Colonial Ins. Co. of California v. Lundquist, 18969

Decision Date15 November 1995
Docket NumberNo. 18969,18969
Citation539 N.W.2d 871
PartiesCOLONIAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Chadd A. LUNDQUIST, Defendant, and Carol Allen, Garry Allen, and Garry Allen as Special Administrator of the Estate of Sharon Allen, Defendants and Appellees.
CourtSouth Dakota Supreme Court

Michael J. Schaffer, Davenport, Evans, Hurwitz & Smith, Sioux Falls, for plaintiff and appellant.

Albert Steven Fox, Larson, Sundall, Larson, Schaub & Fox, Chamberlain, for defendants and appellees.

David A. Gerdes of May, Adam, Gerdes and Thompson, Pierre, for Amicus Curie National Association of Independent Insurers.

RUSCH, Circuit Judge.

Colonial Insurance Company of California (Colonial) brought this action pursuant to SDCL 21-24 for a declaratory judgment to determine its rights and obligations in connection with a lawsuit brought against Chadd Lundquist (Lundquist) by the estate of Sharon Allen (Estate). Colonial moved for summary judgment. The trial court denied the motion for summary judgment and Colonial appealed. We affirm.

FACTS

Colonial issued an automobile liability insurance policy to Lundquist on June 28, 1990. The policy specifically covered Lundquist's vehicle, a 1980 Jeep CJ5. The policy provided liability coverage, uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage, medical payments, and car damage (collision and comprehensive) coverage.

On July 13, 1990, Lundquist, who was nineteen years old, Sharon Allen (Allen), who was fourteen years old, and four others left Chamberlain and drove to a nearby lake for a party which included underage consumption of alcohol. 1 After the weather turned cool, Allen asked Lundquist for permission to drive the Jeep back to town so that she and others could get jackets. After several requests, Lundquist agreed to let Allen drive his vehicle. On the way back to town, the Jeep tipped over and Allen was killed.

Allen's estate sued Lundquist for negligent entrustment of the Jeep to Allen. Estate claims that Lundquist negligently entrusted his Jeep to a young, inexperienced driver who had been drinking, who did not have a valid driver's license and who was unfamiliar with the handling characteristics of high-center off road vehicles. 2

Colonial claims that the policy does not cover bodily injury or death of the named policyholder or any other "insured person." The insurance company further contends that "insured person," as defined by the policy, includes any person using Lundquist's car with his permission. 3 Since Allen was using the Jeep with Lundquist's permission, Colonial claims she was an "insured person" and therefore she is excluded from recovery for bodily injury under the policy. 4

DECISION
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This case involves construction of the Colonial insurance policy. The construction of a written contract is a question of law. Isaac v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 522 N.W.2d 752, 755 (S.D.1994). Where an insurance policy is susceptible to different interpretations, the interpretation most favorable to the insured must be adopted. Prokop v. North Star Mutual Ins. Co., 457 N.W.2d 862, 864 (S.D.1990). The trial court's construction of an insurance contract is a question of law which is reviewed de novo. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Vostad, 520 N.W.2d 273, 275 (S.D.1994). The burden of showing no duty to defend rests on the insurer. Hawkeye-Security Insurance Co. v. Clifford, 366 N.W.2d 489, 492 (S.D.1985); Fort Pierre v. United Fire and Cas. Co., 463 N.W.2d 845, 847 (S.D.1990).

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT

In this case Colonial moved for summary judgment. Summary judgment is an extreme remedy which should be awarded only when the truth is clear. It is not a substitute for a trial when there are genuine issues of material fact. The burden of proof is upon the moving party to show clearly that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A mere surmise that a party will not prevail at trial is not a sufficient basis to grant summary judgment. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the evidence must be viewed most favorably to the non-moving party. However, where there are no genuine issues of material fact, summary judgment is looked upon with favor and is particularly adaptable to expose sham claims and defenses. Wilson v. Great Northern Railway Co., 83 S.D. 207, 157 N.W.2d 19 (S.D.1968).

III. EXCLUSIONS FROM POLICY COVERAGE

The trial court held that SDCL 58-11-9.3 authorizes the exclusion of named persons or classes of persons from coverage by an insurance policy, but that the policy still must provide the minimum amount of insurance required by SDCL 32-35-70. 5 However, after that decision by the trial court, this Court held that SDCL 58-11-9.3 authorizes complete exclusion from coverage for a named person and that no minimum amount of coverage is required for excluded persons. National Farmers v. Universal, 534 N.W.2d 63 (S.D.1995). 6

Although we find that the expressed reason for the trial court's decision is not correct, we believe that it reached the correct result.

IV. NEGLIGENT ENTRUSTMENT

This case is different from the usual "insurance coverage" case. Although Allen was driving the Jeep at the time of the accident, the suit instituted by her Estate does not claim negligence on her part. This is not a "negligent operation" case. The suit claims negligence on the part of Lundquist in allowing Allen to use the car. It alleges negligent entrustment and seeks to hold Lundquist, who is the policyholder or "named insured," liable for his own negligence in allowing Allen to drive his car. As pointed out above, South Dakota has recognized negligent entrustment as a cause of action. The essence of the suit is not a claim that Colonial should pay Allen's Estate for Allen's negligent driving but rather that it should pay for Lundquist's negligence in entrusting his high-centered off road vehicle to a young and inexperienced driver who had been drinking. The negligence at issue is Lundquist's negligence, not Allen's negligence.

Clearly Allen cannot claim that she (Allen) was negligent in driving the car and that she can sue herself for her own negligence and that Colonial will be responsible for paying any resulting judgment. 7 We do not agree with Colonial's argument that SDCL 58-11-9.3 allows them to write an exclusion which excludes coverage for the negligent actions of the "named insured."

V. LIABILITY COVERAGE

Colonial claims that under SDCL 58-11-9.3, it can exclude Allen from any coverage under the policy. 8

SDCL 58-11-9.3 provides:

An insurance policy covering a private passenger automobile or other motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this state may by written agreement with the named insured exclude a named individual from coverage. The policy may also contain a restrictive endorsement reducing the limits of liability or collision coverage when the vehicle is operated by a named person or class of persons. However, if the policy does provide liability coverage to a person or persons named in a restrictive endorsement, the liability coverage may not be less than the minimum prescribed by chapter 32-35.

This statute authorizes Colonial to exclude or limit "liability coverage" for a person or class of persons. A liability policy is a contract to protect the policy owner and other included persons from liability for damages to persons or property for which they are liable due to their negligence. 9 SDCL 58-11-9.3 authorizes Colonial to exclude or limit any protection for Allen, i.e. they will not defend her if she is sued or pay any damages for which she is found to be responsible. 10 However, that statute does not authorize Colonial to exclude "liability coverage" for Lundquist who purchased the policy. Colonial can not sell Lundquist a policy of insurance purporting to protect him from liability claims as required by SDCL 32-35-70 and then, in the fine print, take that protection away from him. Nowhere in the policy did Colonial exclude or limit liability coverage for Lundquist, the named insured or policyholder. 11 Under SDCL 58-11-9.3, Colonial can exclude liability coverage for Allen but it cannot exclude liability coverage for Lundquist.

In support of its position Colonial relies on Progressive Preferred Ins. Co. v. Williams, 864 F.2d 110 (11th Cir.1989). In that case, an unlicensed driver was given permission to drive the defendant's truck. An accident occurred and the insurance company brought a declaratory action to determine its duty to defend against a claim brought by the driver. Relying on Georgia precedent, the Eleventh Circuit held that the unlicensed driver was not covered under defendant's policy "because she cannot plausibly contend that she was an 'innocent victim' of her own unlicensed driving." Id. at 112 (citing Cotton States Mutual Insurance Co. v. Neese, 254 Ga. 335, 329 S.E.2d 136, 141 (1985)). Therefore, public policy did not require voiding the unlicensed driver exclusion contained in the policy.

However, in Progressive, unlike the present case, the plaintiff did not sue for negligent entrustment by the policyholder or named insured, but rather sued to recover damages she sustained as a result of her own negligent driving. For that reason, Progressive is distinguishable.

Other jurisdictions which have considered negligent entrustment claims have found coverage for the negligence of the named insured. In Viking Ins. Co. v. Petersen, 308 Or. 616, 784 P.2d 437 (1989) the owner of a truck entrusted it to another person. The driver of the truck collided with a motorcycle. The motorcycle driver's estate brought suit against the owner, alleging that the owner negligently entrusted his vehicle to the driver. The insurance company brought a declaratory action for a determination of its duty to defend against this suit. The Oregon Supreme Court held that negligent entrustment is...

To continue reading

Request your trial
15 cases
  • SDCP v. Wausau Underwriters Ins. Co., No. 20789
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of South Dakota
    • August 23, 2000
    ...N.W.2d 455 (1970))). The construction and interpretation of an insurance contract is a question of law. See Colonial Ins. Co. of Cal. v. Lundquist, 539 N.W.2d 871, 873 (S.D.1995), and State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Wertz, 540 N.W.2d 636, 638 (S.D.1995). Our standard of review for questio......
  • Heib v. Lehrkamp
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of South Dakota
    • September 21, 2005
    ...¶ 7, 620 N.W.2d 187. The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Colonial Ins. Co. of California v. Lundquist, 539 N.W.2d 871, 873 (S.D. 1995). All inferences from the evidence must also be viewed in favor of the non-moving party. Thus, "summary judgment......
  • Truhe v. Turnac Group, L.L.C.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of South Dakota
    • April 27, 1999
    ...which is a question of law. Olson v. U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co., 1996 SD 66, p 6, 549 N.W.2d 199, 200; Colonial Ins. Co. of Cal. v. Lundquist, 539 N.W.2d 871, 873 (S.D.1995). As a question of law, it is fully reviewable on appeal. Lane v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 1997 SD 58, p 12, 563 N.W.......
  • Truhe v. Turnac Group, LLC, 20631.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of South Dakota
    • September 1, 1999
    ...is a question of law. Olson v. U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co., 1996 SD 66, ¶ 6, 549 N.W.2d 199, 200; Colonial Ins. Co. of Cal. v. Lundquist, 539 N.W.2d 871, 873 (S.D.1995). As a question of law, it is fully reviewable on appeal. Lane v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 1997 SD 58, ¶ 12, 563 N.W.2d 423......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT