Colson v. City of Alcoa
| Citation | 458 F.Supp.3d 887 |
| Decision Date | 30 April 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 3:16-CV-377,3:16-CV-377 |
| Parties | Annissa COLSON, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF ALCOA, el al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Tennessee |
Lance Kristopher Baker, The Baker Law Firm, Knoxville, TN, Thomas C. Jessee, Jessee & Jessee, Johnson City, TN, for Plaintiff.
Benjamin K. Lauderback, Brian Robert Bibb, Watson, Roach, Batson, Rowell & Lauderback PLC, Knoxville, TN, for Defendants City of Alcoa, Tennessee, Philip K. Potter, Keith Fletcher, Dustin Cook, Arik Wilson.
Craig L. Garrett, Craig L. Garrett, Attorney at Law PLLC, Maryville, TN, for Defendant Tennessee Blount County.
Gary M. Prince, Nathaniel Craig Strand, O'Neil, Parker & Williamson, Knoxville, TN, Craig L. Garrett, Craig L. Garrett, Attorney at Law PLLC, Maryville, TN, for Defendants James L. Berrong, Mandy England.
Matthew J. Anderson, Reid D. Leitner, Reid Leitner Law Group, PLLC, Nashville, TN, for Defendant Jennifer Russell.
This civil action is before the Court for consideration of the motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants Chief Philip K. Potter, Lieutenant Keith Fletcher, Officer Duston Cook, Officer Arik Wilson, and the City of Alcoa ("City Defendants") [doc. 128]. Plaintiff has responded [doc. 162], and the City Defendants have replied [doc. 173]. Oral argument is unnecessary, and the motion is ripe for the court's determination.
Plaintiff has filed suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986, and 1988, alleging, violations of her constitutional rights under the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiff also raises claims under Tennessee law for assault and battery, negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. For the reasons that follow, the motion will be granted in part and denied in part.
Plaintiff's lawsuit stems from her arrest by Officers Cook and Wilson, both of the Alcoa Police Department ("APD"), for driving under the influence ("DUI") and reckless endangerment. [Doc. 1 at 6-7]. At the scene of her initial arrest, Plaintiff consented to a blood alcohol test, and the officers drove her to Blount Memorial Hospital ("BMH") for the test. [Id. at 7]. However, once she arrived, she withdrew her consent, prompting the officers to instruct her to get back into the police cruiser. At that point, Plaintiff alleges, she began suffering from a panic attack, and asked the officers to let her breathe. The officers, however, believed that she was resisting their commands and responded by forcing her back into the vehicle. In the process, Officer Wilson pushed his knee into Plaintiff's knee, causing her knee to "pop." [Id. ]. Plaintiff alleges that, once she was inside the patrol vehicle, she was screaming in pain, and Officer Cook contacted his supervisor, Lieutenant Fletcher, for instructions about how to proceed. [Id. at 8]. Lieutenant Fletcher allegedly told the officers to take Plaintiff to the Blount County Jail where the staff nurse could check her knee and conduct a mandatory blood draw. [Id. at 8, 28]. The officers then took her to the Blount County Jail, where Plaintiff alleges that she suffered from numerous other abuses from the Blount County staff. Plaintiff alleges that after she was released from the jail she learned that she had suffered knee injuries
including a tibial plateau fracture, a torn ACL, and a torn LCL, as well as abrasions and bruises. [Id. at 10]. She also states that she experienced "substantial mental anguish." [Id. ].
Plaintiff specifically raised the following claims against the City Defendants:
[Id. at 36-60]. This Court dismissed all official-capacity claims against Chief Potter, Lieutenant Fletcher, Officer Cook, and Officer Wilson. [Doc. 79 at 31]. The Court also dismissed: (a) Count 4 as to Chief Potter and Lieutenant Fletcher; (b) Count 11 as to Officer Cook and Officer Wilson; and (c) Count 12 as to Alcoa, Chief Potter, and Lieutenant Fletcher. [Id. at 20, 23, 27]. In her response to the instant motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff explicitly states that she is abandoning Counts 4, 6, 10, and 11 in the entirety, and Count 9 as it relates to Chief Potter. [Doc. 162 at 5-6]. Accordingly, those claims will be dismissed, and the Court will address summary judgment as to the remaining claims.
The primary evidence in this case is the two video recordings from Officer Cook's body camera [Exhibits F and H]. The Court has reviewed the video evidence, and summarizes the events shown on the video as follows.
Officer Cook first arrives at the scene of an apparent accident, where a black SUV has been driven into a field off the side of a roadway, and left fender-first in a ditch, facing the roadway. A woman, later identified as Plaintiff, is sitting in the field behind the SUV. A man wearing a police badge around his neck, but not wearing a uniform, stands in the grass not far away from her. Officer Cook acknowledges him. "What's up?" Officer Cook says to him. "She's drunk" the off-duty officer says, pointing to the woman in the grass. The off-duty officer tells Officer Cook that he was driving on Springbrook Road earlier in the afternoon, saw the woman driving her vehicle—the same vehicle now lying in the ditch—and witnessed a boy jump from the vehicle and run into the grass adjacent to the road. According to the off-duty officer, the woman "gunned it" after the boy fled the vehicle, traversing off road, nearly hitting the boy, and crashing into the ditch. He states that the boy was Plaintiff's son, and informs Officer Cook that he is sitting safely in the officer's SUV, parked on the side of the road. He also hands Plaintiff's driver's license to Officer Cook, and Officer Cook radios for backup.
Officer Cook then approaches Plaintiff and asks what was going on, and she responds that she stopped to get her son and pulled off in a ditch. She states that her son was in the car and then ran out, and she followed him. When Officer Cook asks how much Plaintiff had drank that day, she states that she had "two shots" of vodka. Officer Cook then asks Plaintiff what medications she took, and she lists numerous medications, and states that there were numerous others, but does not specifically mention Klonopin
.
Officer Cook then goes to speak to Plaintiff's son, Mason, who is still sitting in the off-duty police officer's vehicle. Officer Cook asks Mason what happened, and Mason states that they were at the pool and his mom got "some ... something that makes her drunk ... alcohol," but he did not actually see her drink it. He states "I didn't know until she started cooking, I mean, not cooking, driving." Mason states that he pulled the emergency brake and ran away because his mom was "driving very fast" and he was afraid that they were going to crash.1
Officer Cook then begins setting up a sobriety test, by placing duct tape on the pavement. At that point, Officer Wilson arrives on the scene, and Officer Cook relays the information he had learned from Plaintiff, Mason, and the off-duty police officer (whom he refers to as "Opie"). When Officer Cook approaches Plaintiff again, she is talking to someone on her cell phone, and hands the phone to Officer Cook, to talk to her "friend." Officer Cook speaks to Plaintiff's friend for a moment and writes down the individual's phone number to return the call later. Officer Cook instructs Plaintiff to walk down in front of his car, and Plaintiff responds "no." Officer Cook then asks Plaintiff if she is willing to submit to sobriety tests and she responds "no, I'm not," and states "I was driving [unintelligible] I was buzzed." Plaintiff again confirms that she is refusing to submit to a sobriety test. Officer Cook then instructs Plaintiff to stand up and she refuses. Officer Cook informs her that she is under arrest for DUI, and Plaintiff yells back that her keys were not in her ignition. Officer Cook informs Plaintiff that it does not matter, and instructs her that, if she does not want to be charged with resisting arrest, to stand up and put her hands behind her back. Plaintiff continues to refuse, but ultimately relents when threatened again with a charge of resisting arrest. After she is handcuffed Officers Cook and Wilson tell Plaintiff that she is under arrest for DUI, and she repeatedly states that her keys were not in her ignition.
As Officer Cook escorts Plaintiff to his patrol vehicle, he asks Plaintiff if she is willing to submit to a blood alcohol test and she responds "no, I'm not willing to do anything for you because my keys were not in my ignition." The officers place Plaintiff in the backseat of a police cruiser, and get contact information for her mother, to come pick up Mason. Plaintiff continues to yell at the officers that her keys were not in the ignition, and begins swearing at the officers. Officer Cook then calls the district attorney to determine whether the situation would require a mandatory blood draw, and is informed that it is a mandatory blood draw. Officer Cook confirms that if Plaintiff does not consent to the blood draw, he should get a search warrant.
Lieutenant Fletcher then arrives on the scene, and...
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