Columbian Athletic Club v. State ex rel. McMahan
| Decision Date | 04 June 1895 |
| Parties | COLUMBIAN ATHLETIC CLUB v. STATE ex rel. McMAHAN. |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
COLUMBIAN ATHLETIC CLUB
v.
STATE ex rel.
McMAHAN.1
Supreme Court of Indiana.
June 4, 1895.
Appeal from circuit court, Lake county; J. H. Gillett, Judge.
Suit by the state, on the relation of Willis C. McMahan, against the Columbian Athletic Club, for injunction and receiver. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals. Affirmed.
John B. Peterson and E. D. Crumpacker, for appellant. J. E. McMullough and Elliott & Elliott, for appellee.
HOWARD, C. J.
On the 2d day of September, 1893, the appellee, by her relator, who is the prosecuting attorney, filed in the clerk's office of the court below her verified complaint or information, alleging, among other things, that the appellant was a corporation duly organized and then existing under the laws of the state of Indiana; that the said appellant, assuming to act as such corporation, was engaged in violating the laws of the state, and had misused its corporate powers and franchises; that under the claim of corporate right, and in its character as a corporation, the appellant had willfully violated the statute of the state prohibiting prize fighting, giving the details of such violation; that the appellant claimed the right, as a corporate franchise, to conduct prize fights, insisting that the statute
[40 N.E. 915]
under which it was organized gave to it such right; that, by reason of such wrongful claim, it had induced persons to believe that it had a franchise under the laws of the state to engage in such business of prize fighting, and so had greatly abused its corporate privileges and usurped authority which it did not possess; that it had fitted up and maintained its premises in the county of Lake for the sole purpose of engaging in prize fighting; that it advertised such business in the most public manner, and thus induced thousands of persons to come upon its said premises in order to witness men engaged in fighting one another for prizes to be awarded to the victors; that the appellant, as such corporation, had further abused and misused its corporate franchises and violated the statutes by bringing into the state certain persons to perform the duties of sheriffs and other peace officers, and by causing such imported persons, so feloniously assuming to act as peace officers, to beat, bruise, and wound persons assembled on appellant's said premises; that many persons were in consequence grievously wounded, and that even death had been thereby caused; that appellant, in violation of another statute, had conspired with divers persons, to appellee unknown, to commit and procure the commission of an offense in the nighttime, to wit, prize fighting, upon said premises; that appellant, in its said corporate capacity, had caused, created, and was then maintaining a public nuisance on its said premises, in that it had thereon prepared and constructed buildings and other structures for the sole purpose of procuring men to fight therein for prizes, giving details of fights that had already taken place, stating also the riotous proceedings that followed, and that appellant avows its purpose to continue such prize fighting; that appellant fortified and strengthened its buildings so as the better to enable it to carry on its said illegal business, as well as to render it the more difficult for sheriffs and other peace officers to enter and arrest those engaged in the violation of the laws, pursuant also to the purpose and design of the appellant to permanently use and maintain its premises for the sole purpose of conducting prize fights on its said premises; that, under claim of corporate right and privilege, appellant would, if not enjoined, continue its usurpation of corporate functions and its abuse of its corporate franchises, thereby causing tumults and riots, so that human life would be endangered and the local officers of the county be unable to suppress the consequent violence; that the incorporators, as well as all those thus engaged in violation of the laws, were nonresidents of the state of Indiana; that appellant had conspired with certain persons named and with others, whose names were unknown, with the purpose, in the event that the court should issue such restraining order, to render the same nugatory by having the prize fights conducted by such other persons; that, unless a receiver should also be appointed, the appellant would falsely and fraudulently assign its rights and property to said co-conspirators or other third parties, so that prize fighting and other unlawful acts might still be conducted notwithstanding such order of the court. The prayer was for a dissolution of the incorporation, as having forfeited its franchises, and that it be ousted therefrom; that an injunction be issued; and that a receiver be appointed to take charge of the property, until the further order of the court. The restraining order was issued by the judge in vacation, and was directed especially against a fight advertised for the 4th day of September, being two days after the issue of the order; and the receiver was appointed for the property of appellant in Lake county, being the premises in question.
The appointment of the receiver is assigned as error; and it is contended by counsel for appellant that the court erred both in the issuing of its restraining order and also in the appointment of the receiver, for the reason that equity will not aid in the punishment or in the prevention of crime. “One sufficient reason, among the many,” say counsel, “for denying the jurisdiction of equity in this class of cases, is that the law regards the crimes charged as those of the individual perpetrators, and not of the corporation, and the penal...
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