Com., Human Relations Commission v. Thorp, Reed and Armstrong
| Decision Date | 24 June 1976 |
| Citation | 25 Pa.Cmwlth. 295,361 A.2d 497 |
| Parties | , 16 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1352, 12 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 11,058 COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania HUMAN RELATIONS COMMISSION v. THORP, REED & ARMSTRONG, Appellant, Marcella Phelps Hanson, Intervening-Appellee. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court |
This is a case of first impression involving a question of alleged discrimination in employment under Section 5(d) of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act 1 (Act), which provides:
'It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice unless based upon a bona fide occupational qualification . . .
'(d) For any employer, employment agency or labor organization to discriminate In any manner against any individual because such individual has opposed any practice forbidden by this act, or Because such individual has made a charge, testified or assisted, in any manner, In any investigation, proceeding or hearing under this act.' (Emphasis added.)
We have previously, of course, considered many cases of alleged discrimination in employment under Section 5(a) of the Act, 2 and an issue of discrimination as prohibited under that section of the Act and as between the same parties here concerned may yet come before us if and when either party appeals from a still pending decision of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission (Commission) as to whether or not there was Also discrimination in employment in this case because of the claimant's age or sex. Here, however, we are concerned only with the employer-appellant's appeal from the decision of the Commission that the employee-appellee, because of her original complaint of discrimination under Section 5(a) which has not yet been adjudicated, was later discriminated against under Section 5(d), and, if so, whether or not the Commission's order should be affirmed as issued.
The facts may be briefly stated. Marcella Phelps Hanson, then a 49-year-old woman attorney, who had then been employed as an associate of the law firm of Thorp, Reed & Armstrong (Thorp Reed) since November 1970, filed a complaint with the Commission on December 20, 1974 charging discrimination in employment because of age and sex. Thorp Reed was not informed of this complaint, either by the Commission or by Ms. Hanson, until Thursday, March 6, 1975 when Ms. Hanson advised Mr. Ralph DeStefano, a partner in the firm, that the Commission would be serving a complaint on the firm the following day. About one hour later, after Mr. DeStefano had reported the matter to Mr. Clyde W. Armstrong, a partner and secretary of the firm's Executive Committee, Mr. Armstrong directed Ms. Hanson by a written memorandum to prepare a list of the files which she was handling on matters concerning clients of the firm, so that such matters could be reassigned. On the following Monday, March 10, 1975, a letter was drafted and delivered in behalf of the firm to Ms. Hanson placing her on an indeterminate leave of absence with pay but otherwise completely disassociating her from the firm. She responded two days later, on March 12, 1975, by filing a second complaint with the Commission, charging therein that Thorp Reed's actions on March 10, 1975 amounted to another unlawful discriminatory practice under Section 5(d) of the Act. The Commission, which had as yet scheduled no hearing on the first complaint, scheduled and held hearings on the second complaint before three hearing commissioners on April 10 and 11, 1975, and issued its adjudication on June 1, 1975, determining that Thorp Reed had violated Section 5(d) of the Act. Its order directed that Ms. Hanson be restored to the full status which she enjoyed with the firm on March 6, 1975. 3 Thorp Reed here appeals from that adjudication.
The Administrative Agency Law 4 limits our scope of review here to a determination as to whether or not the findings of fact necessary for the Commission's adjudication were supported by substantial evidence, whether or not the adjudication was made in accordance with law, and whether or not the Commission abused its discretion either in reaching its decision or in directing appropriate relief. Freeport Area School District v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission, 18 Pa.Cmwlth. 400, 335 A.2d 873 (1975); Midland Heights Homes v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission, 17 Pa.Cmwlth. 563, 333 A.2d 516 (1975). And, of course, our review must be limited to the adjudication here under appeal, which, as previously noted, concerns only Ms. Hanson's second complaint charging Thorp Reed with Section 5(d) discrimination. We are Not here concerned with her first complaint which charged age and sex discrimination under Section 5(a) of the Act.
Thorp Reed first raises a procedural due process challenge to the hearings held by the Commission on April 10 and 11, 1975. It argues that, at those hearings, an assistant attorney general who was attached to the legal branch of the Commission presented the charges, while, at the same time, the General Counsel, who was also attached to the legal branch of the Commission, served as legal advisor to the hearing commissioners. Unquestionably this commingling of prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions in the legal office of the Commission 'comes perilously close' to a violation of due process. State Board of Medical Education and Licensure v. Grumbles, 22 Pa.Cmwlth. 74, 347 A.2d 782 (1975). We clearly do not have the constitutionally permissible circumstances where prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions are handled by separate branches of an administrative entity, See State Dental Council and Examining Board v. Pollock, 457 Pa. 264, 318 A.2d 910 (1974); nor do we have the constitutionally impermissible circumstances where prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions are commingled in the same individual, Dussia v. Barger, --- Pa. ---, 351 A.2d 667 (1975); Horn v. Township of Hilltown, 461 Pa. 745, 337 A.2d 858 (1975); Gardner v. Repasky, 434 Pa. 126, 252 A.2d 704 (1969); English v. North East Board of Education, 22 Pa.Cmwlth. 240, 348 A.2d 494 (1975); In re: Appeal of Feldman, 21 Pa.Cmwlth. 451, 346 A.2d 895 (1975); and most notably Pennsylvania Relations Commission v. Feeser, 20 Pa.Cmwlth. 406, 341 A.2d 584 (1975). Instead, we have two individuals who are both within the same branch of an adminstrative entity, one handling a prosecutorial function and the other separately handling an adjudicatory function. These circumstances place us at the interface between a constitutionally permissible and a constitutionally impermissible commingling of prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions. See State Board of Medical Education and Licensure v. Grumbles, supra.
We are mindful, of course, that a fair trial in a fair tribunal is the basic requirement of due process and that fairness requires the absence of actual bias in the trial of cases. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 75 S.Ct. 623, 99 L.Ed. 942 (1955); Accord, Dussia v. Barger, supra. We also recognize that the most critical function in the prosecution and adjudication of administrative cases is in the resolution of disputed facts because the findings of fact which result from administrative proceedings are subject to only limited appellate review. The fact finding process, therefore, must be afforded the broadest dimensions of constitutional protection.
We have, however, meticulously examined the proceedings before the hearing commissioners in this case and we cannot find that the Commission and its counsel have crossed here into unconstitutional realms. In this respect, it is significant that the facts of this case are largely undisputed and that the findings of the Commission which were necessary to support a violation of Section 5(d) of the Act are not challenged by the appellant. The possible absence of constitutional protections during the critical fact finding phases of this case, therefore, was not a factor which resulted in any unfairness to Thorp Reed. The issue, consequently, is a matter of legal determination, not of determination of fact. And, while it may be extremely difficult to uncover bias or unfairness among an agency's findings of fact, a reviewing court unquestionably has power to examine the legal conclusions drawn therefrom (which we have done,) whether such conclusions were affected by bias or otherwise. 5 Viewing the case in this light we do not believe that Thorp Reed has been denied due process of law.
Thorp Reed also argues that, even if the procedure can be held constitutional, Section 5(d) of the Act was not actually violated in this case. It contends first that what it did was actually not discriminatory under the Act. It must be noted, however, that an unlawful discriminatory practice may be established upon a well supported finding that an employer has taken 'any manner' of discriminatory action against an individual because he or she has filed a charge under the Act, and that nether animosity nor resentment need by shown to establish a violation. Here the Commission has found that, when, on March 6, 1975, Thorp Reed learned that Ms. Hanson had filed a charge under the Act, a determination was then made by Thorp Reed that she should no longer continue to represent 'firm clients' 6 and she was directed, therefore, to list the files which she had been handling for those clients so that the files could be reassigned. The...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Shah v. State Bd. of Medicine
...a person who must remain impartial to tilt the balance in favor of one side. In Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission v. Thorp, Reed and Armstrong, 25 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 295, 302, 361 A.2d 497, 501 (1976), we stated The most critical function in the prosecution and adjudication of admini......
-
Collins v. State of Ill.
...... an isolated area of the plant."), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 675 F.2d 811 (6th Cir.1982).10 Commonwealth v. Thorp, Reed & Armstrong, 25 Pa.Commw. 295, 361 A.2d 497, 502 (1976) (holding in sex and age discrimination case, based on state statute similar to Title VII, that law firm r......
-
Boyd v. Brookstone Corp. of New Hampshire, Inc., 93-6632-CIV.
...to move her personal files and was prohibited from using the firm's stationery and support services, Commonwealth v. Thorp, Reed & Armstrong, 25 Pa.Cmwlth. 295, 361 A.2d 497, 502 (1976) (applying a state statute similar to Title VII). Moreover, several courts have also determined that the s......
-
Keystone Redevelopment Partners, LLC v. Pa. Gaming Control Bd.
...of fact. See Horsley v. Phila. Bd. of Pensions & Ret. 519 Pa. 264, 546 A.2d 1115 (1988) (citing Pa. Human Relations Comm'n v. Thorp, Reed & Armstrong, 25 Pa.Cmwlth. 295, 361 A.2d 497 (1976)) (the resolution of disputed facts, which are subject to limited appellate review, is the most critic......