Columbus & R. Ry. Co. v. Christian

• Decision Date: 16 August 1895
• Citation: 25 S.E. 411,97 Ga. 56
• Parties: COLUMBUS & R. RY. CO. v. CHRISTIAN.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

25 S.E. 411

97 Ga. 56

COLUMBUS & R. RY. CO. v. CHRISTIAN.

Supreme Court of Georgia

August 16, 1895

Syllabus by the Court.

1.For the wrongful act of an employé of a railroad company resulting injury to another, committed while engaged in the performance of the company's business in the line of his duty, the company is liable.But if, while so engaged, upon account of some private feud previously existing or suddenly arising, wholly disconnected with his duties as such employé and not pertaining to the business then in process of transaction (the company then not owing to the other person the duty of personal protection), he commit injury upon the person of another, the company would not be liable.The turning point in the present case being whether the agent of the company wrongfully slew the husband of the plaintiff and, if so, whether it was done while he was engaged in the transaction of the company's business, in the line of his duty, because of differences arising in the settlement thereof, or whether he committed the homicide because of a personal grievance wholly disconnected with the business then in hand, it was error for the court to charge generally, and without qualification, as follows: "If you believe from the testimony that Dixon was not justifiable in taking the life of Christian, then I charge you that the plaintiff would be entitled to recover for whatever damages the evidence shows she has sustained by reason of the death of her husband."

2.If the homicide be wrongful, whether the offense be properly classed as manslaughter or murder would not be material; but if the agent was justified in its commission, no liability would arise against the company, whether the act was committed by him while engaged in the business of the company, in the line of his duty, or otherwise.

3.When, in the course of a judicial proceeding, it becomes material to inquire whether one is, generally speaking, a "dangerous man," evidence of general reputation with respect to those particular characteristics which tend to establish the fact is admissible; but it is not competent for the party offering the witness for that purpose in such a proceeding to show affirmatively by him particular acts of violence or manifestations of petulance in a particular instance upon the part of the person whose character is under investigation.

Error from superior court, Harris county; W. B. Butt, Judge.

Action by Ella E. Christian against the Columbus & Rome Railway Company to recover damages for the death of her husband.From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant brings error.Brought forward from the last term.Code, §§ 4271a-4271c. Reversed.

Little & Little, C.J. Thornton, H. C. Cameron, and Peabody, Brannon, Hatcher & Martin, for plaintiff in error.

John W. Park, Blandford & Grimes, L. F. Garrard, and Tol.Y. Crawford, for defendant in error.

ATKINSON J.

1, 2.Twice before this case has been before this court for review.The decision made upon its first appearance is reported in 79 Ga. 460, and7 S.E. 216, and that made when it was last here appears in 90 Ga. 124, and15 S.E. 701.The law of the case seems to have been practically settled by the decision first above indicated.In that case, upon authority of our Code provision, it was ruled that liability of railroad companies for injuries committed upon others by persons in their employment was not confined to injuries inflicted by their servants while engaged in running and operating their cars but extended to injuries inflicted by their employés in the conduct of their business other than those resulting from negligence in running their trains, etc.The effect of this construction placed upon this section of the Code is to eliminate entirely from the region of doubt the proposition as to whether railroad companies are answerable generally for torts committed by their employés while engaged in the transaction of the business of their employers.Whatever room there may be for the consideration of that question by courts in other states, we are concluded, not only by the Code provision above referred to, but likewise by the adjudications of this court upon that section of the Code.But while the section of the Code in question lays down the proposition broadly that, for damage done by any person in the employment and service of such company, the latter shall be liable, such language must be understood to mean such torts only as are committed by an employé while engaged about the business of his employer; for it cannot be presumed that the legislature intended that the mere circumstances of a person being in the employment of a railroad company should render it liable for all torts committed by such employé, whether in any manner connected with the performance of his duties to his employer or otherwise.Such a construction would impose upon the employer a responsibility for the probity of an employé's conduct in all the relations of life, and under those circumstances under which the employer...