Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC v. 14.96 Acres

• Decision Date: 16 June 2015
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:14-cv-27773
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of West Virginia
• Parties: COLUMBIA GAS TRANSMISSION, LLC, Plaintiff, v. 14.96 ACRES, MORE OR LESS, IN LOGAN COUNTY, et al., Defendant.

COLUMBIA GAS TRANSMISSION, LLC, Plaintiff, v. 14.96 ACRES, MORE OR LESS, IN LOGAN COUNTY, et al., Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:14-cv-27773

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA CHARLESTON DIVISION

June 16, 2015

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion to Strike (the "Motion"). (ECF 12.) For the reasons discussed herein, the Court construes the Motion as a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and GRANTS the Motion.

I. Background

This action arises out of Plaintiff's failed attempts to acquire temporary and permanent easements on Defendants' land. Plaintiff "is an interstate natural gas company as defined by Section 717a(6) of the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717 et. seq." (ECF 13 at 1.) Defendants "are record owners of that certain parcel of real property located in Logan County, West Virginia, identified as Parcel Identification No. 03-144-0077, as is more particularly described in a deed recorded in the land records of Logan County, West Virginia in Deed Book 610, at Page 998, comprising 14.47 acres, more or less" (the "Property"). (ECF 1 ¶ 7.)

On November 7, 2014, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in Condemnation¹ seeking a judgment order of taking by eminent domain granting Plaintiff permanent and temporary easements on the Property in order for Plaintiff to construct or later relocate a pipeline, as well as "to conduct all activities incident thereto."² (ECF 1 at 5-7.) Plaintiff alleges that it "negotiated with [Defendants] and made bona fide efforts to acquire the necessary easements by agreement but [was] unable to obtain any such rights by contract, or to agree with [Defendants] upon the compensation to be paid." (Id. ¶ 36.)

Defendants filed their answer to the Complaint in Condemnation on January 9, 2015. (ECF 10.) Defendants' answer includes a counterclaim against Plaintiff. (Id. at 7-9.) The counterclaim does not contest Plaintiff's authority to seek a judgment order of taking by eminent domain for easements on the Property. (See id.) Instead, Defendants' counterclaim requests the following relief: (1) "just compensation of the property to be taken;" (2) "reasonable royalties for pipingand/or transporting natural gas across [Defendants'] property;" (3) a judgment against Plaintiff "for annoyance and inconvenience as a direct and proximate result of [Plaintiff's] actions;" (4) a judgment against Plaintiff "for such other harms, losses and general damages that may exist;" (5) "post-judgment interest on [Defendants'] special damages;" and (6) "attorney's fees and costs in pursuing this action as equity requires." (Id. at 9.)

Plaintiff filed the Motion on January 30, 2015. (ECF 12.) In the Motion, Plaintiff argues that the Court should strike Defendants' counterclaim because it is procedurally improper under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 71.1(e) and the case law interpreting that rule. (See ECF 13.) To date, Plaintiff has not filed a responsive brief to the Motion. As such, the Motion is ready for disposition.

II. Discussion

Plaintiff argues that the Court should strike Defendants' counterclaim to the Complaint in Condemnation pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f). (ECF 13.) Rule 12(f) provides, in relevant part, that "[t]he court may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." Plaintiff does not argue that the Court should strike Defendants' counterclaim based on any of the grounds provided in Rule 12(f). (See ECF 13.) Rather, Plaintiff argues that the counterclaim is "impermissible" and "procedurally invalid" because "[f]ederal courts have held that an answer is the only permissible filing in response to a condemnation action." (Id. at 2-4.) As such, Plaintiff's motion actually seeks dismissal of Defendant's counterclaim based on the argument that it is precluded as a matter of law. (See id.); cf. Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 2010)(construing a motion to strike pleadings on the basis that the sought-after damages "are precluded as a matter of law" as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)).

"A motion to strike 'is neither an authorized nor proper way to procure the dismissal of all or a part of . . . a counterclaim.'" Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Berck, Civil Action No. DKC 09-0578, 2010 WL 3294305, at *2 (D. Md. Aug. 20, 2010) (citing 5C Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1382 (3d ed. 2004)); e.g., GTSI Corp. v. Wildflower Int'l, Inc., No. 1:09cv123 (JCC), 2009 WL 2160451, at *4 (E.D. Va. July 17, 2009) (citation omitted); Oracle v. DrugLogic, Inc., 807 F. Supp. 2d 885, 896 (N.D. Cal. 2011); see, e.g., Whittlestone, Inc., 618 F.3d at 974-75 (holding "that Rule 12(f) does not authorize district courts to strike claims for damages on the ground that such claims are precluded as a matter of law"). But see Constitution Pipeline Co. v. A Permanent Easement for 2.40 Acres, No. 3:14-CV-2046, 2015 WL 1726223, at *1-2 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2015) (finding that the defendant's counterclaim in a condemnation action was procedurally improper under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 71.1(e)(3) and therefore granting the plaintiff's motion to strike the counterclaim). Nonetheless, "where a motion is in substance a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, but is incorrectly denominated as a Rule 12(f) motion, a court may convert the improperly designated Rule 12(f) motion into a Rule 12(b)(6) motion." Consumer Solutions REO, LLC v. Hillery, 658 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1021 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2009). As Plaintiff's Motion seeks dismissal of Defendants' counterclaim based on the argument that it is precluded by law, the Court will construe the Motion to Strike as a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See, e.g., Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 2010 WL 3294305, at *2 (construing a motion to strike a counterclaim—which sought to procure the dismissal of the counterclaim—as a motion to dismiss).

In addressing a motion to dismiss a counterclaim, the Court "applies the same standard of review that would be applied to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss a complaint." First Data Merch. Servs. Corp. v. SecurityMetrics, Inc., Civil Action No. RDB-12-2568, 2013 WL 6234598, at *3 (D. Md. Nov. 13, 2013) (citations omitted); see, e.g., Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Chapman, Civil Action No. 3:13-27225, 2014 WL 2534901, at *1-2 (S.D. W. Va. June 5, 2014); Marfork Coal Co. v. Smith, Civil Action No. 5:10-cv-00069, 2011 WL 744727, at *2 (S.D. W. Va. Feb. 23, 2011). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Allegations "must be simple, concise, and direct" and "[n]o technical form is required." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1). A motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a pleading. See Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999). "[I]t does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses." Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992) (citing 5A C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1356 (1990)).

"To survive a motion to dismiss, a [pleading] must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, 'to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A court decides whether this standard is met by separating the legal conclusions from the factual allegations, assuming the truth of only the factual allegations, and then determining whether those allegations allow the court to reasonably infer that "the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. A motion to dismiss will be granted if, "after accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the plaintiff's [pleading] as true and drawing all reasonable factual inferences from those facts in the plaintiff'sfavor, it appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claim entitling him to relief." Edwards, 178 F.3d at 244.

Plaintiff argues that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 71.1 prohibits Defendant from filing a counterclaim in this condemnation proceeding. (ECF 13.) The Court agrees.

Rule 71.1 "govern[s] proceedings to condemn real and personal property by eminent domain." Fed. R. Civ. P. 71.1(a); see also S. Natural Gas Co. v. Land, Cullman Cnty., 197 F.3d 1368, 1375 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding "that the practices and procedures of federal eminent domain actions . . . are governed by" Rule 71.1 and stating that this rule supersedes the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h) and state law). "The purpose of Rule 71.1 is to provide for a uniform procedure for condemnation in the federal courts." N. Natural Gas Co. v. Approximately 9117.53 Acres in Pratt, Kingman, & Reno Counties, Kan., No. 10-1232-WEB, 2011 WL 2118642, at *3 (D. Kan. May 27, 2011) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 71.1 advisory committee's note (1951)). Rule 71.1 states the following, in relevant part, regarding a defendant's permissible answers to a complaint in condemnation:

A defendant waives all objections and defenses not stated in its answer. No other pleading or motion asserting an additional objection or defense is allowed. But at the trial on compensation, a defendant--whether or not it has previously appeared or answered--may present evidence on the amount of compensation to be paid and may share in the award.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 71.1(e)(3). The "prohibition of other pleadings" in Rule 71.1(e) "clearly had, as its purpose, an early joinder of issue and the elimination of the possibility of extended delay through the presentation of preliminary pleadings with resultant hearings and orders." Atl. Seaboard Corp. v. Van Sterkenburg, 318 F.2d 455, 458 (4th Cir. 1963) (discussing the precursor rule to ...