Com'R of Env. Protection v. Mellon, 17945.

• Decision Date: 29 April 2008
• Docket Number: No. 17945.,17945.
• Citation: 945 A.2d 464,286 Conn. 687
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: COMMISSIONER OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION v. Timothy MELLON et al.

945 A.2d 464

286 Conn. 687

COMMISSIONER OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION v. Timothy MELLON et al.

No. 17945.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued February 14, 2008.

Decided April 29, 2008.

David H. Wrinn, assistant attorney general, with whom were George W. O'Connell, assistant attorney general, and, on the brief, Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Dean M. Cordiano, with whom were Sharon M. Seligman, Hartford, and John R. Bashaw, Boston, MA, for the appellees (defendants).

ROGERS, C.J., and NORCOTT, KATZ, PALMER and SCHALLER, Js.

ROGERS, C.J.

The sole issue in this appeal¹ is whether the trial court properly determined that the plaintiff, the commissioner of environmental protection (commissioner),² was not eligible, under General Statutes § 22a-18(e),³ for an award of attorney's fees and costs after prevailing in his action against the defendants, Timothy Mellon and Goodspeed Airport, LLC,⁴ pursuant to the Connecticut Environmental Protection Act of 1971(act), General Statutes § 22a-14 et seq. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The record reveals the following undisputed facts and procedural history. Goodspeed Airport, LLC, operates an airport in East Haddam. Mellon is the sole member of Goodspeed Airport, LLC. The commissioner filed a three count complaint against the defendants alleging, inter alia, that they had violated the act by cutting all of the trees and other vegetation on approximately 2.5 acres of land adjacent to the airport owned by the East Haddam Land Trust and the Nature Conservancy. After a trial to the court, the court rendered judgment for the defendants on count one of the complaint alleging unreasonable impairment of wetlands and water-courses in violation of General Statutes § 22a-16, and for the commissioner on count three of the complaint alleging unreasonable impairment and destruction of floodplain forest in violation of § 22a-16. The defendants appealed to this court and the commissioner cross appealed. See Rocque v. Mellon, 275 Conn. 161, 164, 881 A.2d 972 (2005). We concluded that the trial court properly had rendered judgment for the commissioner on count three and that it improperly had rendered judgment for the defendants on count one. Id. Accordingly, we remanded the case to the trial court with direction to render judgment for the commissioner on count one. Id., at 171, 881 A.2d 972. Thereafter, the United States Supreme Court denied the defendants' petition for a writ of certiorari. Goodspeed Airport, LLC v. Ventres, 547 U.S. 1111, 126 S.Ct. 1913, 164 L.Ed.2d 664 (2006).

After this court remanded the case to the trial court, the commissioner, pursuant to § 22a-18(e), filed an application for an award in the amount of $138,926.70 for attorney's fees, expenses and costs that had been incurred by the department of environmental protection in all phases of this litigation.⁵ The trial court denied the application on the ground that a "person" entitled to recover costs and fees under § 22a-18(e) means natural persons and does not include public entities, such as the department of environmental protection.

This appeal followed. The commissioner claims that the trial court improperly denied his application for attorney's fees, expenses and costs on the ground that a public entity is not a "person" within the meaning of § 22a-18(e). We disagree.

The meaning of the word "person" as used in § 22a-8 (e) is a question of statutory interpretation over which our review is plenary. See Tracy v. Scherwitzky Gutter Co., 279 Conn. 265, 273, 901 A.2d 1176 (2006). When construing a statute, "General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Southern New England Telephone Co. v. Cashman, 283 Conn. 644, 650, 931 A.2d 142 (2007). "Furthermore, we presume that laws are enacted in view of existing relevant statutes ... and that [s]tatutes are to be interpreted with regard to other relevant statutes because the legislature is presumed to have created a consistent body of law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Cardwell, 246 Conn. 721, 738-39, 718 A.2d 954 (1998).

In the present case, the commissioner contends that the word "person," as used in § 22a-18(e), is defined in General Statutes § 22a-2(c), which provides in relevant part: "As used in this chapter⁶ ... except where otherwise provided, `person' means any individual, firm, partnership, association, syndicate, company, trust, corporation, limited liability company, municipality agency or political or administrative subdivision of the state, or other legal entity of any kind." (Emphasis added.) Thus, he contends, the word "person" as used in § 22a-18(e) plainly and unambiguously includes state agencies.

The defendants contend, to the contrary, that because § 22a-18(e) refers only to "any person, partnership, corporation, association, organization or other legal entity," and does not refer expressly to the public entities listed in § 22a-2(c), § 22a-18(e) unambiguously excludes such public entities from its scope. The defendants further contend that, if the definition set forth in § 22a-2(c) is applied to § 22a-18(e), the enumeration of the various types of entities in that statute would be rendered redundant. Thus, the defendants argue, § 22a-18 (e) falls within the "where otherwise provided" exception to the definition of "person" set forth in § 22a-2 (c), and the word "person" under § 22a-18(e) means a natural person.

We conclude that the legislature's decision to exclude some of the types of entities listed in § 22a-2(c) from § 22a-18, but to include others, raises doubt as to whether the legislature intended for the definition of "person" set forth in § 22a-2(c) to apply to § 22a-18(e).⁷ Accordingly we conclude that the meaning of the term "person" as used in § 22a-18(e) is ambiguous and that we may consider extratextual sources in determining its meaning.

After considering these sources and the arguments of the parties, we conclude that the defendants' interpretation of § 22a-18(e) is the more reasonable one. First, as the defendants point out, if the legislature had intended for § 22a-2(c) to apply to § 22a-18(e), it would have had no reason to enumerate the specific classes of entities in § 22a-18(e), each of which already is included in the statutory definition of "person" in § 22a-2 (c), rendering further enumeration superfluous. "We generally reject a construction that renders any portion of a statute superfluous." Interlude, Inc. v. Skurat, 266 Conn. 130, 147, 831 A.2d 235 (2003).

Second, although the legislature enumerated certain classes of legal entities in § 22a-18(e), it did not list public entities. "Unless there is evidence to the contrary, statutory itemization indicates that the legislature intended the list to be exclusive."⁸ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bridgeport Hospital v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 232 Conn. 91, 101, 653 A.2d 782 (1995).

Third, as the trial court recognized, the entities enumerated in § 22a-18(e) are identical to those that are authorized to bring an action under § 22a-16,⁹ with the sole exception that § 22a-18(e) omits any reference to public entities. Section 22a-16 was enacted in 1971; Public Acts 1971, No. 71-96, § 3; whereas § 22a-18(e), which specifically references § 22a-16 in delineating the entities who may be awarded costs and attorney's fees in an action brought pursuant to § 22a-16, was enacted in 1990. Public Acts 1990, No. 90-222, § 4. Accordingly, it is reasonable to conclude that the legislature had § 22a-16 in mind when it enacted § 22a-18(e) and that it deliberately excluded the public entities listed in § 22a-16 from its scope.¹⁰ The legislative history of § 22a-18 (e) strongly supports this interpretation. During the floor debate on the bill that ultimately was enacted as § 22a-18(e), Senator Steven Spellman explained that the proposed legislation "authorizes a court to award costs to any private entity that successfully sues for declaratory and equitable relief ... [under the] environmental protection laws." (Emphasis added.) 33 S. Proc., Pt. 9, 1990 Sess., p. 2916.

Finally, "[t]he common law rule in Connecticut, also known as the American Rule, is that attorney's fees and ordinary expenses and burdens of litigation are not allowed to the successful party absent a contractual or statutory exception.... Because we must respect the legislative prerogative of choosing the special circumstances under which [attorney's fees] awards may be made ... we require a clear expression of the legislature's intent to create a statutory exception [to the rule]." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Ames v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 267 Conn. 524, 532-33, 839 A.2d 1250 (2004). "In the absence of such language, we will not presume that the legislature intended for [a statute] to operate in derogation of our long-standing common-law rule disfavoring the award of attorney's fees to the prevailing party." Id., at 533, 839 A.2d 1250. Although this rule typically is invoked when the statutory language is unclear as to whether it authorizes an award of attorney's fees to any person, we conclude that it also applies when the legislature clearly has authorized the court to award attorney's fees but, as in the present case, the statute is ambiguous as to whether a particular entity is entitled to such an award.

As the trial court also recognized, the defendants' interpretation is consistent with the public policy underlying the act and the legislature's "strong commitment to the act's broad remedial goals...." Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v....