Columbia Sussex Mgmt., LLC v. City of Santa Monica
| Decision Date | 28 August 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:19-CV-09991-ODW (SKx) |
| Citation | 482 F.Supp.3d 1002 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of California |
| Parties | COLUMBIA SUSSEX MANAGEMENT, LLC, and CW Hotel Limited Partnership, individually and on behalf of all other hotel owners and managers operating hotels in Santa Monica, California, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF SANTA MONICA, Defendant. |
Diana L. Dowell, Peter B. Maretz, Stokes Wagner ALC, Los Angeles, CA, Jamie Lee Santos, Stokes Wagner, San Diego, CA, George M. Vinci, Jr., Pro Hac Vice, Neal R. Troum, Pro Hac Vice, Spector Gadon Rosen Vinci PC, Philadelphia, PA, for Plaintiffs.
Kirsten R. Galler, George S. Cardona, Santa Monica City Attorneys Office, Santa Monica, CA, for Defendant.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT [42]
Defendant City of Santa Monica ("Defendant" or "City") moves to dismiss Plaintiffs Columbia Sussex Management, LLC, and CW Hotel Limited Partnership's ("Plaintiffs") Second Amended Complaint ("SAC") (the "Motion"). (See Mot., ECF No. 42.) Plaintiffs opposed and the City replied. (See Opp'n to Mot. ("Opp'n"), ECF No. 44; Reply, ECF No. 47.) With the Court's permission, Plaintiffs filed a surreply in opposition to the Motion. (See Surreply, ECF No. 51.) For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS the City's Motion.1
On September 10, 2019, the Santa Monica City Council adopted Santa Monica Municipal Code ("SMMC") Chapter 4.67, including section 4.67.030(a) (the "Ordinance" or "Workload Limitation Provision"), with the stated purpose "to Enhance Protection of Hotel Workers in the Local Hospitality Industry." (SAC ¶¶ 1, 18, ECF No. 39.) Entitled "Measures to Provide Fair Compensation for Workload," the Workload Limitation Provision prevents hotel employees who clean guest rooms ("Room Attendants") from cleaning more than a specified square footage of floor space during their scheduled shift without receiving additional compensation. (SAC ¶ 20 (quoting the Workload Limitation Provision).) At hotels with fewer than forty rooms, Room Attendants may not be required to clean more than 4000 square feet in an eight-hour workday without additional pay. SMMC § 4.67.030(a). At hotels with forty or more rooms, Room Attendants may not be required to clean more than 3500 square feet in an eight-hour workday without additional pay. Id. If a Room Attendant is required to exceed these limits, the hotel employer must compensate the Room Attendant at twice the regular rate of pay for all hours worked in that workday. Id. The Workload Limitation Provision may be waived "pursuant to a bona fide collective bargaining agreement." Id. § 4.67.110.
Chapter 4.67 became effective on January 1, 2020. Id. § 4.67.130. Any person who violates provisions of Chapter 4.67, including the Workload Limitation Provision, is liable for actual damages or for statutory damages including a $100 penalty per employee, per day, with treble penalties for willful violations. Id. § 4.67.120(c). Chapter 4.67 also provides hotel employees a private right of action to seek damages and recover penalties for alleged violations, attorneys’ fees, and costs if they are the prevailing party in a civil action. Id. § 4.67.120(d). Plaintiffs estimate they will spend roughly $1 million annually on additional Room Attendant labor costs and administrative costs to monitor compliance with the Workload Limitation Provision, and these expenses will trickle down to "predominantly out-of-state" hotel guests leading to fewer repeat customers and lost revenue. (SAC ¶¶ 29–31.)
In enacting this Ordinance, the Santa Monica City Council sought to "ensur[e] that hotel workers receive fair compensation when their work assignments exceed proscribed limits" and "promote the public interest [by] enabl[ing] hotel workers to receive fair pay for honest work, to perform their work in a manner that adequately protects their personal wellbeing, and to meet personal and family obligations." (SAC Ex. 2 ("Ordinance") 2, ECF No. 39-2.) The city council stressed that, "given that tourism is one of the largest industries in the City and in the entire region, establishing the foregoing safety and security measures [and] fair compensation ... for hotel workers will not only improve worker safety and working conditions, but also benefit the local and regional economy overall, and thereby promote the public health, safety, and welfare." (Ordinance 3.)
On November 21, 2019, Plaintiffs filed this class action lawsuit on behalf of "all of the other 40 hotels located within Santa Monica," challenging the validity of portions of the Ordinance. (SAC ¶ 62; see also Compl., ECF No. 1; First Am. Compl., ECF No 4.) Specifically, Plaintiffs assert five causes of action for: (1) declaratory relief; (2) Machinists preemption under the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. ("NLRA"); (3) violation of the dormant Commerce Clause ("DCC"); (4) preemption under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 651 et seq. ("OSHA") and the California Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1973, Cal. Lab. Code § 6300 et seq. ("CalOSHA"); and (5) violation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (SAC ¶¶ 64–78.)
On December 2, 2019, Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent the Workload Limitation Provision from going into effect in January 2020 as scheduled. (See Mot. Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 24.) On December 18, 2019, the Court denied Plaintiffs’ request for preliminary injunctive relief because Plaintiffs failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits or irreparable harm. (See Prelim. Inj. Order 14, ECF No. 34.) The City now moves to dismiss the SAC in its entirety arguing that Plaintiffs’ federal claims lack merit and requesting that the Court decline supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ remaining state claim. (See generally Mot.)
A court may dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) for lack of a cognizable legal theory or insufficient facts pleaded to support an otherwise cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't , 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). To survive a dismissal motion, a complaint need only satisfy the minimal notice pleading requirements of Rule 8(a)(2)—a short and plain statement of the claim. Porter v. Jones , 319 F.3d 483, 494 (9th Cir. 2003). The factual "allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). That is, the complaint must "contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The determination of whether a complaint satisfies the plausibility standard is a "context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. A court is generally limited to the pleadings and must construe all "factual allegations set forth in the complaint ... as true and ... in the light most favorable" to the plaintiff. Lee v. City of Los Angeles , 250 F.3d 668, 679 (9th Cir. 2001). However, a court need not blindly accept conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of fact, and unreasonable inferences. Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors , 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001).
In conjunction with the Motion, the City requests that the Court take judicial notice of a Los Angeles Superior Court ruling granting summary judgment in California Hotels & Lodging Ass'n v. City of Long Beach , No. 19LBCV00055 (L.A. Super. Jan. 8, 2020) ("CHLA Long Beach Opinion"). (See Req. for Judicial Notice ("RJN") Ex. 1, ECF No. 43-1.) Plaintiffs did not oppose the City's request.
Federal Rule of Evidence 201 allows a court to take judicial notice of a fact that "is not subject to reasonable dispute because it: (1) is generally known within the trial court's territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." Fed. R. Evid. 201(b) ; see United States v. Ritchie , 342 F.3d 903, 909 (9th Cir. 2003) (). Thus, the Court may take judicial notice of court orders and other matters of public record. See Reyn's Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc. , 442 F.3d 741, 746 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006) ().
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the City's unopposed RJN and takes judicial notice of the CHLA Long Beach Opinion, but not the truth of the facts contained therein. Lee , 250 F.3d at 690.
Plaintiffs’ suit challenges only the Workload Limitation Provision and its corresponding collective bargaining waiver provision, section 4.67.110 ("Waiver"); Plaintiffs challenge no other part of Chapter 4.67. (Opp'n 1 n.1.) Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief, including findings that the Workload Limitation Provision is unconstitutional, invalid, and preempted. (SAC ¶¶ 64–78.)
The City urges the Court to dismiss the SAC on several bases. Specifically, the City argues: (1) the Workload Limitation Provision is not preempted by federal or state health and safety laws; (2) the Workload Limitation Provision is not preempted by the NLRA; (3) the Workload Limitation Provision does not violate the DCC; (4) Plaintiffs cannot maintain a derivative section 1983 claim because there is no underlying constitutional violation; and (5) the Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ alternative request for declaratory relief. (Mot. 1–2.) The Court will address each argument in turn.
First, the City...
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