Columbia School Supply Company v. Lewis

Decision Date11 May 1917
Docket Number9,791
Citation116 N.E. 1,65 Ind.App. 339
PartiesCOLUMBIA SCHOOL SUPPLY COMPANY v. LEWIS
CourtIndiana Appellate Court

Rehearing denied October 9, 1917.

From the Industrial Board of Indiana.

Proceedings for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Charles Lewis against the Columbia School Supply Company. From an award for applicant, the defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

McKay Turner & Merrill, for appellant.

Willard Robertson, for appellee

OPINION

IBACH, P. J.

This is an appeal from the award of the full board rendered on review.

The finding of facts filed with the award are as follows "On the 8th day of July, 1916, plaintiff was in the employment of the defendant at an average weekly wage not exceeding $ 10; that on said date he received a personal injury by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, resulting in the total, permanent loss of the entire vision of his right eye; that the defendant had actual knowledge of the plaintiff's accident and injury on the day of its occurrence."

In addition to the facts above set out the undisputed evidence shows that appellee had an agreement with the appellant to do hauling for it. He was to furnish his own horse and the company was to pay him seventy-five cents a load to haul down to the depot and fifty cents for hauling to Twenty-First street and thirty cents an hour for hauling around the factory. He was hauling sheet metal around the factory on a single wagon and was pulling in the driveway between two buildings on the premises of the appellant when something was whisked through the air and struck him in the eye. Appellee hauled whenever there was anything to haul. Part of the time he used his own wagon and part of the time the company's wagon. At the time he was injured he was using his own wagon and horse. His wagon had a sign "Transfer" on one side and another sign "Charles Lewis Transfer" on the other side. Appellee had others drive his wagon at times. He was required to report at appellant's factory each morning about seven o'clock. "If there was any hauling to do I hauled and if there was not I went back home." Appellee was not to haul for any definite period and could have been discharged at any time. Appellee worked for others after hours. There is other evidence tending to show that appellant had the right, under the employment, to tell appellee "to quit, what to do, and how to do it."

The only...

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