Com. ex rel. Johnson v. Myers

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
• Writing for the Court: Before BELL; EAGEN; ROBERTS, J., files a concurring opinion in which MUSMANNO; ROBERTS; MUSMANNO
• Citation: 213 A.2d 359,419 Pa. 155
• Decision Date: 29 September 1965
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania ex rel. Charles E. JOHNSON, Appellant v. David N. MYERS, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution, Graterford, Pennsylvania.

Page 359

213 A.2d 359 419 Pa. 155 COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania ex rel. Charles E. JOHNSON, Appellant
v.
David N. MYERS, Superintendent, State Correctional
Institution, Graterford, Pennsylvania. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Sept. 29, 1965.

[419 Pa. 156]

Page 360

Charles E. Johnson, in pro. per.

John A. F. Hall, First Asst. Dist. Atty., and Herbert A. Schaffner, Asst. Dist. Atty., Harrisburg, for appellee.

[419 Pa. 155] Before BELL, C. J., and MUSMANNO, JONES, COHEN, EAGEN, O'BRIEN and ROBERTS, JJ.

[419 Pa. 156] EAGEN, Justice.

On March 21, 1958, the appellant, Charles E. Johnson, was convicted by a jury of murder in the second degree. At trial, he was represented by counsel retained by his family. No post trial motions were filed, and on March 27, 1958, the court sentenced him to serve an indeterminate term in a state correctional institution for a period of not less than ten and not more than twenty years. No appeal from the judgment was entered.

On November 13, 1964, an action in habeas corpus was instituted which the lower court dismissed without hearing. ¹ An appeal to this court followed.

The basic reason urged in attacking the legality of the conviction and confinement and in support of the issuance of the writ is that two statements given by Johnson to police investigating officers following his arrest, which were reduced to writing and admitted in evidence at trial, were allegedly coerced and obtained in violation of his constitutional rights at a time when he was without the assistance of counsel.

An examination of the trial record discloses that the statements involved were admitted of record not only without objection, but also with the express consent of appellant's counsel. Also, at no time during the trial was it even hinted that the statements were [419 Pa. 157] coerced or not freely given. The appellant personally testified, and a study of his testimony fails to indicate the slightest suggestion of coercion.

Under such circumstances, appellant's belated objection to the admissibility of this evidence cannot be successfully asserted in this collateral action: Commonwealth ex rel. Blackshear v. Myers, Pa., 213 A.2d 378 (1965), and Commonwealth ex rel. Adderley v. Myers, 418 Pa. 366, 211 A.2d 481 (1965). Nor is any further proceeding necessary concerning the voluntariness of the statements, as dictated by Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908, 1 A.L.R.2d 1205 (1964). See, Commonwealth ex rel....