Colt Industries, Inc. v. Finance Adm'r of City of New York
| Decision Date | 07 January 1982 |
| Citation | 54 N.Y.2d 533,430 N.E.2d 1290,446 N.Y.S.2d 237 |
| Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | , 430 N.E.2d 1290 In the Matter of COLT INDUSTRIES, INC., Appellant, v. FINANCE ADMINISTRATOR OF the CITY OF NEW YORK et al., Respondents. Robert Abrams, as Attorney-General of the State of New York, Intervenor- Respondent. In the Matter of EQUITABLE LIFE ASSURANCE SOCIETY OF THE UNITED STATES, Appellant, v. FINANCE ADMINISTRATOR OF the CITY OF NEW YORK et al., Respondents. Robert Abrams, as Attorney-General of the State of New York, Intervenor- Respondent. |
In Matter of Colt Inds. v. Finance Administrator of City of N. Y., the order of the Appellate Division, 81 A.D.2d 777, 439 N.Y.S.2d 24, should be modified by deleting therefrom all declarations as to the constitutionality or applicability of former section 307 and subdivision 3 of section 720 of the Real Property Tax Law and by reversing so much of the order as denied petitioner's motion for discovery of "special sales data listings" and remitting that motion to Supreme Court for further consideration and disposition in light of our decision in this case. As so modified, the order of the Appellate Division, should be affirmed and the consolidated proceedings remitted to Supreme Court. The question certified is answered in the negative.
In Matter of Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U. S. v. Finance Administrator of City of N. Y., the order of the Appellate Division, 81 A.D.2d 781, 441 N.Y.S.2d 385, should be modified to the extent of granting petitioner's motion to dismiss those defenses which rely on the New York City Administrative Code's purported authorization of a classified system of assessment. As so modified, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed. The question certified should be answered in the negative.
Section 166-1.0 of the Administrative Code of the City of New York governs the procedure for review of tax assessments in the City of New York. By its terms, taxpayers may challenge the assessed valuation of their property on the grounds that it is illegal, that it overvalues the property, or that "the assessment is erroneous by reason of inequality." That section further provides that inequality may be proven by showing that the assessment was "made at a higher proportionate valuation than the assessment or other real property of like character in the same ward or section, or other real property on the assessment rolls of the city for the same year". To hold, as the courts below have, that this procedural provision is legislative authorization for a classified system of assessments in the City of New York improperly expands the scope of the section. In these proceedings to challenge tax assessments on the ground of inequality, we have no occasion to reach and, therefore, do not address the contentions of the parties with respect to the methods or systems of assessments in New York City. Our attention is focused on assertions of inequality of actual assessments whatever the means or basis on which they were made. Thus, we hold that this section authorizes taxpayers who challenge the assessments of their real property to present proof of inequality based on either or both of two theories--that the particular assessment "has been made at a higher proportionate valuation than the assessment of other real property of like character in the same ward or section", or that the assessment "has been made at a higher proportionate valuation than the assessment of * * * other real property on the assessment rolls of the city for the same year." Thus, proof may be introduced to establish inequality with respect to property of similar character in the same ward or section or with respect to the city-wide assessment rolls. In continuing this proceeding, petitioner should be allowed to introduce either or both types of proof.
There remains the question whether, if it is sought to establish inequality with respect to city-wide assessment rolls, State equalization rates may be introduced. (Cf. Matter of Rokowsky v. Finance Administrator of City of N. Y., 41 N.Y.2d 574, 394 N.Y.S.2d 176, 362 N.E.2d 974; Guth Realty v. Gingold, 34 N.Y.2d 440, 358 N.Y.S.2d 367, 315 N.E.2d 441.) Legislative action taken over the past few years to restrict the use of such proof and considered by the courts below 1 expired on October 30, 1981 and accordingly now has no application to this proceeding.
On December 3, 1981, however, the Legislature passed S-7000A over the Governor's veto (L.1981, ch. ____). Section 7 of that bill contains a new subdivision 3 of section 720. 2 This new legislation contains no express provision for retroactive application as did the former law (L.1979, ch. 126, § 4; L.1979, ch. 127, § 3); it provides only, in section 17, that "this act shall take effect immediately". Accordingly to the extent that it is otherwise appropriate, it applies to proceedings pending on December 3, 1981.
We hold that this new subdivision 3 now applies to these proceedings. Although the proceedings were commenced prior to the enactment of S-7000A, no evidentiary hearings have yet been held or interlocutory determinations made as was the case in Matter of Slewett & Farber v. Board of Assessors of County of Nassau, 54 N.Y.2d 547, 446 N.Y.S.2d 241, 430 N.E.2d 1294. Accordingly, when such evidentiary hearings are held in these cases on remittal following this appeal, among other considerations to be taken into account in rulings with respect to the admissibility of evidence will be the provisions of new subdivision 3 of section 720.
We further consider, on the basis of postargument briefs submitted to this court after the enactment by the Legislature of S-7000A, the constitutionality of the new subdivision 3 of section 720 insofar as it is applicable to the litigation now before us. As did former subdivision 3, this section governs what evidence is admissible on the issue of whether an assessment is unequal. Data on selected parcels and actual sales are admissible as evidence to show an unequal assessment in all assessing units. Use of the State equalization rate, however, is limited to "all assessing units other than special assessing units." 3 The effect of this provision is to foreclose the use of State equalization rates in this type of proceeding in the City of New York and in Nassau County.
Petitioners claim that this is a restriction based on population and geographic area which violates their right to equal protection of the laws. They further claim that the excessive cost of proving a claim of unequal assessment associated with the remaining two methods of proof essentially bars them from seeking any redress and, therefore, constitutes a violation of their due process rights. Recognizing that subdivision 3 of section 720 is procedural in nature, we hold this section of the Real Property Tax Law, as enacted on December 3, 1981, to be constitutional.
The core of petitioners' equal protection claim is that the Legislature, by allowing the use of State equalization rates as proof of the ratio between assessed and full value in all parts of the State but the City of New York and Nassau County, makes an impermissible distinction between geographic areas of the...
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