Columbia Motors Co. v. Ada County

• Decision Date: 30 June 1926
• Citation: 247 P. 786,42 Idaho 678
• Parties: THE COLUMBIA MOTORS COMPANY, a Corporation, Appellant, v. THE COUNTY OF ADA of the STATE OF IDAHO, Respondent
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

247 P. 786

42 Idaho 678

THE COLUMBIA MOTORS COMPANY, a Corporation, Appellant, v. THE COUNTY OF ADA of the STATE OF IDAHO, Respondent

Supreme Court of Idaho

June 30, 1926

INTERSTATE COMMERCE-DUTY OF CARRIER WHERE CONSIGNEE REFUSES TO RECEIVE GOODS-CONTRACT OF TRANSPORTATION.

1. Where shipment of automobiles in interstate commerce with title remaining in consignor was refused by consignee and placed in warehouse by carrier in its own name, interstate character of shipment ceased, justifying state tax thereon despite Const., U.S. , art. 1, sec. 8.

2. On failure or refusal of consignee to receive goods, carrier must store goods in own warehouses, or that of responsible third party, and hold them subject to order of consignor whereupon its relation to goods becomes that of warehouseman.

3. Contract of transportation is presumed made with knowledge of duty of common carrier to store goods in warehouses after refusal of delivery by consignee.

APPEAL from the District Court of the Third Judicial District, for Ada County. Hon. Raymond L. Givens, Judge.

Action to recover taxes paid on automobiles claimed to be exempt as a shipment of goods in interstate commerce. Judgment for Defendant. Affirmed.

Judgment affirmed with costs to the respondent.

J. R Smead, for Appellant.

State legislation of any sort constituting a regulation of, or placing a burden on, interstate commerce, or executive acts thereunder operating to the same effect, are invalid because forbidden by the federal constitution. (Cooley, Taxation, p 152; Parks Bros. v. Nez Perce County, 13 Idaho 298, 121 Am. St. 261, 12 Ann. Cas. 1113, 89 P. 949; In re Kinyon, 9 Idaho 642, 2 Ann. Cas. 699, 75 P. 268; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. (U. S.) 1, 6 L.Ed. 23; State Freight Tax, 15 Wall. (U. S.) 232, 21 L.Ed. 146; Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. (U. S.) 419, 6 L.Ed. 678; The License Cases, 5 How. (U. S.) 504, 599, 12 L.Ed. 256, 299; Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 10 S.Ct. 681, 34 L.Ed. 128; Bowman v. Chicago N.W. R. Co., 125 U.S. 465, 8 S.Ct. 689, 31 L.Ed. 700.)

Where the transportation is by carrier, the goods become an interstate shipment when delivered to the carrier, and remain such until they have been transported and delivered at the other end of the journey. (Coe v. Errol, 116 U.S. 517, 6 S.Ct. 475, 29 L.Ed. 715; Judson, Taxation, sec. 135; Adams Exp. Co. v. Kentucky, 214 U.S. 218, 29 S.Ct. 633, 53 L.Ed. 972; Rhodes v. Iowa 170 U.S. 412, 18 S.Ct. 664, 42 L.Ed. 1088; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. F. W. Cook Brg. Co., 223 U.S. 70, 32 S.Ct. 189, 56 L.Ed. 355; State v. Adams Exp. Co., 171 Ind. 138, 85 N.E. 337, 19 L. R. A., N. S., 93; Ogilvie v. Crawford Co., 7 F. 745; 2 McCrary, 148; State v. Carrigan, 39 N.J.L. 35.)

Control of the property by the owner or someone other than the carrier, or the contrary, is the test by which to determine whether goods placed with a carrier for shipment still retain their interstate character and are so exempt from state taxation. (American Steel & Wire Co. v. Speed, 192 U.S. 500, 519, 521, 522, 24 S.Ct. 365, 48 L.Ed. 538, 546, 547; Wrought Iron Range Co. v. Rich, 32 Idaho 453, 184 P. 627; Bacon v. Illinois, 227 U.S. 504, 33 S.Ct. 299, 57 L.Ed. 615; Susquehanna Coal Co. v. South Amboy, 228 U.S. 665, 33 S.Ct. 712, 57 L.Ed. 1015; General Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211, 28 S.Ct. 475, 52 L.Ed. 754; Texas Co. v. Brown, 258 U.S. 466, 42 S.Ct. 375, 66 L.Ed. 721.)

Delay not caused by the consignor does not change the character of the interstate shipment, nor does delay occurring incidentally to carrying out the consignment. (Coe v. Errol, supra: Kelly v. Rhodes, supra; State v. Engle, 34 N.J.L. 425; State v. Carrigan, supra; Ogilvie v. Crawford, supra; State v. Cumberland & P. R. Co., 40 Md. 22.)

Laurel E. Elam and Carl A. Burke, for Respondent.

Property is only exempt from taxation while in actual transit and if delayed for other than natural causes or lack of transportation can be lawfully taxed by state authorities. (Susquehanna Coal Co. v. South Amboy, 228 U.S. 665, 33 S.Ct. 712, 57 L.Ed. 1015; Bacon v. Illinois, 277 U.S. 504, 33 S.Ct. 299, 57 L.Ed. 615; General Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211, 28 S.Ct. 475, 52 L.Ed. 754; Logan v. Brown, 125 Tenn. 209, 141 S.W. 751; State v. Maxwell Motor Sales Co., 142 Minn. 226, 171 N.W. 566; McCutcheon v. Board of Equalization, 87 N.J.L. 370, 94 A. 310; 5 R. C. L. 707.)

Storage of property by railroad company on account of consignee's refusal to accept delivery is not due to natural causes or lack of transportation. Such action amounts to a constructive delivery to the consignor and terminates the function of carrier. (4 R. C. L., p. 760, sec. 226, p. 761, sec. 228, p. 830, sec. 284, p. 763, sec. 229; State v. Intoxicating Liquor, 94 Me. 335, 47 A. 531; In re Kinyon, 9 Idaho 642, 75 P. 268, 2 Ann. Cas. 699; Parks Bros. & Co. v. Nez Perce County, 13 Idaho 298, 121 Am. St. 261, 12 Ann. Cas. 1113, 89 P. 949; Wrought Iron Range Co. v. Rich, 32 Idaho 453, 184 P. 627; Carriers, 10 C. J. 269.)

TERRELL, District Judge. William A. Lee, C. J., and Wm. E. Lee and Taylor, JJ., and Varian, Dist. Judge, concur.

OPINION

TERRELL. District Judge.

--This is an action to recover the sum of $ 1,087.45 with interest at the lawful rate from November 1, 1921, paid (under protest) as a tax on certain automobiles.

The case was submitted to the lower court upon a stipulation that the allegations of the amended complaint, other than paragraph five thereof, were true and might be considered as the facts in the case. The lower court rendered and entered judgment in favor of the respondent. From this judgment appeal is taken.

Omitting certain formal allegations, the salient facts of the amended complaint are as follows: that plaintiff was at all times mentioned in the amended complaint a manufacturer of automobiles and dealt in the same at wholesale, but did not deal in automobiles at retail either at Boise, or at any other point in Idaho; that in the latter part of 1920 plaintiff caused to be shipped by common carrier certain automobiles from some point in the state of Michigan to an automobile dealer at Boise, who had ordered said automobiles and had agreed to accept delivery of same and pay a draft for the purchase price of said cars accompanying the bill of lading as a condition precedent to delivery; that upon the arrival of said cars at Boise, in the latter part of the year 1920, the said automobile dealer, the consignee of said cars, without giving notice to plaintiff, refused to pay said draft or freight charges thereon; that said automobile dealer continued to refuse to pay said purchase price of said automobiles and freight charges; that thereupon the Oregon Short Line Railroad Company caused the automobiles to be unloaded from the railroad cars and stored them in warehouses in Boise, in its own name, and took warehouse receipts therefor; that in the early part of the year 1921 while the cars were in said warehouses and while plaintiff was endeavoring to deliver them to consignee and procure payment of the purchase price and freight charges, without being able to do so, the assessor of Ada county assessed said automobiles for the purpose of taxation, and levied a tax against the same for the year 1921, in reliance upon the laws of the state of Idaho; that on or about November 1, 1921, after having petitioned the board of county commissioners of Ada county to cancel said taxes, and their refusal so to do, plaintiff paid said tax so levied, under protest that the tax was illegal; that thereafter plaintiff presented a claim to the board of county commissioners of Ada county for the amount of the tax so paid, which claim was rejected; that said cars on or about May 1, 1922, were sold by plaintiff for shipment to Portland, Oregon, and that the purchaser thereof on his own account, without any suggestion from plaintiff, decided to put them on sale in Idaho, and did so.

Appellant makes nine assignments of error, all of which relate to one question of law, and may be reduced to the following: That the court erred in holding that the automobiles in question were not a shipment of goods in interstate commerce but were subject to be assessed and levied upon for taxes in the state of Idaho, and rendering and entering judgment in favor of respondent.

If, as contended by counsel for appellant, the automobiles in question were still in interstate commerce at the time of the assessment and levy complained of, manifestly the said tax so levied would be illegal as being in contravention of article 1 of section 8 of the constitution of the United States, commonly known as the "commerce clause," and the judicial construction placed thereon, to the effect that a state may not unduly burden or restrict interstate commerce, which obviously such a tax would do, and the judgment of the lower court, could not stand.

On the contrary, if the said automobiles were not in interstate commerce at the time of said assessment and levy, the facts in the record of this case, aided by other facts judicially noticed, such as the powers and duties of a duly qualified and acting county assessor under the laws of the state of Idaho, would amply support the judgment of the lower court.

The sole question, therefore, presented by the record in this case is whether the automobiles in question in the warehouses in the city of Boise, under the circumstances hereinbefore set forth, were still a shipment of merchandise in interstate commerce when the assessor of Ada county assessed them for taxation and levied a tax thereon in the early part of 1921.

While counsel for appellant has discussed a number of points and authorities dealing with some one or another phase of interstate commerce not in point in this case, we assume that these were intended to...