Colosmio v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Salt Lake City
Decision Date | 26 November 2004 |
Docket Number | No. 20030793-CA.,20030793-CA. |
Citation | 2004 UT App 436,104 P.3d 646 |
Parties | Charles Matthew COLOSIMO, an individual; and Ralph Louis Colosimo, an individual, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF SALT LAKE CITY dba Catholic Diocese of Salt Lake City, a Utah corporation sole; Archdiocese of San Francisco, a foreign entity; Oblates of St. Francis de Sales, a foreign entity; Judge Memorial High School Board of Financial Trustees, a Utah corporation; James F. Rapp, an individual; Thomas P. O'Neill, an individual; Francis J. Gross, an individual; W. Ivan Cendese, an individual; John Does I-V, individuals and/or entities, Defendants and Appellees. |
Court | Utah Court of Appeals |
Christian J. Cannon and Larry R. Keller, Cohne Rappaort & Segal, Salt Lake City, for Appellants.
Matthew F. McNulty III, Tacy A. Hartman, Mark A. Wagner, Van Cott Bagley Cornwall & McCarthy, Tim Dalton Dunn, Stephen D. Alderman, Dunn & Dunn, Russell C. Fericks, and Mark L. McCarty, Richards Brandt Miller & Nelson, Salt Lake City, for Appellees.
Before Judges DAVIS, JACKSON, and THORNE, Jr.
¶ 1 Ralph and Charles Colosimo (collectively, Plaintiffs) appeal a trial court order dismissing with prejudice their claims against the Roman Catholic Bishop of Salt Lake City, doing business as the Catholic Diocese of Salt Lake City; the Archdiocese of San Francisco; the Oblates of St. Francis de Sales; Judge Memorial High School Board of Financial Trustees; Thomas P. O'Neill; Francis J. Gross; and W. Ivan Cendese (collectively, Defendants). We affirm.
¶ 2 On February 18, 2003, Plaintiffs filed their complaint asserting causes of action against Defendants for aggravated sexual assault and battery, negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, intentional infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and false imprisonment. Plaintiffs sought both general and punitive damages. Each of Plaintiffs' claims stemmed from being sexually abused by James F. Rapp in the early 1970s. ¶ 3 Prior to either party conducting discovery, all of the Defendants, except Rapp,1 filed motions to dismiss pursuant to rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, or in the alternative, motions for summary judgment pursuant to rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In response, Plaintiffs filed a supplemental memorandum and an alterative motion to allow discovery prior to considering Defendants' motions to dismiss and/or, if necessary grant Plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint. However, after considering the pleadings, memoranda, supporting and counter-affidavits submitted by the parties, and arguments of counsel, the trial court treated Defendants' dismissal motions as motions for summary judgment. The court identified the undisputed material facts, determined as a matter of law that the statutes of limitation had run against Plaintiffs' claims, and dismissed their complaint with prejudice.
¶ 4 The following facts were undisputed. Plaintiffs claim that Rapp sexually abused them at different times between 1970 and 1975. Plaintiffs allege that Rapp abused Ralph Colosimo sometime prior to the beginning of Ralph's senior year at Judge Memorial High School in late 1970 and early 1971 and continued to abuse Ralph throughout his senior year and afterward. Ralph turned eighteen years old on September 20, 1971. Plaintiffs further allege that Rapp abused Charles Colosimo from 1972 through 1975. Charles turned eighteen years old on September 22, 1979. At the time of the alleged abuse, Rapp was a member of the Oblates of St. Francis de Sales, and a teacher, priest, and staff member of Judge Memorial High School.
¶ 5 Plaintiffs knew at the time they were allegedly abused by Rapp that they had been abused and that they had suffered injury as a result. Charles was aware of the abuse at the time it occurred and at the time he reached the age of majority — he claims he "has never forgotten what happened to him." Although Ralph claims that he "repressed all memory of many instances of the abuse [he] suffered at the hands of Rapp," he does not contend that he repressed every occurrence of abuse. In their complaint, Plaintiffs noted the "obvious physical and emotional harm that resulted immediately" from Rapp's abuse of Ralph. Further, at some time in 1975, Rapp admitted to Ralph that he was a pedophile and that he was abusing Charles. Plaintiffs have known since they were allegedly abused that Rapp was an Oblate, a priest, and a teacher at Judge Memorial High School. Although Plaintiffs knew they had been injured by Rapp, they made no inquiry into Defendants' knowledge of or responsibility for the abuse during the limitations period. Plaintiffs asserted that they did not suspect that Defendants had any prior knowledge about Rapp's actions or that Defendants could have protected them from Rapp's abuse until May 2002, when the Washington Post published an article documenting Rapp's history of abuse.
¶ 6 Plaintiffs generally argue that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants. We review the trial court's grant of summary judgment for correctness and give no deference to the trial court's application of the law. See Whatcott v. Whatcott, 790 P.2d 578, 580 (Utah Ct.App.1990).
¶ 7 More specifically, Plaintiffs assert that the court applied an incorrect legal standard when it dismissed Plaintiffs' claim. The articulation of a proper legal standard is a question of law, which we review for correctness. See In re Adoption of B.T.D., 2003 UT App 99, ¶ 13, 68 P.3d 1021.
¶ 8 Further, Plaintiffs argue that the trial court wrongly ruled that the statutes of limitation had run against Plaintiffs' claims. "The applicability of a statute of limitations and the applicability of the discovery rule are questions of law, which we review for correctness." Spears v. Warr, 2002 UT 24, ¶ 32, 44 P.3d 742. "[T]he applicability of the statute of limitations and the discovery rules also involves a subsidiary factual determination — the point at which a person reasonably should know that he or she has suffered a legal injury." Id. We incorporate "a clearly erroneous standard of review for the subsidiary factual determination of when the plaintiffs should have known of their alleged legal injuries." Id.
¶ 9 Finally, Plaintiffs claim that the trial court's application of the statutes of limitation violated their rights guaranteed by the open courts, due process, equal protection, and trial by jury provisions of the Utah and United States Constitutions. Constitutional challenges to the application of statutes present questions of law, which we review for correctness. See State v. Green, 2004 UT 76, ¶ 42, 99 P.3d 820.
¶ 10 Notwithstanding the fact that the trial court identified the undisputed material facts and determined that, based upon those facts, Defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law, Plaintiffs argue that the court applied an incorrect legal standard when it considered Defendants' summary judgment motions. We conclude that the trial court did not apply an incorrect standard for summary judgment, which has been well established by rule. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c).
Plaintiffs argue that the standard applied by the trial court was whether Plaintiffs "would be entitled to present evidence at all in this matter." Plaintiffs have taken this language from the trial court's memorandum decision, wherein the trial court stated, "In reviewing these Motions to Dismiss, the [c]ourt has not looked at whether the [P]laintiffs would ultimately prevail if this matter were to be tried, but whether they would be entitled to present evidence at all in this matter."
¶ 12 Plaintiffs' claim is both unclear and without merit. First, Plaintiffs argue that the standard applied by the trial court runs contrary to the standard applied in cases granting motions to dismiss under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). However, the trial court clearly treated Defendants' motions as motions for summary judgment under rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; therefore, any references to the standards under rule 12(b)(6) are irrelevant.
¶ 13 Plaintiffs further argue that the standard applied by the trial court in a summary judgment context ignores the court's responsibility to view all the facts and reasonable inferences drawn from them in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Breiggar Props., L.C. v. H.E. Davis & Sons, Inc., 2002 UT 53, ¶ 2, 52 P.3d 1133. Assuming the language cited from the court's memorandum decision established the standard under which the court evaluated Defendants' motions, that language must be read together with the sentence that preceded it. In that sentence, the trial court recognized that "[P]laintiffs' [c]omplaint in this matter should not be dismissed unless it appears that the [P]laintiffs can prove no set of facts in support of their claims that would entitle them to relief." This standard is even higher than the standard argued by Plaintiffs and is not inconsistent with the standard set out in rule 56(c).
¶ 14 Plaintiffs also argue that the trial court failed to rule on their rule 56(f) motion and their motion to amend their complaint. However, under the facts and circumstances of this case, the trial court denied Plaintiffs' motions by necessary implication when it granted Defendants' motions for summary judgment. The subject matter of Plaintiffs' motions for discovery and to amend, their memoranda in...
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