Com. v. Alexander

• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
• Writing for the Court: Before HENNESSEY; QUIRICO
• Citation: 371 Mass. 726,359 N.E.2d 306
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. Louis D. ALEXANDER.
• Decision Date: 20 January 1977

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359 N.E.2d 306 371 Mass. 726 COMMONWEALTH v. Louis D. ALEXANDER. Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Bristol. Argued Sept. 14, 1976.
Decided Jan. 20, 1977.

Walter P. Faria, Asst. Dist. Atty., for the Commonwealth.

Lois M. Lewis, West Newton, for defendant.

Before HENNESSEY, C.J., and QUIRICO, KAPLAN and WILKINS, JJ.

QUIRICO, Justice.

The Commonwealth seeks further appellate review of a decision of the Appeals

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Court ¹ reversing the defendant's conviction and dismissing the indictment against him because of a violation of his statutory right [371 Mass. 727] to a 'prompt trial' under G.L. c. 277, § 72A. ² We granted the Commonwealth's application under G.L. c. 211A, § 11. We now reverse the judgment of the Superior Court, but we do so on a somewhat different analysis of the statute from that adopted by the Appeals Court.

The defendant was indicted for rape on March 3, 1971, and after a delay caused by his flight from Massachusetts, he pleaded not guilty on August 23, 1972. On November 21, 1972, he was sentenced to the Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Walpole on unrelated charges. On March 6, 1973, while in custody under that sentence, he filed a motion for speedy trial and, in the alternative, for dismissal of the indictment based on the Federal and State Constitutions and on G.L. c. 277, § 72A. ³ No further [371 Mass. 728] entries appear on the docket until January, 1974, when the motion was set down for hearing. The hearing was held on February 6, 1974, and the motion was denied on April 11, 1974. The Commonwealth offered no explanation for the eleven months' delay between the filing of the motion and the hearing. The defendant was tried and convicted of rape in November, 1974.

General Laws c. 277, § 72A, provides that a prisoner who applies for a 'prompt trial . . . shall, within six months after such application is received by the court, be brought into court for trial or other disposition of any such indictment, information or complaint, unless the court shall otherwise order.' In this case and in Commonwealth v. Gove, 1 Mass.App. 614, 304 N.E.2d 589 (1973), aff'd on other grounds, 366 Mass. 351, 320 N.E.2d 900 (1974), the Appeals Court has held that where delay was neither attributable to the defendant nor for his benefit, a six months' delay after application for a prompt trial under this statute requires automatic dismissal of the indictment. Since the Commonwealth did not seek further review of this aspect of the Appeals Court decision in Commonwealth v. Gove, supra, we had no occasion to decide whether a delay exceeding the

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statutory period required automatic dismissal in that case. See Commonwealth v. Fields, --- Mass. ---, --- ^a , 356 N.E.2d 1211

(1976); Commonwealth v. Boyd, --- Mass. ---, --- n.1^b , 326 N.E.2d 320 (1975). While the defendant in this case was denied his statutory rights and the indictment must be dismissed, we think the statute does not mandate a per se rule of dismissal after the statutory period has expired.

We have recently discussed G.L. c. 277, § 72A, at some length in Commonwealth v. Fields, supra at --- - --- ^c , 356 N.E.2d 1211 (1976), and no good purpose would be served by extensive repetition. The statute 'should not be seen as broad-guage legislative attempt to help solve the problems underlying the concept of 'speedy trial.' The statute has a more restricted[371 Mass. 729] application. It 'establishes a priority for trials of defendants who are already in custody.' Commonwealth v. Stewart, 361 Mass. 857, 858, 279 N.E.2d 697, 698 (1972). Commonwealth v. Lauria, 359 Mass. 168, 171, 268 N.E.2d 363 (1971). It furnishes a ready method of inmates to accelerate action on possible further impediments to their freedom.' Commonwealth v. Gove, 366 Mass. 351, 355, 320 N.E.2d 900, 904 (1974). ^d

In light of this limited purpose, we have previously stated that 'General Laws c. 277, § 72A, does not compel a judge to dismiss an indictment if the case is not tried or otherwise disposed of within six months after an application for a speedy trial is 'received by the court" (emphasis supplied). Commonwealth v. Fields, supra at ---,^e 356 N.E.2d at 1215, quoting from Commonwealth v. Loftis, 361 Mass. 545, 549, 281 N.E.2d 258 (1972). Commonwealth v. Daggett, --- Mass. ---, ---^e, 343 N.E.2d 409 (1976). When the delay is ordered to assist the defendant in his defense, or is assented to or caused by the defendant, or otherwise redounds to his benefit, dismissal of the indictment is not necessary. Commonwealth v. Daggett, supra at --- - ---^f, 343 N.E.2d 409. Commonwealth v. Boyd, --- Mass. ---, ---^g, 326 N.E.2d 320 (1975). Commonwealth v. Loftis, supra. A defendant who is responsible for delay exceeding the statutory period is correctly precluded from 'insist(ing) upon strict adherence to the exact six-month period.' Commonwealth v. Daggett, supra at --- ^h , 343 N.E.2d at 411. These decisions alone render inappropriate any invariable rule requiring immediate dismissal of an indictment when the statutory period has expired.

Where the defendant has neither caused the delay nor benefited from it, the statute does not inexorably render indictments ineffective after six months. Such a mechanistic approach is not required by the language of the statute and does not appear to have...