Com. ex rel. McCant v. Rundle

• Decision Date: 30 June 1965
• Citation: 211 A.2d 460,418 Pa. 394
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania ex rel. Joseph McCANT, Appellant, v. A. T. RUNDLE, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

211 A.2d 460

418 Pa. 394

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania ex rel. Joseph McCANT, Appellant, v. A. T. RUNDLE, Superintendent, State Correctional

Institution, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

June 30, 1965.

Joseph McCant, in pro. per.

Joseph M. Smith, Asst. Dist. Atty., Philadelphia, for appellee.

Before BELL C. J., and MUSMANNO, JONES, COHEN, EAGEN, O'BRIEN and ROBERTS, JJ.

MUSMANNO Justice.

Joseph McCant, on a plea of guilty to a murder indictment, was convicted of murder in the first degree and a sentence of life imprisonment was imposed. He has filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus averring he was denied due process in that he had no counsel at the preliminary hearing, that he did not have effective representation at his trial and that his plea of guilty was coerced. None of these reasons has merit.

The petitioner finds himself in prison for life because he fired a revolver shot at one William Harold, the bullet passed through Harold's body and struck Gloria Osborne, his partner in an immoral relationship, killing her. He contends in his petition that since he had no intention of killing Gloria Osborne his crime could not be first degree murder. First degree murder is not the slaying of any particular person, it is the taking of the life of another premeditatedly and with malice aforethought, regardless of the identity of the victim. If McCant, intending to kill shot into a crowd, the resulting crime would be first degree murder even if he had never before seen his eventual homicidal victim.

In Commonwealth v. Lyons, 283 Pa. 327, 129 A. 86, this Court said:

'The defendant's felonious assault upon his wife and the murder of Humphrey were so interwoven as to be a double crime, and, on the theory that the fatal shots were intended for the wife, the guilt would be the same as though her life had been taken. In other words, the degree of guilt is not varied because mortal violance intended for one person accidentally kills another.' (Emphasis supplied.)

After the shooting, the petitioner voluntarily surrendered to the police and voluntarily gave a statement admitting the shooting. At the trial he freely admitted what he had done. During the trial no reference was made to the preliminary hearing. Thus, the defendant was in no way prejudiced in the adjudication of his offense by the fact that he had no counsel at the preliminary hearing. In Commonwealth ex rel. Butler v. Rundle, 416 Pa. 321, 206 A.2d 283, this Court said:

'Petitioner does not allege, nor does the record show, any consequences which flowed from the absence of counsel at the preliminary hearing. No legal right was lost; no factual or legal disadvantage was suffered. Petitioner's flat assertion is that lack of counsel at this state of the proceedings, in itself, violates due process. Reliance is placed on Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963), by the petitioner. More closely related, of course, is White v. [State of] Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 83 .S.Ct. 1050, 10 L.Ed.2d 193 (1963).

'The court below rejected petitioner's assertion. Our Superior Court has ruled to the same effect. Commonwealth ex rel. Land v. Rundle, 202 Pa.Super. 509, 198 A.2d 433 (1964). * * *

'The holding of these cases is...