Com. Dept. of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Clayton

• Decision Date: 01 November 1996
• Citation: 546 Pa. 342,684 A.2d 1060
• Parties: , 9 NDLR P 79 COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, BUREAU OF DRIVER LICENSING, Appellant, v. David A. CLAYTON, Sr., Appellee.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 1060

684 A.2d 1060

546 Pa. 342, 9 NDLR P 79

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION BUREAU OF DRIVER LICENSING, Appellant, v. David A. CLAYTON, Sr., Appellee.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued Sept. 19, 1995.

Decided Nov. 1, 1996.

[546 Pa. 343] Timothy P. Wile, Harold H. Cramer, Harrisburg, for PENNDOT.

Thomas J. Graham, Washington, for D. Clayton.

Before NIX, C.J., and FLAHERTY, ZAPPALA, CAPPY, CASTILLE and MONTEMURO, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT

CAPPY, Justice.

The instant appeal presents us with the issue of whether a regulation which provides for the revocation of one's operating privilege for a period of one year upon the occurrence of only a single epileptic seizure, without the licensee having an opportunity to present medical evidence in an effort to establish his or her competency to drive, violates due process. Both the trial court and the Commonwealth Court have ruled that the regulation at issue here is violative of due process. For the reasons that follow, we affirm that conclusion.

The facts giving rise to the instant appeal are not in dispute. On September 5, 1986, Appellee, David A. Clayton, Sr., suffered a grand mal epileptic seizure. He had no prior history of seizure disorders. On October 25, 1986, Appellee's treating physician, Dr. H.J. Silvis, submitted to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing (Department) a convulsive disorder form. The form essentially contained information that Appellee had suffered a grand mal seizure on September 5, 1986, and that he was being treated with a daily dose of 300 milligrams of Dilantin. Significantly, Dr. Silvis noted on the form that Appellee was a safe driver and that he was physically and mentally competent to operate a motor vehicle. This report was submitted in accordance with 75 Pa.C.S. § 1518(b). ¹

On November 28, 1986, following receipt of the report, the Department notified Appellee that his operating privileges were being recalled pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S. § 1519(c) which provides that the Department shall recall the operating privileges of any person who has been deemed incompetent to drive. ² Appellee was deemed incompetent to drive under the regulations promulgated pursuant to Section 1517 of the Vehicle Code which provides for the creation of a medical advisory board whose purpose it is to formulate rules and regulations concerning the physical and mental criteria required to obtain and to retain an operator's license. 75 Pa.C.S. § 1517. The regulation respecting epilepsy, which is found at 67 Pa.Code § 83.4, provides for the recall of a person's operating privilege for a period of one year following the occurrence of a single epileptic seizure irrespective of whether that person's treating physician has determined that the licensee is competent to drive a vehicle. Specifically § 83.4 provides:

§ 83.4 Epilepsy.

(a) General. A person suffering from epilepsy may not drive unless their personal licensed physician reports that the person has been free from seizure for a period of at least 1 year immediately preceding, with or without medication.

(b) Applicants between the ages of 16 and 18 years. Applicants between the ages of 16 and 18 years applying for their first license shall have been free from seizure for a period of at least 2 years immediately preceding, with or without medication.

(c) Waiver. Waiver of the freedom from seizure requirement may be made upon specific recommendation by a licensed physician who specializes in neurology or neurosurgery if:

(1) A strictly nocturnal pattern of the condition has been established over a period of at least 3 years immediately preceding, with or without medication; or

(2) A specific prolonged aura accompanied by sufficient warning has been established over a period of at least 5 years immediately preceding, with or without medication.

Following the recall of his operating privileges, Appellee filed, in the trial court, a statutory appeal pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S. § 1550. As the basis of his statutory appeal, Appellee argued that the mandatory minimum one year suspension under section 84.3(a) of the regulations was substantively unreasonable and procedurally offensive to due process.

A de novo hearing was held on March 31, 1987, before a trial judge at which time the Department offered into evidence the convulsive disorder form which Dr. Silvis had previously submitted to the Department. Appellee introduced a questionnaire completed by his physician which declared him fit to drive a vehicle. In addition, Appellee testified that he had suffered no additional seizures since the September 5, 1986 seizure; that he had no difficulty driving after the seizure; and that he continued to take antiseizure medicine.

The trial court sustained Appellee's appeal finding that the provisions of § 83.4 are unreasonable and violative of procedural due process. In so ruling, the trial court relied exclusively on an opinion written by Judge Rodgers, also of the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County, in In re Appeal of Charles R. Wiseman, 32 D. & C.3d 294 (1983). In that case, Judge Rodgers declared § 83.4 unreasonable concluding that there appeared to be no basis for the view that one epileptic seizure renders all persons unsafe to operate a motor vehicle for a period of at least one year. In support thereof, Judge Rodgers cited to several medical publications which indicate that the symptoms and frequency of epilepsy vary with each individual, noting as well that the Department offered no countervailing evidence that would suggest that every person who experiences one epileptic seizure is rendered unsafe to drive a motor vehicle. Alternatively, Judge Rodgers ruled that even if reasonable, the regulation offends procedural due process insofar as it provides for no meaningful hearing, but rather creates an irrebuttable presumption that such a person is incompetent to drive for a period of one year.

The Commonwealth Court here discussed at length the issue of whether the irrebuttable presumption doctrine rests upon substantive due process analysis or that of procedural due process seemingly concluding that only procedural due process rights are implicated. As will be discussed infra, such a distinction is not only ill-advised but also not critical to a resolution of the instant matter. The Commonwealth Court ultimately affirmed on the basis that § 83.4 violated procedural due process by creating an impermissible irrebuttable presumption. The Commonwealth Court reasoned that the interest of the Department in protecting the physical well-being of the public was outweighed by a licensee's interest in his/her operating privileges, especially in light of the minimal added burden to the Commonwealth in litigating such competency issues. This appeal followed. ^{3 4}

The Department submits that the Commonwealth Court erred in concluding that a procedural due process analysis was applicable when faced with an "irrebuttable presumption." Instead, the Department submits that the "irrebuttable presumption" doctrine remains one of substantive due process law and that since the one-year disqualification provision at issue here is rationally related to the legitimate state interest of promoting public safety, it satisfies substantive due process standards. The Department argues in the alternative that even assuming the "irrebuttable presumption" doctrine is one of procedural due process, § 83.4(a) does satisfy procedural due process insofar as Appellee had a right to a de novo hearing at which he could have presented evidence to rebut the fact that he had an epileptic seizure.

The regulation at issue here, section 83.4, clearly creates an irrebuttable presumption that a person who has had one seizure is incompetent to drive for a period of at least one year following the occurrence of the seizure. Under the regulation, any evidence that may rebut this presumption of incompetency, including medical evidence from the licensee's treating physician, is irrelevant, at least with respect to the period of the one year suspension. The only exceptions to this regulation appear in subsection (c) which pertain to licensees who have a history of either nocturnal seizures or seizures which are accompanied by warning symptoms, neither of which are applicable under the facts of the instant matter.

While we agree with the Commonwealth Court's ultimate conclusion here that § 83.4 creates an impermissible irrebuttable presumption, we disagree with that court's apparent conclusion that the "irrebuttable presumption doctrine" rests upon procedural due process principles. Accordingly, we find it necessary to first address this disagreement, especially in light of the fact that the Department argues, as well, that only substantive due process is implicated under the "irrebuttable presumption doctrine."

Although acknowledging that prior to the decision in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 109 S.Ct. 2333, 105 L.Ed.2d 91 (1989), none of the decisions of the United States Supreme Court which addressed the "irrebuttable presumption doctrine" definitively stated whether that doctrine rests upon substantive or procedural due process grounds, the Commonwealth Court here determined that five of the justices in Michael H. did, indeed, conclude that the procedural due process analysis alone applies when reviewing such presumptions. Even a cursory review of the various opinions in Michael H. evinces that such a conclusion is speculative at best. In short, Michael H. represents a badly split decision of the United States Supreme Court to which a counting of votes for specific propositions is illusory. ⁵ Furthermore, as the following review of the key United States Supreme Court decisions involving this doctrine illustrates, the distinction as to whether substantive or procedural due process is implicated is not paramount.

The "irrebuttable presumption...