Colon–Rodriguez v. Astra/Zeneca Pharms., LP
| Decision Date | 13 December 2011 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 11–1495 (FAB). |
| Citation | 831 F.Supp.2d 545 |
| Parties | Annette COLON–RODRIGUEZ, Plaintiff, v. ASTRA/ZENECA PHARMACEUTICALS, LP, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Preempted
Antonio M. Cuevas–Delgado, Cuevas Kuinlam & Bermudez, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff.
Carl E. Schuster, Lourdes C. Hernandez–Venegas, Shiara L. Dilone–Fernandez, Schuster & Aguilo LLP, San Juan, PR, for Defendant.
Before the Court is plaintiff Annette Colon–Rodriguez's motion to remand this case to the Commonwealth court (Docket No. 8), defendant Astra/Zeneca Pharmaceuticals, LP's (“AZP”) opposition to the motion remand (Docket No. 14), and defendant AZP's motion to dismiss the case (Docket No. 11). For the reasons set forth below, plaintiff Colon–Rodriguez's motion to remand is DENIED and defendant AZP's motion to dismiss is GRANTED.
I. Background
Plaintiff Colon–Rodriguez sued defendant AZP, her former employer, pursuant to Puerto Rico law in the Commonwealth Court of First Instance, Carolina Superior Division (Civil No. FFPE 11–0389–403). Her claims arise out of AZP's alleged failure to perform under the terms of a severance agreement, the Astra/Zeneca Separation Plan (“Severance Plan”), between AZP and her. (Docket No. 10–1, ¶¶ 3.4–3.6 and 4.4.) On May 27, 2011, AZP removed the case to this forum, arguing that the Severance Plan is an “employee welfare benefit plan” covered by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq. (Docket No. 1 at p. 2.) Defendant AZP argues that plaintiff Colon–Rodriguez's cause of action amounts to a claim for benefits under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(1)(B). Id. AZP concludes that this Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Commonwealth courts, and that removal was therefore proper. Id. at 3.
Subsequently, plaintiff Colon–Rodriguez moved to remand the case to the Commonwealth court on June 27, 2011. (Docket No. 8.) She argues (1) that the well-pleaded complaint rule precludes removal because the complaint on its face does not make reference to ERISA, (2) that the suit filed before the Commonwealth court is not an action to recover benefits under an employee benefit plan but seeks relief for defendant AZP's violation of a legal duty under Puerto Rico law, and (3) that rules of comity counsel against federal court involvement in state controversies in the area of taxation.
On June 27, 2011, defendant AZP filed a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (“Rule 12(b)(6)”) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. ( See Docket No. 11.) Defendant AZP also attached the AZP Separation Plan, ( see Docket No. 11–1), and the AZP Separation Plan Summary Plan Description, ( see Docket No. 11–2), to its motion to dismiss.
On July 14, 2011, defendant AZP filed an opposition to plaintiff Colon–Rodriguez's motion to remand, responding (1) that ERISA's complete preemption doctrine is an exception to the well–pleaded complaint rule, (2) that plaintiff Colon–Rodriguez's severance benefits are provided as part of an employee benefits plan governed by ERISA, and (3) that the rules of comity do not apply to the facts of this case. The Court will consider each argument in turn.
On August 4, 2011, defendant AZP filed a motion pursuant to Local Rule 7(b) to deem its motion to dismiss as unopposed. ( See Docket No. 20.) On August 5, 2011, the Court granted defendant AZP's motion to have its motion to dismiss be considered unopposed. ( See Docket No. 22.) The Court will first decide plaintiff's motion to remand and subsequently address defendant's motion to dismiss.
II. StandardsA. Removal
A defendant may remove a case to federal court only when the action could have originally been filed in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441. When a notice of removal is presented, “defendants have the burden of showing the federal court's jurisdiction.” See, e.g., Danca v. Private Health Care Sys., 185 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.1999) ( citing BIW Deceived v. Local S6, 132 F.3d 824, 831 (1st Cir.1997)). If there are any doubts about the propriety of the removal, however, “all doubts should be resolved in favor of remand.” Boyer v. Snap-on Tools Corp., 913 F.2d 108, 111 (3d Cir.1990) (quoting Steel Valley Auth. v. Union Switch and Signal Div., 809 F.2d 1006, 1010 (3d Cir.1987)).
B. Federal Question Jurisdiction and Preemption
Federal courts have original jurisdiction over cases “arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. “A case arises under federal law for purposes of removal when ‘the plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law.’ ” Rossello–Gonzalez v. Calderon, 398 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir.2004) (internal citations omitted).
The controlling principle for federal jurisdiction is the “well-pleaded complaint” rule, which forbids the application of federal question jurisdiction if no federal claim can be discerned from the face of a complaint. BIW Deceived, 132 F.3d at 831. Congress has preempted certain matters to have an exclusive federal cause of action, however, so that even what a plaintiff may call a state claim is to be characterized as a federal one. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 64–65, 107 S.Ct. 1542, 95 L.Ed.2d 55 (1987) () Thus, certain state law claims can be removed “even if they purport to rest only on state law because the subject matter is powerfully preempted by federal law.” Negron–Fuentes v. UPS Supply Chain Solutions, 532 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir.2008) (internal citations omitted). “The articulation ... is that these are federal claims in state law clothing and, to defeat artful pleading, the district court can simply ‘recharacterize’ them to reveal their true basis.” Id. This doctrine is sometimes called “complete preemption” and is an exception to the well–pleaded complaint rule. Id. Consequently, even if a claim does not make reference to a federal cause of action, if the court determines a plaintiff has asserted a federal law claim that is characterized as a state law claim, removal is proper. BIW Deceived, 132 F.3d at 831.
C. Rule 12(b)(6) Standard
Rule 12(b)(6) permits a court to dismiss a complaint when it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a court must take the allegations of the complaint as “true, and determine whether, under any theory, the allegations are sufficient to state a cause of action in accordance with the law.” Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prod., 68 F.3d 525, 530 (1st Cir.1995). A court should not accept unsupported conclusions or interpretations of law. Wash. Legal Found. v. Mass. Bar Found., 993 F.2d 962, 971 (1st Cir.1993). According to this provision, a court will base its determination solely on the material submitted as part of the complaint or central to it. Fudge v. Penthouse Int'l. Ltd., 840 F.2d 1012, 1015 (1st Cir.1988). “When ... a complaint's factual allegations are expressly linked to—and admittedly dependent upon—a document (the authenticity of which is not challenged), that document effectively merges into the pleadings and the trial court can review it in deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).” Beddall v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 137 F.3d 12, 17 (1st Cir.1998) (internal citation omitted). This is especially true where the plaintiff has “actual notice ... and has relied upon these documents in framing the complaint.” Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir.1993).
III. DiscussionA. Plaintiff's Motion to Remand
Plaintiff Colon–Rodriguez asserts that AZP illegally withheld Puerto Rico taxes from her severance pay. (Docket Nos. 8 at p. 1 and 10–1 at ¶¶ 4.1–4.3.) First, plaintiff argues that the well-pleaded complaint rule precludes removal because the complaint on its face does not make reference to ERISA. (Docket No. 8 at p. 3). Next, while plaintiff admits that she subscribed to the Severance Plan and received severance pay according to the plan's terms (Docket No. 10–1 at ¶ 3.4), she argues that her action is not for recovery of benefits under an employee benefit plan. (Docket No. 8 at p. 4.) Instead, she argues that the promised severance benefits were “free-standing and not premised in any way on the existing [Severance Plan]” and that her action simply seeks to recover benefits under Puerto Rico Law 80, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 185a. Id. Furthermore, she argues that the Severance Plan was “adopted and maintained solely for the purpose of complying with Puerto Rico's applicable employees' compensation laws and unemployment compensation rules.” Id. at p. 9. The Court finds plaintiff's arguments unpersuasive.
Congress enacted ERISA to “provide a uniform regulatory regime over employee benefit plans.” 1Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 208, 124 S.Ct. 2488, 159 L.Ed.2d 312 (2004). The statute contains such expansive preemption provisions that employee benefit claims are exclusively a federal concern. Id. Consequently, “any state-law cause of action that duplicates, supplements, or supplants” ERISA is preempted by federal law. Id. at 209, 124 S.Ct. 2488;see also29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (). For preemption purposes, “state laws” are “all laws, decision, rules, regulations, or other State action having the effect of law.” 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(1). Puerto Rico is expressly included in the statute's definition of “state.” 29 U.S.C. § 1002(10). Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly explained that a state law “relates...
To continue reading
Request your trial