Columbia Insurance Co. v. Masonheimer

• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: Williams
• Citation: Columbia Insurance Co. v. Masonheimer, 76 Pa. 138 (Pa. 1874)
• Decision Date: 02 July 1874
• Parties: Columbia Insurance Company <I>versus</I> Masonheimer.

76 Pa. 138

Columbia Insurance Company versus Masonheimer.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

May 13, 1874.

July 2, 1874.

May 13th 1874.

Before AGNEW, C. J., SHARSWOOD, WILLIAMS, MERCUR and GORDON, JJ.

Error to the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland county: No. 54, to May Term 1874.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

J. Ritner, for plaintiffs in error.—The secretary of a company is not presumed to have authority to bind the company; it must be shown: Williams v. Chester, &c., Railway, 5 Eng. L. & Eq. 497; Baxter v. Chelsea Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 1 Allen 294.

J. Hays, for defendant in error.

Mr. Justice WILLIAMS delivered the opinion of the court, July 2d 1874.

The secretary was the proper organ of communication between the company and the defendant, as the assignee and holder of one of its policies, and it was clearly within the scope of his authority to inform the defendant of its cancellation for the failure of the assignor to comply with the condition upon which it was issued, and for the non-performance of which the company had reserved the right to cancel it. If the policy was in fact cancelled, there can be no recovery of the assessments on the premium-note given by the defendant. It was wholly without consideration, if the contract of insurance was rescinded, after the assignment of the policy, for the non-payment of a previous assessment by the assignor. No question is made in regard to the right of the company to cancel the policy, but it is contended that it was not in fact cancelled, and that the letter of the secretary, taken in its broadest sense, does not declare that the company had cancelled the policy, but only that they had power to do it if they chose to exercise it. There can be no doubt, as already suggested, that the letter of the secretary was within the scope of his official authority, and that it is binding on the company, whether they expressly authorized it or not. The only question then is whether it admits of the construction put upon it by the defendant. It is true that it does not assert in express terms that the company have cancelled the policy for the non-payment of the assessment, but is not this the obvious meaning and import of its language? If it was not intended that the defendant should understand that the policy was cancelled, why was he informed that "the company cancel all policies on which the assessment is not paid in thirty days after the same is called for"? And why was he told "if you have paid the agent you...