Com. ex rel. Walls v. Rundle

• Decision Date: 17 March 1964
• Docket Number: Philadelphia 30,Pennsylvania.,Institution
• Citation: 414 Pa. 53,198 A.2d 528
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania ex rel. Albert H. WALLS, Appellant, v. Alfred T. RUNDLE, Supt., Eastern State Correctional
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

198 A.2d 528

414 Pa. 53

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania ex rel. Albert H. WALLS, Appellant, v. Alfred T. RUNDLE, Supt., Eastern State Correctional

Institution, Philadelphia 30, Pennsylvania.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

March 17, 1964.

Albert H. Walls, Philadelphia, for appellant.

Thomas M. Reed, Asst. Dist. Atty., Philadelphia, Julian F. King Asst. Dist. Atty., Arlen Specter, Asst. Dist. Atty., Chief Litigation Division, F. Emmett Fitzpatrick, Jr., First Asst Dist. Atty., James C. Crumlish, Jr., Dist. Atty Philadelphia, for appellee.

Before BELL, C. J., and MUSMANNO, JONES, COHEN, EAGEN, O'BRIEN and ROBERTS, JJ.

ROBERTS Justice.

On June 10, 1952, Albert Hosey Walls, petitioner-appellant, then seventeen and represented by counsel, entered a plea of guilty generally to an indictment charging him with murder. Testimony was taken before a court en banc, consisting of three judges, to determine the degree of guilt and to fix the penalty. Because the cases of co-defendants were pending, the court did not dispose of the plea until November 21, 1952. On that date, appellant was adjudged guilty of murder in the first degree, and a sentence of life imprisonment was imposed. From that judgment of sentence, no appeal was taken.

Eleven years later, on September 6, 1963, appellant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia. He urged that his constitutional rights had been violated in that he was denied equal protection of the law and was convicted and sentenced without due process. Petitioner contended (1) that he was refused representation by counsel at a preliminary hearing in Juvenile Court following an illegal detention; (2) that he was held incommunicado and was forced to give a subsequent statement which was coerced and totally involuntary; (3) that at the time of arrest he was sixteen years of age, a 'juvenile 'child" under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court and was refused permission to see his parents; and (4) that he was 'uncounseled when his case was transferred from the Juvenile Division and certified over to the Common Pleas Court of Adult Jurisdiction.' The court below held appellant's allegations to be without merit and denied his petition. From that determination, this appeal followed.

We are satisfied, after careful review of both the record in the court below on the petition for habeas corpus as well as the entire transcript and record of the hearing on the plea that the court below correctly summarized the basic factual background of the homicide.

'The record establishes conclusively that on August 10, 1951, relator went to the home of a friend, one William Sampson, where he met both Sampson and a Marshall Miller. Relator asked them to go with him to commit a robbery. The three of them entered a taxicab, with relator sitting in the front seat and the other two in the rear seat. Relator shot the driver who later died. The three fled and relator was traced through the revolver while attempting to dispose of it.' ^[1]

We conclude also, as did the court below, that appellant's contentions are entirely without legal validity. His plea constituted an admission of his guilt and of all the facts averred in the indictment; it constituted a waiver of all nonjurisdictional defects and defenses. United States v. Parker, 292 F.2d 2 (6th Cir. 1961); United States v. Gallagher, 183 F.2d 342 (3rd Cir. 1950); United States v. Rozanc, 210 F.Supp. 900 (W.D.Pa.1962); Richardson v. Baldi, 139 F.Supp. 928 (M.D.Pa.1956); see also 4 Anderson, Wharton's Criminal Law and Procedure §§ 1900-1901 (1957); 10 P.L.E. Criminal Law § 174. Appellant's allegations raise no question of jurisdiction, nor do they raise any question as to whether the substantive offense itself was committed. Accordingly, there is nothing in the petition which takes this case outside the rule recited above, and the petition was properly refused.

The hearing in Juvenile Court was solely to determine whether or not to certify the case to the criminal courts. It was not a criminal hearing which in any way required the appointment of counsel. See Holmes' Appeal, 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523 (1954), cert. den., 348 U.S. 973, 75 S.Ct. 535, 99 L.Ed. 757 (1955). It had no bearing upon either the procedural or substantive aspects of the conviction in criminal court.

Appellant also urged in his petition that his 'plea of guilty was coerced under pressure pursuant to the illegally obtained confession in flagrant violation of Due Process and fundamental justice.' We construe this allegation to mean that because appellant was allegedly forced to confess (according to his version), he was compelled to plead guilty. Appellant, without counsel, signed a written confession on October 16, 1951, at 7:20 A.M. (He had been arrested at approximately 11:00 P.M. on October 15.) His plea, on the advice of counsel, was entered on June 10, 1952, eight months later. During the...