Com. ex rel. Osburn v. Haas

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
• Writing for the Court: Before BELL; POMEROY
• Citation: 439 Pa. 341,268 A.2d 85
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania ex rel. Roy OSBURN v. William F. HAAS, Sheriff of Union County, Appellant (two cases).
• Decision Date: 13 July 1970

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268 A.2d 85 439 Pa. 341 COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania ex rel. Roy OSBURN
v.
William F. HAAS, Sheriff of Union County, Appellant (two cases). Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. July 13, 1970.

[439 Pa. 342] James F. McClure, Jr. (submitted) McClure & McClure, Lewisburg, for appellant.

A. Thomas Wilson, Dist. Atty. (submitted) Lewisburg, for appellee.

Before BELL, C.J., and JONES, COHEN, EAGEN, O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, and POMEROY, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT

POMEROY, Justice.

On June 6, 1969, appellant Roy Osburn was taken into custody by appellee, the Sheriff of Union County, on a detainer warrant charging that he was a fugitive [439 Pa. 343] from justice in West Virginia. On June 30, 1969, the Governor of Pennsylvania, at the request of the Governor of West Virginia and in accordance with the provisions

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of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, Act of July 8, 1941, P.L. 288, 19 P.S. § 191.1, et seq., issued a Governor's Warrant for the arrest and extradition of appellant to West Virginia where he stood indicted for escape from lawful custody. Appellant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the Court of Common Pleas of the 17th Judicial District, Union County Branch. A hearing was duly held, and on August 9, 1969, the petition was denied and appellant was ordered extradited to West Virginia. The appeal at No. 494 January Term, 1969 was then filed. Subsequently appellant filed a supplemental petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which was also denied. The appeal from that order, No. 484 January Term, 1970, was consolidated with the earlier appeal. We affirm both orders.

Appellant does not contend that the normal statutory requirements for extradition have not been met and the record establishes that they have. Commonwealth ex rel. Kelly v. Santo, 436 Pa. 204, 206, 259 A.2d 456 (1969); Commonwealth ex rel. Flood v. Pizzo, 434 Pa. 208, 211, 252 A.2d 656 (1969). He contends, rather, that certain collateral matters relating to the delay in procuring his return to West Virginia render his extradition improper and entitle him to release from custody.

In the first place, appellant argues that his right to a speedy trial in West Virginia guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, as made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, ¹ has been violated by West [439 Pa. 344] Virginia's delay in procuring his presence for trial. Whatever may be the merits of appellant's position on this point, they are not cognizable in an extradition proceeding. When and if appellant is tried in West Virginia he can raise this constitutional claim. Commonwealth ex rel. Flood v. Pizzo, Supra, at 211, 252 A.2d 656.

Appellant next asserts that the authorities of Monongalia County, West Virginia, have refused to pay the costs and expenses of his detention in Pennsylvania and contends that such a refusal demonstrates a lack of good faith on the part of that State's authorities such as to constitute a waiver by them of their right to extradite him. This allegation also, even if we were to assume its truth, ² would form no basis for appellant's release. It is true that section 24 of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, 19 P.S. § 191.24, provides: 'All costs and expenses shall be paid out of the county treasury in the county wherein the crime is alleged to have been committed.' But the subject of the extradition is not a third party beneficiary of this provision, and a failure to comply with this requirement in no way [439 Pa. 345] harms him. If a dispute indeed exists over the payment of these costs, it is solely between the executive authorities

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of the States involved; it does not infringe the rights of the prisoner. ³

The only procedural defect in the extradition proceeding itself to which appellant directs our attention is the failure formally to re-arrest him on the Governor's Warrant within thirty days of his initial arrest on...