Com. ex rel. Harbold v. Myers
| Decision Date | 16 March 1965 |
| Citation | 207 A.2d 805,417 Pa. 358 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania ex rel. James W. HARBOLD, Appellant, v. David N. MYERS, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution, Graterford, Pennsylvania. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
James W. Harbold, in pro. per.
Daniel W. Shoemaker, Dist. Atty., John T. Willer First Asst. Dist. Atty., and Earl R. Doll Lewis H. Markowitz, Nevin J. Trout and Elmer M. Morris, Asst Dist. Attys., York, for appellee.
Before BELL C. J., and MUSMANNO, JONES, COHEN, EAGEN, O'BRIEN and ROBERTS, JJ.
Appellant petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus which would release him from imprisonment. Appellant-petitioner is serving a life sentence imposed in 1962 after a jury returned a verdict of murder in the first degree. At the jury trial, two court-appointed counsel conducted petitioner's defense.
Following the verdict, counsel for petitioner filed motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment. [1] Before the trial court passes on these motions, however, the petitioner himself wrote to the trial judge requesting that the post-trial motions be withdrawn and that sentence be imposed. [2] Informed of this development, petitioner's counsel consulted with him and discussed the consequences of withdrawing the motions. Shortly thereafter petitioner was brought before the court and sentenced. [3]
In June of 1964, petitioner filed his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The petition alleged, in reality, six grounds in support of the requested relief. [4] Three of these grounds were identical with those explicitly raised in the 1962 post-trial motion. [5] two assignments related to matters objected to during trial and, although not specifically set out, apparently were incorporated into the post-trial motions. [6] The sixth allegation in the habeas corpus petition concerned a matter not previously raised. [7] A three judge court en banc carefully scrutinized the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. In an extensive opinion, after discussing each of the petition's allegations, the court unanimously denied the petition. Because the court deemed the petition to be clearly without merit, no hearing was held. We agree that the petition should be denied.
Although we agree with the conclusions of the court below, we believe there is a further ground on which the denial should be predicated. Upon review of this record, we conclude that petitioner waived his right to collaterally attack the validity of his conviction in the state court by deliberately by-passing the orderly procedures devised for direct post-trial review in this Commonwealth. [8]
As we have noted, post-trial motions were filed on behalf of petitioner, but these were withdrawn on petitioner's initiative and express request. [9] When petitioner was brought before the court for sentencing on June 15, 1962, his counsel reviewed, in his presence and on the record of that hearing, the background of the defendant's request for the withdrawal. [10] Petitioner's trial counsel asked if the facts had been correctly portrayed; petitioner affirmed that they had. [11] Thereafter the court imposed sentence. [12] This record presents a situation in which petitioner himself chose to waive the pursual of alleged trial errors about which he now complains. The record clearly warrants a conclusion of effective waiver.
This is not a case where the defendant did not himself choose to forgo the normal post-trial procedures. Neither is this a case where failure to pursue the established procedure was due to mere neglect or inadvertence. Nor is it a case where the defendant can plausibly deny either that he understood the alternatives open to him or deny that he comprehended the consequences of his withdrawal. Furthermore, the record relating to the withdrawal of the post-conviction motions is entirely free from any suggestion of coercive circumstances. [13]
The courts of this Commonwealth, and most especially in recent times, have earnestly sought to provide a fair and full adjudication of all federal and state constitutional claims. This Court has exercised particular vigilance to see that, on both direct and collateral review, claims of federal, as well as state, constitutional rights are comprehensively and justly entertained and decided by our state courts. [14] Federal rights concern us as much as any other rights which we are charged to enforce. This practice has frequently been maintained even where established post-trial procedures may have been negligently or inadvertently ignored. Indeed, the practice has been followed even where there has been some possibility of a conscious choice to forego the usual direct review provided, but where the record nevertheless does not clearly support a finding of intelligent, understanding waiver of orderly review procedures. [15] We have no intention of departing from our purpose of solicitously insuring that right constitutionally conferred are not unduly forfeited. The case presently before us, however, falls into a different category.
This case is one in which there has been no undue forfeiture. It is one in which the record reveals that petitioner understandingly decided to by-pass our post-trial review procedures. Justice can best be accomplished in an orderly framework, and when a defendant deliberately by-passes the adequate means provided for review of alleged errors he cannot be heard to insist that the state must now, at his discretion, provide an additional opportunity for review of his once abandoned contentions. There is every reason to hold such a defendant to his waiver instead of permitting him to re-open the case at whatever time the defendant chooses, at a juncture when witnesses may have disappeared, memories may have faded, and other evidence may no longer be available. The problems may be aggravated because a deliberate decision by a defendant to forgo established state remedial procedures induces and creates a justifiable belief and appearance that the case has been finally concluded.
Surely, the protections afforded one convicted of crime do not include the right to knowingly reject available post-conviction procedures without being bound by the consequences of such planned rejection. The orderly and expeditious disposition of criminal litigation, as well as the desirability for finality after opportunity for adequate review, precludes this defendant from exercising the privilege of asserting errors at at time or in a manner contrary to the currently established and applicable rule for the adjudication of such issues.
It is needless to dwell on the desirability of prompt review and of the difficulties presented by delayed review, difficulties which, among other things, affect both the ability to conduct satisfactorily a comprehensive habeas corpus hearing and the ability to proceed effectively with a new trial if one is required.
We need go no further in this case than to hold that the lower court could have placed dismissal of the petition on the ground that, in light of the facts and record of this case, petitioner deliberately by-passed the procedures which were available to test the contentions he now seeks to assert. Because of this waiver, petitioner is precluded at this unduly postponed stage from successfully pursuing them in our courts.
Order affirmed.
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Notes:
[1] These motions were filed on May 28, 1962 four days after the verdict of guilty.
[2] The letter was dated June 11, 1962.
[3] Sentence was imposed on June 15, 1962.
[4] A seventh challenge is really a reiteration of two other allegations.
[5] In summary form, these allegations are: (1) that, because a writ of habeas corpus had been granted by a court en banc, petitioner's trial constituted double jeopardy, even though the writ was granted before a jury had been impaneled; (2) that an alternate juror had a preconceived opinion of the defendant's guilt and misrepresented on voir dire that he had no fixed opinion; and (3) that the district attorney illegally sequestered a witness.
All of these objections, specifically raised at the trial, were discussed on the record and were overruled by the court. Counsel for defendant were quite diligent in raising and arguing these, as well as other, objections.
[6] These objections were directed to (1) the court's refusal, because of information originally received from defense counsel, to order the petitioner released from his handcuffing to a sheriff during the first day of trial (during voir dire examination) and (2) the district attorney's alteration of a witness card which changed the designation of a witness from 'Commonwealth' to 'defense'. As were the objections set forth in note 5, supra, these objections were urged at trial and overruled after side-bar conferences.
In the post-trial motions, counsel for defendant reserved the right to file additional objections when the notes of testimony were transcribed and the court allowed 30 days from the receipt of transcript for defense counsel to do so. The motions were withdrawn before the 30 day period expired.
[7] This last ground consisted of an allegation that the court had intentionally suppressed relevant and material evidence. This contention was based on the fact that, prior to trial, defense counsel had made a request for the appointment of a sanity commission, a request which was granted. The commission found that the defendant was not mentally ill. Defense counsel did not, of course, introduce this report at trial. Petitioner now contends that this report was accordingly thus suppressed by the court. The contention is so devoid of merit as to be termed frivolous and, naturally, was not raised by counsel in their post-trial motions.
[8] A determination by a federal court...
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