Colwell v. Suffolk County Police Dept.

• Decision Date: 26 June 1997
• Docket Number: No. 94-CV-1900 (FB).,94-CV-1900 (FB).
• Citation: 967 F.Supp. 1419
• Parties: Robert N. COLWELL, Charles R. Ellinger and Richard H. Abrams, Jr., Plaintiffs, v. SUFFOLK COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT and The County of Suffolk, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

967 F.Supp. 1419

Robert N. COLWELL, Charles R. Ellinger and Richard H. Abrams, Jr., Plaintiffs, v. SUFFOLK COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT and The County of Suffolk, Defendants.

No. 94-CV-1900 (FB).

United States District Court, E.D. New York.

June 26, 1997.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Brian J. Davis, Certilman Balin Adler & Hyman, LLP, East Meadow, NY, for Plaintiffs.

Robert J. Cimino, Suffolk County Attorney by Herbert A. Smith, Jr., Craig D. Pavlik, Assistant County Attorneys, Hauppauge, NY, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

BLOCK, District Judge.

Plaintiffs Robert Colwell ("Colwell"), Charles Ellinger ("Ellinger") and Richard Abrams ("Abrams"), employees of defendant Suffolk County Police Department (together with defendant County of Suffolk referred to collectively as "County"), brought suit against the County because each was denied a promotion within the Police Department. Colwell was denied promotion from Lieutenant to Captain; Abrams and Ellinger were denied promotions from Sergeant to Lieutenant. Plaintiffs alleged that they were denied these promotions on the basis of their physical disabilities in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1995). Plaintiffs' claims were tried before a jury, commencing on March 10, 1997. On March 18, 1997, the jury returned verdicts in favor of each plaintiff. The jury awarded Colwell $70,636, and Abrams and Ellinger $65,683 each, for compensatory damages from the time they were denied their respective promotions to the date of the verdict. The jury further awarded each of the three plaintiffs $150,000 for future compensatory damages. The Court now determines that the record contains sufficient evidence to support the verdicts, and fashions appropriate remedial relief.

I. THE COUNTY'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW

At the close of plaintiffs' case, the County moved for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and submitted a memorandum of law contending that: (1) all three plaintiffs failed to support their claims of disability with sufficient medical testimony, and that testimony by the plaintiffs themselves could not form the basis of a finding of disability under the ADA; (2) all three plaintiffs were not "qualified" for the promotions they sought, with or without reasonable accommodation, for purposes of the ADA; and (3) all three plaintiffs failed to prove that the County intentionally discriminated against them on the basis of their disabilities.¹ Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants' Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law ("Def.Mem."). The Court reserved decision. At the close of all of the evidence, the County again asked the Court for judgment as a matter of law. The Court stated that it would continue to reserve. After the jury returned its verdicts, the Court withheld decision on the 50(a) motion, and gave the parties twenty days to submit additional memoranda of law on the motion, and to address remedial issues.

The County's Rule 50(a) motion should be denied. In so ruling, the Court has analyzed the sufficiency of the evidence in relation to the jury's findings. Although this mode of analysis normally applies to Rule 50(b) motions, the standard for determination is exactly the same for 50(a) and 50(b) motions. See Raspente v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 111 F.3d 239, 241 n. 3 (2d Cir.1997) ("the same standard applies under either subsection [of Rule 50]"). Furthermore, should the County make a 50(b) motion, it will be limited to the grounds raised in its 50(a) motion.² See Holmes v. United States, 85 F.3d 956, 962 (2d Cir.1996) ("Together, Rules 50(a) and (b) `limit the grounds for judgment n.o.v. to those specifically raised in the prior motion for a directed verdict.'") (quoting Lambert v. Genesee Hosp., 10 F.3d 46, 54 (2d Cir.1993)). The Court will therefore proceed to adjudicate the reserved 50(a) motion,³ bearing in mind that the Court's analysis will likewise apply to the County's Rule 50(b) motion, should that motion be made.

A. The Applicable Legal Standard for Ruling on a Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law

In order to prevail on a motion for judgment as a matter of law, the County must convince the Court that "when `drawing all reasonable inferences regarding the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses in favor of [Colwell, Ellinger and Abrams], a reasonable jury could only have found for the [County].'" Vermont Plastics, Inc. v. Brine, Inc., 79 F.3d 272, 277 (2d Cir.1996) (quoting In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 52 F.3d 1124, 1131 (2d Cir. 1995)). It is well settled that the Court may only grant the motion if "there is such a complete absence of evidence supporting the verdict that the jury's finding could only have been the result of sheer surmise and conjecture, or if the evidence is so overwhelming that reasonable and fair minded persons could only have reached the opposite result." Lambert, 10 F.3d at 56 (2d Cir.1993). In making this determination, the Court "may not weigh evidence, assess credibility, or substitute its opinion of the facts for that of the jury." Vermont Plastics, Inc., 79 F.3d at 277.

B. Elements of a Claim under the ADA

In order to establish a claim under the ADA, a plaintiff must prove that: (1) he is a qualified person with a disability; (2) the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff — that is, the fact that plaintiff was a qualified individual with a disability was a motivating factor in the defendant's decision not to promote him; and (3) as a direct result of the defendant's intentional discrimination, the plaintiff sustained damages. 42 U.S.C. § 12112; see also Wernick v. Federal Reserve Bank, 91 F.3d 379, 383 (2d Cir.1996) (citing Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131 (2d Cir.1995)).

C. Mixed Motive

The Second Circuit recently reiterated that employment discrimination cases can be presented to the jury as either a "single issue motivation" or "dual issue motivation" scenario. See Fields v. New York State Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities, 115 F.3d 116, 118-19 (2d Cir.1997); see also Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1176, 1180 (2d Cir.1992) (noting that employment discrimination cases generally fall into one of those two categories). These two scenarios are often referred to as "pretext" and "mixed motive" cases, respectively. In the mixed motive scenario, the Court asks the jury not only to determine whether the impermissible reason — in the present case, disability — was a motivating factor in the employment decision, but also "whether the defendant has established that it would have taken the same adverse action in the absence of an impermissible reason." Fields, 115 F.3d at 125 n. 4. The Second Circuit in Tyler explained the respective burdens of proof in the mixed motive case:

If the plaintiff convinces the factfinder that the illegitimate factor played such a role, the employee has proved that the decision was made at least in part because of the illegitimate factor. At this point the employee is entitled to succeed subject only to the employer's opportunity to prove its "affirmative defense," ... that is, that it would have reached the same decision as to [the employee's employment] even in the absence of the impermissible factor.

Id. at 1181 (internal quotations omitted) (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268, (1989); Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977)).

Despite the perplexities often facing the trial court in determining the application and fashioning of mixed motive and pretextual jury charges, both parties agreed with the Court that the present case should be presented to the jury as a mixed motive case, Tr. at 910-11, 918-20, 954-56, 1046-48, since "the available evidence support[ed] a reasonable inference that `permissible and forbidden motives coexisted.'" Fields, 115 F.3d at 122 n. 2 (quoting Ostrowski v. Atlantic Mut. Insur. Cos., 968 F.2d 171, 185 (2d Cir.1992)) (noting further that the mixed motive charge is inappropriate where "there was either unlawful motivation or lawful motivation, but not both"). The Court therefore asked the jury two questions on the issue of intentional discrimination in respect to each plaintiff: (1) whether plaintiff's disability was a motivating factor in the decision not to promote him, and (2) whether the County would still not have promoted plaintiff for reasons having nothing to do with his disability. It was therefore possible for the jury to reach the conclusion that although the County took plaintiff's disabilities into account, any or all of them would not have received the promotion for legitimate reasons. The remedial scheme incorporated by the ADA specifically contemplates this possibility, and provides for a limited set of remedies in that instance. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12117(a), 1981a(a)(2), 2000e-5(g)(2).⁴

D. The Verdicts and Supporting Evidence

The jury found in respect to each plaintiff that he was a qualified individual with a disability, and that his disability was a motivating factor in the County's decision not to promote him. The jury further found as to each plaintiff that the County did not prove that it would not have promoted him for other, nondiscriminatory reasons.⁵ The trial record offers ample support for each of these jury findings.

1. Disability

The ADA defines "disability" as: (1) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of the individual; (2) a record of impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of the individual; or (3) being regarded as having an impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of the individual. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). Equal Employment...