Colton T. P. v. Kijakazi
| Docket Number | 4:22-cv-00254-DCN-CWD |
| Decision Date | 17 April 2023 |
| Parties | COLTON T. P.,[1]Plaintiff, v. KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner of Social Security Administration,[2]Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Idaho |
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff filed a Complaint[3]with the Court seeking judicial review of the Commissioner's denial of his application for supplemental security income benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. (Dkt. 1.) The matter has been referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), and is fully briefed. (Dkt. 8.) Plaintiff argues that the residual functional capacity (RFC) is not supported by substantial evidence, because the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) did not reconcile his finding that Plaintiff had moderate limitations in concentration, persistence or pace with his conclusion that Plaintiff could perform work consisting of simple and routine tasks.
Having carefully reviewed the parties' memoranda and the entire administrative record (AR), the Court will recommend that the decision of the Commissioner be affirmed for the reasons set forth below.
On August 14, 2020, Plaintiff protectively filed an application for supplemental security income benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act claiming disability beginning May 30 2018. (AR 127 - 128, 276 - 283.) The application was denied initially and on reconsideration, and a telephonic hearing was held on November 12, 2021, before ALJ Stephen Marchioro. (AR 101 - 126.) At the hearing, Plaintiff amended the alleged disability onset date to August 14, 2020. (AR 85.)
After considering testimony from Plaintiff and a vocational expert the ALJ issued a written decision on January 12, 2022, finding Plaintiff had not been under a disability since the alleged onset date of August 14, 2020, through the date of the written decision, and therefore found Petitioner was not disabled. (AR 85 - 94.) Plaintiff timely requested review by the Appeals Council, which denied his request for review on April 20, 2022. (AR 1 - 6.)
Plaintiff timely appealed this final decision to the Court on June 20, 2022. (Dkt. 1.) The Court has jurisdiction to review the ALJ's decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
The Court will uphold an ALJ's decision unless: (1) the decision is based on legal error, or (2) the decision is not supported by substantial evidence. Revels v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 648, 654 (9th Cir. 2017). Substantial evidence is “‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S.Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). This requires “more than a mere scintilla” of evidence. Id.
The Court must consider the administrative record as a whole. Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1009 (9th Cir. 2014). It must weigh both the evidence that supports, and the evidence that does not support, the ALJ's conclusion. Id.
If the ALJ's decision is based on a rational interpretation of conflicting evidence, the Court will uphold the ALJ's finding. Carmickle v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1165 (9th Cir. 2008). It is unnecessary for the ALJ to “discuss all evidence presented.” Vincent on Behalf of Vincent v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1393, 1394-95 (9th Cir. 1984) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). The ALJ must, however, explain why “significant probative evidence has been rejected.” Id.
When evaluating the evidence presented at an administrative hearing, the ALJ must follow a five step sequential process in determining whether a person is disabled, or continues to be disabled, within the meaning of the Social Security Act. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520, 404.1594, 416.920, 416.994.[4] At step one, the ALJ found Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since August 14, 2020. (AR 87.) At step two, the ALJ found Plaintiff had the following medically determinable, severe impairments: “post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), anxiety disorder, depressive disorder, and obesity.” (AR 87.)
At step three of the sequential process, the ALJ considers whether a claimant's impairment or combination of impairments meets or medically equals the criteria of an impairment listed in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (“Appendix 1”). 20 CFR §§ 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926. Here, the ALJ found Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments which met or were medically equal to Listings 12.04 (Depressive, bipolar and related disorders); 12.06 (Anxiety and obsessive- compulsive disorders); and 12.15 (Trauma- and stressor-related disorders). (AR 88 - 90.) In making this finding, the ALJ explained he considered whether the “paragraph B” criteria were satisfied. The paragraph B criteria consist of the following four areas of mental functioning:
(AR 88 - 98.) In each of the four areas of functioning, the ALJ assessed “moderate limitations.” Id.
At step four, the ALJ concluded Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform light work, as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b), except for the following limitations:
[H]e can only occasionally climb ramps and stairs, but never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; he can only occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl; and he must avoid all exposure to unguarded moving mechanical parts and unprotected heights. The claimant is limited to work consisting of only simple, routine tasks. The claimant is limited to work involving no more than occasional changes in the work setting. He is limited to no more than occasional interaction with the public, coworkers, and supervisors. Finally, the claimant is able to tolerate only occasional independent goal setting.
(AR 90.) Relying upon testimony from the vocational expert, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had no past relevant work, but he would be able to make a successful adjustment to other work existing in significant numbers in the national economy. (AR 93.)
At step five, the ALJ found Plaintiff retained the RFC to perform the requirements of representative occupations such as assembler, power screwdriver operator, or mail clerk, all of which are unskilled positions at the light exertional level. (AR 94.) The ALJ therefore determined Plaintiff was not under a disability since August 14, 2020. (AR 94.)
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ's RFC finding that Plaintiff “is limited to work consisting of only simple, routine tasks” is unexplained, and also does not account for the ALJ's conclusion at step three that Plaintiff had moderate limitations in concentration, persistence or pace. Accordingly, Plaintiff asserts the hypothetical question posed by the ALJ to the vocational expert did not include all of the Plaintiff's limitations, resulting in an erroneous RFC. (Dkt. 16.)
Defendant disagrees, contending that the ALJ adequately discussed the evidence and that the limitation to work consisting of simple, routine tasks incorporated the ALJ's findings regarding moderate limitations in concentration, persistence, or pace. (Dkt. 17 at 4.) Defendant argues the hypothetical question posed to the vocational expert included all of Plaintiff's limitations, and that, in turn, the RFC was supported by substantial evidence and free from error. (Dkt. 17 at 5.)
A claimant's RFC is an assessment of a person's ability to do sustained work-related physical and mental activities in a work setting on a regular and continuing basis-in other words, what a person can still do despite his limitations. See SSR 96-8P. In assessing a claimant's RFC, the ALJ must consider all of the relevant evidence in the case record, including information about the individual's symptoms and any “medical source statements” submitted by a person's treating source or other acceptable medical sources. See id.
The ALJ must include all restrictions in the hypothetical question posed to the vocational expert and in the RFC based on all the relevant evidence in the case record. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545, 416.945; Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 756 (9th Cir. 1989); Lubin v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 507 F.app'x 709, 712 (9th Cir. 2013). Where the medical testimony does not establish any specific restrictions based on a claimant's difficulty with concentration, persistence, or pace, the ALJ does not err in adopting the physician's limitation to simple tasks. See Stubbs-Danielson, 539 F.3d at 1173 (9th Cir. 2008) ().
In Stubbs-Danielson (relied upon by Defendant), the claimant's physician identified her as having “slow pace, both in thinking [and] actions,” but nonetheless opined that claimant was still able to “carry-out simple tasks.” Stubbs-Danielson, 539 F.3d at 1173. In turn, the ALJ “translated” the physician's conclusions regarding the claimant's pace and mental limitations into her RFC by limiting her to “simple tasks.” Id. at 1174. In affirming the district court's denial of the claimant's application for disability benefits, the Ninth Circuit emphasized that, in “translating” the physician's conclusions, the ALJ relied on “the only concrete restriction” available to him: the limitation to “simple tasks.” Id. The court held that the ALJ's assessment as to the claimant's concentration, persistence, and pace was adequately incorporated into her RFC because the “assessment [was]...
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