Colon v. Kennedy

Decision Date03 August 2022
Docket Number20 C 1225
PartiesPABLO COLON (M-55510), Petitioner, v. TERI KENNEDY, Respondent.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

HONORABLE THOMAS M. DURKIN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Petitioner Illinois prisoner Pablo Colon, through counsel, petitions this Court for federal habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C § 2254. Challenging his Cook County conviction for first-degree murder, Petitioner argues: (1) he received insufficient warnings in accordance with Miranda v Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), before his videotaped confession to police officers; and (2) his 40-year imprisonment sentence is unconstitutional. Respondent has responded, and Petitioner has replied. For the reasons below, this Court denies the § 2254 petition on the merits, and declines to issue a certificate of appealability.

Background

The background facts are taken primarily from the Illinois appellate court opinion in Petitioner's direct appeal. People v. Colon, 2018 IL App (1st) 160120. We take the facts from the Illinois Appellate Court's opinions because they are presumptively correct on habeas review and [Petitioner] has not rebutted this presumption.” Hartsfield v. Dorethy, 949 F.3d 307, 309 n.1 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)). The Illinois Appellate Court summarized the trial evidence as follows:

In sum, the State's evidence at trial established that on May 29, 2010, at midnight, a group of men, who belonged to the same gang, approached two men on a nearby street because one of the two men was wearing a red shirt, which was the color of a rival gang. One of the two men, Mario Gallegos, was able to escape, and he testified at trial as the State's sole eyewitness. The other man, Alan Oliva, who was wearing the red shirt, was beaten to death. The State's evidence included a videotaped confession by defendant describing his role in the offense, in which he admitted that he was the first person to approach the two men, that he was the one who demanded to know their gang affiliation, and that he kicked the murder victim in the head after the victim was down on the ground. The State's evidence also included testimony by fellow gang member Kates, concerning statements made by two of the attackers at a subsequent gang meeting attended by defendant. Defendant's statement to the police and Kates's testimony varied from each other, in that defendant stated to the police that there were six to eight men and that they exited a party to approach the murder victim and the victim's companion, while Kates reported that two of the attackers, Ramirez and Guerrero, claimed that they exited a vehicle with defendant and that they were the only three men to approach the murder victim and that the victim was alone.

Colon, 2018 IL App (1st) 160120, ¶ 6.

On direct appeal, Petitioner argued six claims.[1] See Colon, 2018 IL App (1st) 160120, ¶ 2. Of relevance to the instant case, two of those claims were: (1) the trial court erred when it denied his pretrial motion to suppress his videotaped statement because he was not informed that he had the ability to end the interrogation at any time; and (2) his sentence of 40 years' imprisonment is unconstitutionally excessive. Rejecting these claims, as well as Petitioner's other claims, the state appellate court affirmed the conviction and the sentence. Id. Petitioner's petition for leave to appeal (PLA), raising essentially the same claims (Dkt. 16-7), was denied by the Illinois Supreme Court. People v. Colon, 108 N.E.3d 883 (Ill. 2018) (Table). He filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, which denied certiorari. (Dkt. 16-3; Dkt. 16-8.) He then filed the federal habeas petition currently before this Court. (Dkt. 1.)

Discussion

Petitioner's § 2254 petition argues two claims: (1) his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination was violated when police officers failed to advise him that he could end the interrogation at any time; and (2) his 40-year sentence is unconstitutional. (Dkt. 1, pg. 18-25.) Neither claim, as explained below, warrants federal habeas relief.

A. Standard of Review

With respect to claims adjudicated on the merits by a state court, a federal habeas court's review is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Federal habeas relief is unavailable for such claims “unless the adjudication of the claim-

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

“A state-court decision will ... be contrary to [Supreme Court] clearly established precedent if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases . [or] . confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of th[e] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [thei]r precedent.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 40506 (2000). For a state court decision to be an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, it must be “objectively unreasonable.” Felton v. Bartow, 926 F.3d 451, 464 (7th Cir. 2019) (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 411). ‘Unreasonable' in [this] context ... means something ... lying well outside the boundaries of permissible differences of opinion.” McGhee v. Dittmann, 794 F.3d 761, 769 (7th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). The state court decision must have been “so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011). As the Supreme Court recently reiterated, [t]he writ of habeas corpus is an ‘extraordinary remedy' that guards only against ‘extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems.' Shinn v. Ramirez, 142 S.Ct. 1718, 1731 (2022) (quoting Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102).

B. Miranda Warnings

Although § 2254(d)'s deferential review standard usually applies when a state court addressed the merits of a federal claim, the standard of review that applies in this case is unclear due to the way the state courts addressed Petitioner's Miranda claim. When applying § 2254(d)'s deferential standard of review, this Court must ““look to ... the ‘last reasoned state-court decision' addressing the claim. Dassey v. Dittmann, 877 F.3d 297, 302 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Johnson v. Williams, 568 U.S. 289, 297 n.1 (2013) (citing Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 806 (1991)). In Petitioner's case, the state appellate court on direct appeal, Colon, 2018 IL App (1st) 160120, was the last reasoned state court decision insofar as the state supreme court summarily denied his PLA. Colon, 108 N.E.3d 883. But the state appellate court did not address Petitioner's constitutional challenge to his pre-confession warnings. After acknowledging that Petitioner challenged his confession on constitutional and state-law grounds, the court addressed only the state-law claim. See Colon, 2018 IL App (1st) 160120, ¶¶ 56-62.[2]

The state trial court, however, provided a reasoned decision on Petitioner's federal claim when it denied his motion to suppress his videotaped confession. (Dkt. 16-8, pg. 72-73.) But whether this Court applies § 2254(d)'s deferential standard of review to the trial court's decision, or reviews the claim de novo because the state appellate court did not address it, is unclear.[3] Regardless which review standard applies, the state trial court's analysis was correct; this Court agrees with it; and federal habeas relief is unavailable for this claim even under de novo review, the most lenient review standard available to Petitioner. The trial court stated the following:

THE COURT: Thank you.

I had the opportunity to review the disk that was tendered to me on more than one occasion. [I] have reviewed the transcript, which has also been tendered and will be made part of the record. I have reviewed the caselaw as submitted by both parties, and I have considered the arguments of Counsel.
I am prepared to give my findings of fact and conclusions of law. I find that at the time of the-the defendant was initially interviewed, that the detective told the defendant that he had the right to remain silent; that anything he said could be used against him in court. He asked the defendant if he understood that, and the defendant indicated that, yes, he did. The officer detective informed the defendant that he had the right to an attorney and that he could not -- if he could not afford an attorney, he would be given one free of charge. The defendant indicated that he understood that. And the detective also told the defendant that he had the right to have an attorney with him during any questioning. He asked the defendant if he understood that. The defendant replied that, yes, he did. The Court finds that those are sufficient Miranda warnings. They are time specific, informed the defendant he had the right to an attorney during the questioning at that time. The motion to suppress statement is denied.

(Dkt. 16-8, pg. 72-73.)

In Miranda, the Supreme Court addressed the application of the Fifth Amendment right against compulsory self-incrimination to custodial interrogation, and set out “to give concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 441-42; see also U.S Const. amend. V (“No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself ...”). After discussing in detail the information an individual must receive before...

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