Com. ex rel. Yambo v. Jennings

Decision Date13 December 1971
Citation220 Pa.Super. 186,286 A.2d 909
PartiesCOMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania er rel. Jose antonio YAMBO, Appellant, v. William JENNINGS, Warden. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania ex rel. Rafael RIVERA, Appellant, v. William JENNINGS, Warden. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania ex rel. Eligio M. ECHEVARRIA, Appellant, v. William JENNINGS, Warden. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania ex rel. Evalisto R. SANTIAGO, Appellant, v. William JENNINGS, Warden.
CourtPennsylvania Superior Court

William J. Gallagher, Public Defender (Submitted), for appellants.

James Freeman, Asst. Dist. Atty. (Submitted), West Chester, for appellee.

Before WRIGHT, P.J., and WATKINS, MONTGOMERY, JACOBS, HOFFMAN, SPAULDING and CERCONE, JJ.

CERCONE, Judge:

On December 26, 1970 appellants, upon petition of the District Attorney pursuant to Rule of Criminal Procedure 4014, 19 P.S. Appendix, 1 were committed to Chester Farms Prison, in default of $2,000 bonds, as material witnesses to the murder of one Raymond Dutton, whose shooting had taken place in their presence.

While so imprisoned, appellants petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, and after a hearing, the court below dismissed the petitions and set bail at $1,000 for each of appellants Yambo, Rivera, and Echevarria and $500 for appellant Santiago. They posted the said bail and were released from custody. They nevertheless have appealed to this court from the lower court's dismissal of their Petitions for Writ of Habeas Corpus, raising issues as to the sufficiency of the evidence upon which they were detained and as to the constitutionality of Rule 4014 because of its failure expressly to provide for a hearing on the District Attorney's petition.

Our study of the case would lead us to conclude that the evidence presented by the District Attorney was more than sufficient to warrant the holding of the appellants as material witnesses and that no constitutional rights had been violated in that they had been afforded full and complete hearing on their contest of the District Attorney's right to detain them by reason of the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by them. However, the issues as raised by appellants are now moot since appellants posted bail and were, as they themselves state in their brief, 'released from custody'.

This court stated in Com. ex rel. Maisels v. Baldi, 172 Pa.Super.Ct. 19, 20--21, 92 A.2d 257, 258 (1952): 'On April 4, 1952, relator appealed to this Court from the dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Relator at that time was not in the custody of the respondent, the superintendent of county prison, on the original commitment.

'It is well settled that a person out on bail is not so restrained of his liberty as to be entitled to a writ of habeas corpus. 25 Am.Jur., Habeas Corpus, § 24, p. 158. See, also, Com. v. Green, 185 Pa. 641, 40 A. 96; Com. ex rel. Glenn v. Gill, 10 Pa.Co.Ct.R. 71. Relator not being in the custody of the respondent against whom the petition in habeas corpus was directed, the appeal from the order of the court below will be dismissed.

'Appeal is dismissed.'

In Commonwealth ex rel. Spader v. Burke, 171 Pa.Super.Ct. 289, 90 A.2d 849, this court had held as moot an appeal from the dismissal of the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus where the petitioner was released on parole pending disposition of his appeal and no longer was in the custody of the Warden 'from whose custody, by writ of habeas corpus, relator sought his discharge', the court reasoning at page 291, 90 A.2d at page 850: 'Since relator's release respondent-warden could not produce his body to answer any judgment of the court. A writ of habeas corpus is directed to the person detaining another and commanding him to produce the body. Relator being no longer detained by the respondent-warden the proceeding against him has become moot. See Van Meter v. Sanford, 5 Cir., 99 F.2d 511; Ex parte Herrera et al., (Cal.App.) 137 P.2d 82, 86.

'Appeal is dismissed.'

In Commonwealth ex rel. Wood v. Maroney, 207 Pa.Super.Ct. 191, 215 A.2d 286 (1965), the same reasoning was followed at page 192, 215 A.2d at page 287: 'As a consequence of Wood's parole he is no longer in the custody of the superintendent of the Western State Correctional Institution, wherefore the proceeding has become moot: Commonwealth ex rel. Spader v. Burke 171 Pa.Super.Ct. 289, 90 A.2d 849.' However, in Commonwealth ex rel. Ensor v. Cummings, 420 Pa. 23, 215 A.2d 651 (1966): after being released on parole the appellant-petitioner made the state parole board additional defendants of record, and it was held, at page 26, 215 A.2d at page 652: 'Since appellant is not now in custody of the superintendent of the correctional institution, the proceedings are moot as to this particular defendant. However, she is still 'in custody' of the parole board, since, while on parole, she is subject to conditions and restrictions which restrain her freedom. To these defendants, the proceedings are not moot. See also, In re Cawley, 369 Mich. 611, 120 N.W.2d 816 (1963), and People ex rel. Zangrillo v. Doherty, 40 Misc.2d 505, 243 N.Y.S.2d 694 (1963), compare also Garner v. Pennsylvania, 372 U.S. 768, 83 S.Ct. 1105, 10 L.Ed.2d 138 (1963).'

In so holding, however, the court held that 'the case of Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 83 S.Ct. 373, 9 L.Ed.2d 285 (1963) is apposite.' In that case, the United States Supreme Court stated: 'When the petitioner was placed on parole, his cause against the Superintendent of the Virginia State Penitentiary became moot because the superintendent's custody had come to an end, as much as if he had resigned his position with the...

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