Colon v. Carter, s. 80-1665
Decision Date | 24 October 1980 |
Docket Number | 80-1666 and 80-1667,Nos. 80-1665,s. 80-1665 |
Citation | 633 F.2d 964 |
Parties | , 11 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,004 Wilfredo Marquez COLON et al., Plaintiffs, Appellees, v. James E. CARTER, President, etc., et al., Defendants, Appellants. COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. Edmund S. MUSKIE et al., Defendants, Appellees. Wilfredo Marquez COLON et al., Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. James E. CARTER, President, etc. et al., Defendants, Appellees. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit |
Peter R. Steenland, Jr., Atty., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., with whom Lois J. Schiffer, Donald W. Stever, Jr., Richard Lazarus, Atty., Policy, Legislation and Special Litigation Section, Land & Natural Resources Division, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C. and Dorothy Burakreis, Attys., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., were on brief for James E. Carter, President of The United States of America, et al.
Michael J. Henke, Washington, D.C., with whom Richard G. Wilkins, Vinson & Elkins, Washington, D.C., Gerardo A. Carlo, and Miguel A. Gimenez Munoz, Secretary of Justice, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, San Juan, P.R., were on brief, for the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
Pedro Saade Llorens, Hato Rey, P.R., with whom Pedro J. Varela, Hato Rey, P.R., was on brief, for Wilfredo Marquez Colon, et al.
Before COFFIN, Chief Judge, CAMPBELL and BOWNES, Circuit Judges.
These three appeals from a partial preliminary injunction require us to consider the legality of the federal government's efforts to relocate a number of Cuban and Haitian refugees from their present facilities in Florida to Fort Allen, Puerto Rico. Plaintiffs are the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and several individual residents of a municipality near the Fort (hereafter collectively "the Commonwealth"). Defendants are President Carter, Secretary of State Muskie, Secretary of Defense Brown, and various other government officials said to be involved in the relocation program (hereafter collectively "the government").
After an expedited hearing, the district court on October 8, 1980 issued a preliminary injunction restraining the government from "taking any further action, of all natures, for the purpose of transferring refugees to Fort Allen" until an environmental impact statement (EIS) had been prepared in conformity with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C). On October 10, 1980, President Carter signed into law the Refugee Education Assistance Act of 1980, Pub.L. No. 96-422 (REAA), section 501(c) of which exempted action furnishing "assistance ... for the processing, care, maintenance, security, transportation, and initial reception and placement in the United States of Cuban and Haitian entrants" from the EIS requirement of NEPA. Presented with the new statute by the government later that same day, the district court set aside its injunction "as to any new construction in Fort Allen pursuant to the new legislation", but continued its injunction against the transfer of refugees to Fort Allen. Each party has taken an appeal from that order, and each has sought highly expedited review, which has been granted. While motions from each side sought relief pending decision on appeal, the ultimate issues on the merits of the preliminary injunction were both briefed and argued. We consider each appeal in turn.
The Commonwealth's appeal argues that the NEPA exemption contained in Title V of the REAA is inapplicable to the proposed transfer of refugees to Fort Allen for two independent reasons: first that the term "United States" as used there does not include Puerto Rico, and second that the term "Cuban and Haitian entrants"-a term which the Commonwealth interprets to include only refugees entering the United States prior to June 19, 1980-would not apply to some or all of the refugees to be transferred to Fort Allen. 1 We find each of these grounds unpersuasive. The first is contravened by the import of section 501(a)(1) of the REAA, which authorizes the President to exercise authorities with respect to Cuban and Haitian entrants identical to those exercised under the Immigration and Nationality Act, which in turn explicitly defines the term "United States" to include Puerto Rico. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (38). 2 The second we think simply a hypertechnical reading of Title V, which is both generally at odds with the central purpose of Title V and specifically inconsistent with the purpose of providing an EIS exemption. That Title V generally is not limited to Cuban and Haitian refugees entering prior to June 19, 1980 is demonstrated both by its provision for "initial reception" assistance in section 501(c), since refugees entering before June 19 had already been initially received by October 10, and by its inclusion of refugees to be accorded yet-undetermined status classifications in section 501(e)(1)-a provision apparently looking to the future. That its NEPA exemption specifically is not limited to actions assisting such entrants is evident from the very nature of that exemption: it simply makes no sense whatsoever to condition an EIS exemption on a factor so completely irrelevant to environmental impact. Thus, we conclude that the NEPA exemption contained in Title V of the REAA is applicable to the transfer of refugees to Fort Allen, 3 and we decline to reinstate the injunction against continued construction there. 4
The government's appeal argues that the executive order designating Fort Allen as a relocation site is not subject to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. We agree, on the ground that the decision is one committed to the President's discretion by law and therefore unreviewable under 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2). 5 Although "we will not lightly interpret a statute to confer unreviewable power ... the ultimate analysis is always one of Congress' intent." Southern Railway Co. v. Seaboard Allied Milling Corp., 442 U.S. 444, 454, 99 S.Ct. 2388, 2394, 60 L.Ed.2d 1017 (1979). We have previously addressed this analysis as follows:
Hahn v. Gottlieb, 430 F.2d 1243, 1249 (1st Cir. 1970).
We conclude that in this case, as in Southern Railway, " 'there is persuasive reason to believe that (nonreviewability) was the purpose of Congress.' " Id., quoting Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140, ...
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