COM. EX REL. DIST. ATTORNEY OF BLAIR COUNTY

• Decision Date: 24 March 2003
• Citation: 823 A.2d 147
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Acting by and Through the District Attorney of Blair County, Appellant. In re Randy BUCHANAN.
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

823 A.2d 147

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Acting by and Through the District Attorney of Blair County, Appellant.

In re Randy BUCHANAN.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued October 23, 2002.

Filed March 24, 2003.

Reargument Denied June 4, 2003.

Jackie R. Bernard, Assistant District Attorney, Altoona, for Commonwealth, appellant.

James R. Gilmore, Assistant District Attorney, Pittsburgh, for Commonwealth, amicus curiae.

Charles Kelly, Cannonsburg, for The Altoona Mirror, appellee.

Before MUSMANNO, LALLY-GREEN and KLEIN, JJ.

OPINION BY KLEIN, J.:

¶ 1 The Commonwealth appeals from the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County denying its request to seal the autopsy report of Randall P. Buchanan from the general public and from the Altoona Mirror, a local newspaper. Because we find that the release of the report may substantially interfere with the ongoing investigation of Buchanan's homicide, and the Pennsylvania Coroner's Act does not mandate release under such circumstances, we reverse and remand. On remand, the trial court should make findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether the release of the report would substantially impede, obstruct or interfere with the Commonwealth's homicide investigation.

¶ 2 Buchanan was found murdered in his apartment on or about June 21, 2001, and the homicide remains unsolved. On November 20, 2001, the Altoona Mirror made an official written request to the county coroner for the release of Buchanan's autopsy report. The Commonwealth petitioned the trial court for a preliminary injunction and a protective order that the report remain sealed. The trial court issued a temporary order sealing the report until a hearing was scheduled. Following a hearing, on March 14, 2002, the trial court denied the Commonwealth's request for injunctive relief and directed that a copy of the autopsy report be made available to the Altoona Mirror within 24 hours.¹

¶ 3 On appeal, the Commonwealth argues that the release of the autopsy report would permanently handicap the homicide investigation because the details of Buchanan's death, which are known only to the investigative team and the perpetrator of the crime, would be disclosed. The Commonwealth asserts that the report contains not only the cause of Buchanan's death, but also the facts and circumstances surrounding Buchanan's body as it was discovered in his apartment. At a hearing on this matter, the Commonwealth presented unrebutted testimony regarding how the release of the autopsy report would hinder its investigation, including alerting the perpetrator to what information is known and depriving the investigators of the opportunity to test the statements of alleged informants known only to the investigative team. (See N.T. Motion to Seal Coroner's Report, 2/8/02, at 4, 6, 9-10, 16, 61-63.)

¶ 4 The Altoona Mirror argues, and the trial court held, that regardless of whether the release of the autopsy report would impede the homicide investigation, it must be released pursuant to the Pennsylvania Coroner's Act, 16 P.S. §§ 1231-1253, and this Court's decision in In re Dillon, 449 Pa.Super. 559, 674 A.2d 735 (1996). We disagree. We therefore reverse and remand for the trial court's findings of fact and determination of whether the Commonwealth has demonstrated that the release of the autopsy report in this case would substantially hinder the ongoing homicide investigation. If so, then we direct that the report remain sealed for an appropriate period of time to be determined by the trial court to allow the Commonwealth to continue its investigation. The trial court also must set a date for the Commonwealth to return to court to re-establish its need that the report remain sealed. The burden remains on the Commonwealth to establish that releasing the report would substantially hinder the ongoing investigation.

¶ 5 We begin our analysis, as the trial court did, with the Pennsylvania Coroner's Act, which provides:

Every coroner, within thirty (30) days after the end of each year, shall deposit all of his official records and papers for the preceding year in the office of the prothonotary for the inspection of all persons interested therein.

16 P.S. § 1251. Our Court has interpreted "all of [the coroner's] official records" in this provision as including autopsy reports. See Dillon, 674 A.2d at 739.² Thus, under Section 1251, the Blair County coroner's office was required to turn over to the prothonotary's office all of its official records for 2001, including autopsy reports, by January 31, 2002. In its opinion, the trial court recognized that although "[n]o [c]ourt wishes to `hamper' criminal investigations," the Coroner's Act provides no exception for official records connected with criminal investigations. (Opinion & Order, 3/14/02, at 4.) The trial court also noted that because the report at issue here was prepared in June, it had effectively remained "sealed" for more than seven months under the statute, in addition to the time that it remained sealed pursuant to the court's temporary order. Accordingly, the trial court held that because "[t]here is no authority in the law to keep this autopsy report under seal longer," the report must be released. (Id. at 5.) We disagree.

¶ 6 Although the Coroner's Act contains no explicit exception for records connected with criminal investigations, we do not believe that our legislature intended to strip from the common pleas courts their inherent right to ensure that the release of information will not jeopardize either the privacy rights of individuals or ongoing criminal investigations. If we were to adopt the Altoona Mirror's and the trial court's interpretation, then the length of time that an autopsy report could be withheld would vary with the time of the year in which the report is prepared. This is an unreasonable result. See generally 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1922(1); see also Commonwealth v. Masters, 737 A.2d 1229, 1231 (Pa.Super.1999) (in attempting to ascertain meaning of statute, court presumes that legislature did not intend absurd or unreasonable result); Commonwealth v. Berryman, 437 Pa.Super. 258, 649 A.2d 961, 966 (1994) (court may consider practical consequences of particular interpretation of statute in order to effectuate "the most sensible construction possible").

¶ 7 We note that there are many situations in which courts may issue injunctive relief in the form of protective orders to safeguard an articulated interest and need. A common situation, which is not provided by statute or rule but by common law, involves the courts' right to prevent the disclosure of information that could lead to the identification of a confidential informant, such as search or arrest warrant affidavits. The courts use a balancing test, and frequently this information is kept under seal despite an accused's right to ensure that a warrant is properly based on probable cause. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Fenstermaker, 515 Pa. 501, 530 A.2d 414, 420 (1987) (determination "regarding access to arrest warrant affidavits is one best left to the sound discretion of a trial court"); PG Publ'g Co. v. Commonwealth, 389 Pa.Super. 86, 566 A.2d 857, 862 (1989) (court must balance presumption that information is to be kept open to public against Commonwealth's need to keep information confidential so as not to jeopardize ongoing criminal investigation), aff'd, 532 Pa. 1, 614 A.2d 1106 (1992); In re Affidavit of Search Warrant for 4011 Wilson Ave., Bethlehem, Pa., 42 Pa. D. & C.3d 467, 473 (C.P. Northampton County 1986) ("Courts have an inherent power to control their records and proceedings, and may deny access when appropriate.") (citing Nixon v. Warner Comms., Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 98 S.Ct. 1306, 55 L.Ed.2d 570 (1978)).³

¶ 8 Another common situation involves the courts' right to keep certain judicial proceedings closed to the public. For example, in Katz v. Katz, 356 Pa.Super. 461, 514 A.2d 1374 (1986), this Court held that the press and the general public may be excluded from equitable distribution hearings. Although our courts have recognized a common law right of public access to judicial proceedings, that right is not absolute. Id. at 1377; see Storms v. O'Malley, 779 A.2d 548, 569 (Pa.Super.2001), app. denied, 570 Pa. 688, 808 A.2d 573 (2002). As the late Judge Wieand stated:

[T]he public may be "excluded, temporarily or permanently, from court proceedings or the records of court proceedings to protect private as well as public interests: to protect trade secrets, or the privacy and reputations [of innocent parties], as well as to guard against risks to national security interests and to minimize the danger of an unfair trial by adverse publicity." In re National Broadcasting Co., [653 F.2d 609, 613 (D.C.Cir.1981)]. "These are not necessarily the only situations where public access ... can properly be denied. A bright line test has yet to be formulated. Meanwhile, the decision as to public access must rest in the sound discretion of the trial court." Commonwealth v. Frattarola, 336 Pa.Super. 411, 426, 485 A.2d 1147, 1155 (1984) (Wieand, J., concurring).

Katz, 514 A.2d at 1377-78; see also R.W. v. Hampe, 426 Pa.Super. 305, 626 A.2d 1218, 1222 (1993) (recognizing that divorce and juvenile proceedings may be closed to public to prevent parties' embarrassment and protect privacy interests). Likewise, although the United States Constitution provides for public trials, this Court has recognized that "even in the context of a criminal trial, where federal Constitutional guarantees both explicitly and implicitly apply, access rights of the public are subject to limitation by judicial discretion and necessity." Stenger v. Lehigh Valley Hosp. Ctr., 382 Pa.Super. 75, 554 A.2d 954, 957 (1989).

¶ 9 We agree that absent a compelling need, autopsy reports are part of "all of [the coroner's] official records" that must be released within thirty days after the end of the year under Section 1251 of the...