Com. ex rel. Santiago v. Myers

• Decision Date: 09 November 1965
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania ex rel. Miguel Maldonado SANTIAGO, alias Justiliano Ocasio Santiago, Appellant, v. David N. MYERS, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution, Graterford, Pa.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 206

214 A.2d 206

419 Pa. 326

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania ex rel. Miguel Maldonado

SANTIAGO, alias Justiliano Ocasio Santiago, Appellant, v. David N. MYERS, Superintendent, State Correctional

Institution, Graterford, Pa.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Nov. 9, 1965.

Miguel Maldonado Santiago, in pro. per.

Edward H. Carney, Dist. Atty., William A. Peiffer, Asst. Dist. Atty., Erie, for appellee.

Before BELL, C. J., and MUSMANNO, JONES, COHEN, EAGEN, O'BRIEN and ROBERTS, JJ.

O'BRIEN, Justice.

The appellant, after indictment and trial, was convicted by a jury of murder in the first degree and the sentence was fixed at life imprisonment. Judgment of sentence was entered on October 7, 1963. Subsequently, the appellant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which was dismissed without hearing. In his petition, appellant sets out three issues which he alleges governs the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus: (1) that his constitutional rights were violated when he was arrested, seized and searched without a warrant; (2) that he was deprived of his constitutional rights because he was without the assistance of counsel at critical stages prior to trial; (3) that his rights were violated when he was held 28 days before he was brought to his preliminary hearing.

The appellant first complains that he was arrested without a warrant, and asserts that this is grounds for the issuance of the writ. Our examination of the record reveals that the appellant was arrested only several hours after the commission of the felony and that the appellant was positively identified by 3 eye witnesses as the person involved in the felony. In Com. ex rel. Whiting v. Rundle, 414 Pa. 17, p. 19, 198 A.2d 568, p. 569 (1964), we held: Where a police officer has knowledge of facts and circumstances, which are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable caution to believe that a certain individual has committed a felony, he may arrest without the necessity of a prior issuance of a warrant.' See also Ker v. State of Cal., 374 U.S. 23, 83 S.Ct. 1623, 10 L.Ed.2d 726 (1963).

The second point raised by the appellant is that he was deprived of his constitutional rights because he was without the assistance of counsel at critical stages prior to trial. This is an all inclusive charge on pretrial procedures. The Supreme Court of the United States has held on many occasions that an accused is entitled to counsel at all critical stages of criminal litigation. This, however, does not mean that it is error when a petitioner is without counsel at all stages in the pretrial proceedings but applies only to the critical stages of the pretrial proceedings. Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977 (1964). In Pennsylvania, we have held on many occasions, and most recently in Com. ex rel. Lofton v. Russell, 418 Pa. 517, 211 A.2d 427 (1965), that in Pennsylvania, in the absence of unusual circumstances, a preliminary hearing is not critical stage in the pretrial procedure. The appellant in this case gave a statement to the police prior to trial. At the time of the giving of this statement, the appellant did not have benefit of counsel.' This statement was later introduced without objection at the appellant's trial, where he was represented by two competent lawyers. Comm. ex rel. Adderley v. Myers, 418 Pa. 366, 211 A.2d 481 (1965). Com. ex rel. Cuevas v. Rundle, 418 Pa. 373, 211 A.2d 485. Judgment of sentence was entered on October 7, 1963, and no appeal was taken. Inasmuch as judgment of sentence became final prior to the effective date of Escobedo as established in Com. v. Negri No. 2, Pa., 213 A.2d 670 (1965), Escobedo does not apply in this case.

The third point raised by appellant is that his preliminary hearing was not held until 28 days after his arrest. In Com. ex rel. Fox v. Maroney, 417 Pa. 308, 207 A.2d 810 (1965), we said that a delay in the holding of a preliminary hearing without more will not, in itself, be grounds for the granting of a writ of habeas corpus. In Com. ex rel. Light v....