon encountered Anglikowski again in the prison yard on August 18, 2018. Id., ¶ 35. While reportingfor work on September 23, 2018, Colon encountered Anglikowski, who "continued to stare at and attempted to provoke a response" from Colon. Id., ¶ 37. Colon did not...
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