Com. of Puerto Rico v. Perez Casillas
| Decision Date | 04 December 1985 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. 85-2272 (JAF). |
| Citation | 624 F. Supp. 822 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO v. Angel PEREZ CASILLAS, Rafael Torres Marrero, Rafael Moreno Morales, Luis Reveron Martinez, William Colon Berrios, Jose Rios Polanco, Juan Bruno Gonzalez, Nelson Gonzalez Perez, Jaime Quiles Hernandez, Nazario Mateo Espada. COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO v. Luis Daniel ERAZO FELIX, Roberto Morales Rivera, a/k/a Rocky, Eugene Rios Santiago, Carlos Santiago Borrero, Carlos Rivera Falu, Luis A. Vargas Lebron and Alejandro Gonzalez Malave United States of America, Petitioner, Petition for Removal, Motion for Expedited Partial Remand and for Compelling the Return of Luis Reverón Martínez to the Custody of the Attorney General of the United States. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
William Fred Santiago, Independent Sp. Prosecutor, José M. Ortiz-Miller, Hato Rey, Puerto Rico, Secretary of Justice of P.R., Federal Litigations Div., Dept. of Justice, San Juan, Puerto Rico, for plaintiffs.
Gary H. Montilla, Asst. U.S. Atty., Hato Rey, Puerto Rico, for petitioners U.S.A. and U.S. Marshal.
William Bradford Reynolds, Asst. Atty. Gen., Criselda Ortiz, Atty., Civil Rights Div., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., for defendants.
The above-captioned criminal cases involving charges of first-degree murder and kidnapping against former police officers were removed to this Court from the Superior Court of Puerto Rico, Utuado Part. The petition for removal was filed by the United States on November 12, 1985. Removal was prompted by the fact that within the mentioned criminal cases, identified by the Superior Court of Puerto Rico, Utuado Part, with numbers 85-530, 85-498, 85-505, and 85-512, an Independent Special Prosecutor, acting on behalf of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, filed a petition for habeas corpus ad testificandum concerning Luis Reverón-Martínez, hereinafter referred to as "Reverón". The Utuado Court granted said civil relief as a separate procedural incident within the criminal cases and ordered that Reverón, a federal prisoner, be turned over by the United States Marshal to local authorities indefinitely until the conclusion of local criminal proceedings. Reverón, originally charged as a defendant in the Utuado Court, is now also a witness against the other co-defendants.1
This case raises important questions affecting the interrelationship of federal and state courts in the administration of the criminal justice system. We have taken judicial notice of proceedings in Criminal Case No. 84-0070 (CC), entitled United States of America v. Luis Reverón-Martínez, which case was tried to conclusion before this Court. A review of relevant parts of that record is in order.
On March 28, 1985, Reverón was convicted before this Court, in Criminal No. 84-0070 (CC), for conspiracy to obstruct justice and perjury, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1621, and 1623. On May 21, 1985, a provisional sentence of imprisonment was imposed by U.S. District Judge Carmen Consuelo Cerezo. Judge Cerezo concluded that a preponderance of the evidence showed that Reverón was suffering from a mental defect. 18 U.S.C. § 4244. As a result thereof, the provisional sentence was entered. Reverón was committed to the custody of the Attorney General of the United States or his authorized representative for psychiatric treatment and hospitalization. The Attorney General designated the U.S. Medical Center for Federal Prisoners in Springfield, Missouri as the facility where Reverón was to be committed under the terms of the provisional sentence.
On May 10, 1985, the Independent Special Prosecutor petitioned the Superior Court of Puerto Rico, Utuado Part, for a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum. Through this writ, the Independent Special Prosecutor intended to remove Reverón from federal custody in order to prosecute him before the Utuado Court for whatever criminal offenses he committed resulting from the Cerro Maravilla incident of July, 1978.2 Reverón was initially scheduled to appear at a preliminary hearing on August 6, 1985. Having notice of Reverón's federal conviction, provisional sentence, and federal commitment, the Superior Court of Puerto Rico, Utuado Part, issued a first writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum on July 29, 1985. The United States of America consented to the writ and turned over Reverón to the pertinent local authorities on August 4, 1985.
On August 15, 1985, the Independent Special Prosecutor appeared before this Court and filed, in Criminal No. 84-0070 (CC), United States of America v. Luis Reverón-Martínez, a request for limited intervention and an informative motion. Said filing informed this Court that criminal proceedings against Reverón had been continued to September 4, 1985. The Independent Special Prosecutor sought a federal order that would allow Reverón to remain in Puerto Rico until the completion of all local judicial proceedings against him. Having consented to the original local habeas corpus petition, the United States of America requested this Court to order that Reverón be returned to the U.S. medical facility in Springfield, Missouri if any hearing was continued or scheduled for any date after October 4, 1985. By so doing, the United States reaffirmed its consent to the local authorities having custody over Reverón for at least thirty additional days in order to facilitate local prosecution efforts against him for the charges of first-degree murder and kidnapping mentioned before.
On September 23, 1985, Judge Cerezo ordered the Independent Special Prosecutor to define the terms of stay of Reverón in Puerto Rico for the upcoming local judicial proceedings. The Independent Special Prosecutor responded with a request similar to the earlier one, that is, that Reverón was needed as a potential defendant. In addition, Judge Cerezo was informed about the fact that Reverón was now a key witness for the prosecution. On October 11, 1985, Judge Cerezo denied the Independent Special Prosecutor's motion seeking Reverón's indefinite stay in Puerto Rico. The following factors were dispositive: Reverón was a federal inmate in federal custody since the provisional sentence of May 21, 1985; the court had determined that he needed immediate psychiatric treatment for a depressive disorder; and, the local proceedings could take substantial time, thus hampering the Attorney General's arrangements for the psychiatric treatment and hospitalization of Reverón at the mentioned federal facility in Springfield, Missouri. At all times, the United States has opposed Reverón's indefinite stay in Puerto Rico.3 The government argues that the provisional sentence is controlling.
Pursuant to the provisional sentence, 18 U.S.C. § 4244, Judge Cerezo ordered the Independent Special Prosecutor and/or the Commonwealth authorities to return Reverón to the U.S. Medical Center in Springfield, Missouri for hospitalization and treatment. On October 18, 1985, the Independent Special Prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration, which motion was denied with a further order that Reverón be returned to federal authorities not later than October 23, 1985. See App. A to this Memorandum Opinion.4
Instead of complying with this Court's order regarding the return of Reverón to federal authorities, the Independent Special Prosecutor appeared before the Superior Court of Puerto Rico, Utuado Part, and as of October 24, 1985, obtained from said court a second writ of habeas corpus, this time ad testificandum. As stated before, the order was obtained against the United States Marshal, not in an independent civil action, but as an incident within the four criminal cases pending against the named defendants as they appear in the caption of this case. The terms of the second writ were to the effect that Reverón was to remain in Puerto Rico as a witness under local custody until the completion of all pending local criminal proceedings.
The procedural situation described above created the inevitable unpleasant conflict between federal and state jurisdictions which both, courts and parties, should avoid. The issuance of the second writ of habeas corpus was in open contradiction with the terms of Judge Cerezo's post-conviction orders in Criminal No. 84-0070 (CC). As of today, said orders are binding. In light of this factual background, we turn to the issues of removal jurisdiction, the validity of the writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum, and the federal remedy.
The federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) provides:
The purpose of the federal officer removal statute is clear. In order to prevent a paralysis in the operations of the federal government, Gay v. Ruff, 292 U.S. 25, 32, 54 S.Ct. 608, 611, 78 L.Ed. 1099 (1934), a federal officer sued in state court has a right to elect a federal forum in which to raise any colorable defense. Arizona v. Manypenny, 451 U.S. 232, 241-42, 101 S.Ct. 1657, 1664, 68 L.Ed.2d 58 (1981); Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 406, 89 S.Ct. 1813, 1815, 23 L.Ed.2d 396 (1969). "The rationale for granting a right of removal to federal officers acting under color of office has always been the protection of the exercise of legitimate federal authority against interference by individual states through their courts." 14A C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and...
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Sweeney v. State
...523-24, 21 How. 506, 16 L.Ed. 169 (1859). This principle has been reaffirmed on several occasions. See Comm. of Puerto Rico v. Perez Casillas, 624 F.Supp. 822, 830 n. 5 (D.P.R.1985). However, the federal government may, based on principles of comity, honor state-issued Writs. See Ponzi v. F......
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