Com. Through Unified Judicial System v. Vartan

• Decision Date: 13 May 1996
• Citation: 674 A.2d 1156
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, acting Through the UNIFIED JUDICIAL SYSTEM by the agency of the Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts, Petitioner v. John O. VARTAN, trading as Independent American Investments, a registered fictitious name, Respondent.
• Court: Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court

Page 1156

674 A.2d 1156

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, acting Through the UNIFIED JUDICIAL SYSTEM by the agency of the Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts, Petitioner v. John O. VARTAN, trading as Independent American Investments a registered fictitious name, Respondent.

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued Dec. 4, 1995.

Decided April 15, 1996.

Reargument Denied May 13, 1996.

Paul H. Titus, for Petitioner.

Andrew L. Swope, for Respondent.

Before FRIEDMAN and KELLEY, JJ., and LORD, Senior Judge.

FRIEDMAN, Judge.

John O. Vartan, trading as Independent American Investments (Vartan), has filed Preliminary Objections to the Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts' (AOPC) Amended Petition for Review of a Governmental Determination in the Nature of a Petition for a Writ of Prohibition and/or Mandamus (Amended Petition for Review).

AOPC and Vartan entered into a written lease agreement (Contract) on October 10, 1989 for a parcel of land on which Vartan was to build a courthouse which would be occupied by the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania. The Contract was contingent upon AOPC's obtaining all government approvals which, in its sole discretion, it deemed necessary for the project and the lease. Under the terms of the Contract, however, AOPC had no obligation to seek or obtain the necessary approvals and could terminate the Contract without incurring liability if it failed to do so. AOPC exercised its right to terminate by letter to Vartan, dated June 6, 1990, from the designated contract officer for AOPC, the Court Administrator of Pennsylvania.

Consequently, Vartan filed a complaint before the Board of Claims (Board), averring that Vartan had relied to its detriment on one or more written communications from the then President Judge of the Commonwealth Court, which stated that project approvals had been obtained and that the Contract would not be terminated. Vartan claimed that the Contract was not lawfully terminated because "by virtue of its conduct, [AOPC] is estopped from asserting the benefit of the termination provisions of paragraph 4(b) of the Lease or any other provision of the Lease." (Complaint, paragraph 18.) Damages claimed were "at least $6,500,000.00." (Complaint, paragraph 19.)

On April 25, 1995, Vartan directed a notice of deposition and subpoena to Chief Justice Robert N.C. Nix, Jr. (Chief Justice Nix) of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, seeking to discover facts concerning Chief Justice Nix's involvement with the Contract. On May 11, 1995, AOPC moved to quash the subpoena; following the submission of briefs by both parties, the Board denied the motion on July 5, 1995.

Consequently, on August 7, 1995, AOPC filed in this court a Petition for Review of a Governmental Determination in the Nature of a Petition for a Writ of Prohibition and/or Mandamus, seeking an order compelling the Board to quash Vartan's subpoena and/or prohibiting Vartan from taking the deposition. Vartan filed Preliminary Objections on September 1, 1995. In response, AOPC filed the Amended Petition for Review on or about September 18, 1995. It is in reply to this Amended Petition for Review that Vartan has filed the Preliminary Objections before us here.

I.

Initially, we note that Vartan's Preliminary Objections challenge this court's jurisdiction over the Amended Petition for Review, ¹ alleging that we lack the authority to issue a writ of mandamus or prohibition to the Board because there is no appeal pending in this court from which the request for prohibition or mandamus relief stems. We disagree.

In Municipal Publications, Inc. v. Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 507 Pa. 194, 489 A.2d 1286 (1985), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed the question of whether the Superior Court had original jurisdiction to entertain a petition for a writ of prohibition to the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas when no appeal was pending in the Superior Court. The Supreme Court, noting that the Superior Court has been vested with broad appellate jurisdiction but only extremely limited original jurisdiction, examined the language of section 741 of the Judicial Code, which defines the Superior Court's original jurisdiction as follows:

The Superior Court shall have no original jurisdiction, except in cases of mandamus and prohibition to courts of inferior jurisdiction where such relief is ancillary to matters within its appellate jurisdiction....

42 Pa.C.S. § 741 (emphasis added).

Interpreting this language in light of its own constitutional duty to supervise all inferior courts of this Commonwealth, see Pa. Const. Art. V, § 10(a), the Supreme Court concluded that the Superior Court has original jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus or prohibition only where an appeal properly within its appellate jurisdiction is pending in the Superior Court and where the issuance of such a writ becomes necessary to mandate or prohibit action by a lower court that would interfere with the Superior Court's effective exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Id. The Supreme Court held that, without an appeal pending in the Superior Court, mandamus or prohibition relief cannot be "ancillary" to matters within the Superior Court's appellate jurisdiction; thus, there would be no predicate for the Superior Court's exercise of original jurisdiction, as required by 42 Pa.C.S. § 741. Id.

Because there was no appeal pending in the Superior Court at the time the petition for a writ of prohibition was filed there, the Supreme Court assumed jurisdiction over the writ pursuant to section 721 of the Judicial Code. ² In doing so, the Supreme Court essentially held that, where a party files a petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition to a "court of inferior jurisdiction" in an appellate court where no appeal is currently pending, the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction over such a petition is exclusive. Where, on the other hand, a party files a petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition to a "court of inferior jurisdiction" in an appellate court where there is an appeal currently pending, the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction over such a petition is concurrent with that of the appellate court.

This court has since held that, because section 761(c) of the Judicial Code, ³ which delineates the scope of the Commonwealth Court's original jurisdiction over petitions for mandamus or prohibition, sets forth language identical to that of section 741, Municipal Publications is controlling. See Leiber v. County of Allegheny, 654 A.2d 11 (Pa.Cmwlth.1994). Accordingly, where a petitioner requests this court to issue a writ of mandamus or prohibition to a "court of inferior jurisdiction" and there is no appeal pending before us, we have held that we must transfer the matter to the Supreme Court pursuant to sections 721 and 5103(a) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 5103(a). ⁴ Id.

Here, however, we are faced with a jurisdictional issue that we have never directly addressed before. In its Amended Petition for Review, the petitioner, AOPC, requests us to issue a writ of mandamus and/or prohibition to the Board. Because there is no appeal currently pending in this court, Municipal Publications would seemingly require us to transfer this matter to the Supreme Court pursuant to section 721.

However, under section 721, the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus and prohibition only to "courts of inferior jurisdiction." 42 Pa.C.S. § 721 (emphasis added). Because the Board is a quasi-judicial tribunal outside the unified judicial system, ⁵ it is not a "court of inferior jurisdiction;" thus, the Supreme Court is without original jurisdiction to issue the writs requested here. Consequently, we must decide whether this court may assume jurisdiction over AOPC's Amended Petition for Review even though there is no appeal currently pending here.

Extending the logic of Municipal Publications, we hold that this court may not assume original jurisdiction over a petition for review in the nature of a former common law writ ⁶ when no appeal is pending in this court and there is a proper alternative forum to decide the controversy. Where there is no alternative forum, however, i.e., where this court is the court of last resort as a matter of right, we may assume original jurisdiction over a petition for review in the nature of a former common law writ, despite the fact that there is no appeal pending in this court.

Here, as noted, the Supreme Court is without original jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus or prohibition to the Board; the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue such writs extends only to "courts of inferior jurisdiction." 42 Pa.C.S. § 721. The Commonwealth Court's original jurisdiction, on the other hand, extends both to "courts of inferior jurisdiction and other government units." ⁷ 42 Pa.C.S. § 761(c) (emphasis added). The Board, as a quasi-judicial tribunal outside the unified judicial system, is an "other government unit." Accordingly, as the only court with original jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus or prohibition to "other government units," ⁸ including all Commonwealth administrative agencies, departments and tribunals outside the unified judicial system, we are the court of last resort as a matter of right in this case. ⁹ Thus, we conclude that we may properly assume original jurisdiction over AOPC's Amended Petition for Review, despite the fact that there is no appeal pending before this court. ¹⁰

II.

We must agree, however, with Vartan's remaining Preliminary Objections. Vartan alleges that AOPC's Amended Petition for Review does not state a legally sufficient claim for the issuance of a writ of prohibition or mandamus. Specifically, Vartan contends that AOPC is not entitled to the extraordinary remedy of prohibition or mandamus because it has not exhausted all adequate and alternative remedies.

The writ of prohibition is one which, like all other...