Com. of Va. v. Reno
| Decision Date | 11 February 1997 |
| Docket Number | C.A. No. 96-826-A. |
| Citation | 955 F.Supp. 571 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, Plaintiff v. Janet RENO, Attorney General of the United States, and the District of Columbia, Defendants. |
James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General of Virginia, David E. Anderson, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Catherine C. Hammond, Deputy Attorney General, Gregory E. Lucyk, Senior Assistant Attorney General, A. Ann Berkebile, Pamela A. Sargent, Assistant Attorneys General, and Peter R. Messitt, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, Richmond, Virginia, for Plaintiff.
Helen F. Fahey, United States Attorney, Dennis E. Szybala, Assistant United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, Vincent M. Garvey, Joseph W. Lobue, Department of Justice, Charles F.C. Ruff, Corporation, Counsel, D.C., Michael E. Zielinski, Deputy Corporation Counsel, D.C., William J. Earl, Asst. Deputy Corporation Counsel, D.C., Special Litigation Division, Louise Phillips, and Justin Draycott, Assistant Corporation Counsel, D.C., Washington, D.C., for Defendants.
In this action, the Commonwealth of Virginia seeks to close the District of Columbia's Lorton Correctional Complex ("Lorton"). Because Lorton lies outside the District of Columbia ("District") and wholly within Virginia's boundaries, the Commonwealth of Virginia argues that the District's operation of Lorton exceeds the power granted the federal government under the Enclave Clause, U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 17. The federal government and the District respond by asserting that it is the Property Clause, U.S. Const., Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2, not the Enclave Clause, that governs here and authorizes both the acquisition of the property on which Lorton stands and the District's operation of Lorton. Thus, the parties' respective cross-motions for summary judgment and dismissal present the question whether the Enclave Clause limits Congress' power under the Property Clause to authorize the District's operation of a municipal prison beyond the ten mile square area set aside for the seat of federal government.
In the first decade of this century, the District began to explore possible sites in Virginia and Maryland for the construction and operation of a reformatory and workhouse for municipal prisoners. In 1909, Congress expressly authorized the District's Commissioners to acquire two tracts of land in either Maryland or Virginia to "be used as a site for the construction and erection of a reformatory ... and a workhouse...." Act of March 3, 1909, 35 Stat. 688, 717, ch. 250. The manner in which title to the site should be acquired, however, was the subject of an inquiry by then-U.S. Attorney General George Wickersham. In a letter to President Theodore Roosevelt, Wickersham explained his legal conclusion that the federal government, not the District, should acquire title to the site to avoid any constitutional infirmity.2 Accordingly, Congress amended the initial Act to provide that the United States would take title to the land. Act of August 5, 1909, 36 Stat. 118, 122, ch. 7.
And so it did. In a series of separate transactions occurring between March 1910 to December 1953, the United States acquired nine parcels of land in Fairfax County, Virginia by private sale or condemnation proceedings.3 The nine contiguous parcels, which total approximately 3,000 acres, constitute present-day Lorton. The first parcel was acquired on March 19, 1910, when the United States purchased a parcel of land for Lorton's workhouse from private parties. Then, between April 10, 1913 and August 22, 1934, the United States acquired by purchase five more parcels of property for Lorton's reformatory. And finally, the federal government obtained Lorton's three remaining parcels during the period from August 3, 1944 to December 2, 1953. All nine parcels were acquired with congressionally appropriated funds and are titled in the name of the United States.4
Although the federal government acquired and paid for the land on which Lorton stands, the federal Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") has never been involved in Lorton's operation, management, or regulation.5 Instead, since Lorton's inception, Congress has vested authority for its operation in various administrative bodies of the District. In 1926, Congress created a Board of Public Welfare, which consisted of nine members appointed by the District's Commissioners, to supervise Lorton's superintendent and other prison employees. Act of March 16, 1926, 44 Stat. 209, ch. 58. Then, in 1946, Congress created the District's Department of Corrections and transferred the powers and duties of the Board of Public Welfare to the Director of the new Department. Act of June 27, 1946, 60 Stat. 320, ch. 507, §§ 1 and 3 (codified at D.C.Code Ann. §§ 24-441 and 24-443 (1981)). The statute provided that the Department of Corrections shall "have charge of the management and regulation" of Lorton, "be responsible for the safekeeping, care, protection, instruction, and discipline" of all persons committed there, and "have power to promulgate rules and regulations for [its] government." Id., § 2 (codified at § 24-442 (1981)). In carrying out these responsibilities, the Department of Corrections has been, and continues to be, subject to the supervision and control of the District's governing body, which itself has changed form over time.6
Currently, Lorton houses three distinct classes of prisoners: (1) those sentenced by the District's Superior Courts for municipal offenses; (2) those sentenced by the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia for local crimes; and (3) those sentenced by the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia for federal infractions.7 The U.S. Attorney General has authority to designate Lorton, as well as other suitable prison facilities, as the place of confinement for these three classes of prisoners. Act of June 6, 1940, 54 Stat. 244, ch. 254, § 8 (codified at D.C.Code § 24-425 (1981)).8
Lorton's operation does not, of course, require use of all of the approximately 3,000 acres on which the facility stands. Other activities also occur on the property. In this regard, the federal government allows the District to assert a proprietary interest over the Lorton property by leasing portions of it to third parties and by using other portions of it for other non-penal purposes, both municipal and private.9 Thus, the District has located a landfill on Lorton property to hold waste and debris collected from District residents across the Potomac River. Further, the District has leased portions of Lorton property to Vulcan Materials Company for a stone products processing plant. Finally, the District requires federal agencies seeking access to Lorton, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the Department of the Army, to enter into permit agreements for this purpose.
In recent years, severe budget deficits, escalating cash-flow shortages, and a dramatic increase in crime have plagued the District. As a result, the Lorton inmate population has grown significantly, while Lorton's facilities have not been significantly enlarged or modernized. Virginia correctly claims that Lorton has experienced numerous operational problems as a consequence of the District's well-documented decline. Specifically, Virginia points to a 1996 study, authorized by Congress and conducted by the National Council on Crime and Delinquency, that found Lorton's facilities to be "deplorable." The study noted that many of Lorton's basic structures needed repair or replacement, that most of its buildings had no sprinkler and/or fire alarm systems, and that the security staff was wholly unprepared to control adequately the burgeoning inmate population. Accordingly, Virginia complains that escapes and other inmate disturbances threaten the safety and well-being of Virginia's citizens and burden the state's financial and administrative resources.10
This action, filed on June 13, 1996, contains three counts. Counts I and II both claim that the Enclave Clause, U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 17, prohibits Congress from authorizing the operation of a prison facility in Virginia for the District's inmates. Specifically, Count I claims that the District's Code provisions conferring authority on the Department of Corrections for Lorton exceeds the ten mile territorial limit of the Enclave Clause, while Count II claims that the District's use and occupation of a municipal prison violates Virginia's sovereignty. Alternatively, Count III alleges that the U.S. Attorney General lacks any constitutional authority to designate Lorton as the place of confinement for the District's prisoners.
Defendants, Janet Reno and the District, filed separate motions to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Fed.R.Civ.P., on August 16, 1996. On September 5, 1996, plaintiff, Virginia, objected to those two motions and then moved for summary judgment under Rule 56, Fed.R.Civ.P. The motions were argued orally and taken under advisement with the parties invited, but not required, to file additional briefs. Commonwealth of Virginia v. Reno, C.A. No. 96-826-A (Order, November 15, 1996). The parties did not avail themselves of this opportunity and the motions are now ripe for disposition.
The Constitution explicitly refers to federal power over property in two, independent passages: the Enclave Clause, U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 17,11 and the Property Clause, U.S. Const., Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.12 The seldom-analyzed relationship between these two independent grants of federal property power is at the heart of this action. In brief, the Enclave Clause grants Congress exclusive legislative jurisdiction over all property, federal and private, within particular geographical areas, or enclaves. The Property Clause grants the federal government sweeping authority to...
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...time of the suit or, like the rest of the Navy base, was an area of exclusive federal jurisdiction); see also Commonwealth of Va. v. Reno, 955 F.Supp. 571, 573 (E.D.Va.1997) (finding that a federal correctional facility in Virginia was acquired by the United States in a series of separate t......