Com. v. Allen

• Decision Date: 23 July 1985
• Citation: 480 N.E.2d 630,395 Mass. 448
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. Joseph Lee ALLEN.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 630

480 N.E.2d 630

395 Mass. 448

COMMONWEALTH v. Joseph Lee ALLEN.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,

Worcester.

Argued Jan. 7, 1985.

Decided July 23, 1985.

Robert B. Shumway, Worcester (John G. Bagley, Worcester, with him), for defendant.

Lynn Morrill Turcotte, Asst. Dist. Atty., for Commonwealth.

Before HENNESSEY, C.J., and WILKINS, LIACOS, NOLAN and O'CONNOR, JJ.

O'CONNOR, Justice.

After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree of his estranged wife, Nancy J. Allen, and his former neighbor, John W. Vega. ¹ He appeals his convictions directly to this court pursuant to G.L. c. 278, § 33E (1984 ed.). The defendant claims error in (1) the denial of his motion to suppress; (2) the admission of expert testimony as to the cause of the defendant's black eyes; (3) the admission of expert testimony as to whether the defendant was amnesic; (4) the admission of photographs depicting the victims' wounds; and (5) the denial of his motion for a required finding of not guilty and of his renewed motion for a required finding of not guilty or a new trial. He also urges us to exercise our power under G.L. c. 278, § 33E, to grant him a new trial or to reduce the degree of guilt. The trial judge's rulings were not erroneous, and we do not find any reason to exercise our power under G.L. c. 278, § 33E. We affirm the convictions.

We summarize the evidence presented at trial. The defendant and Nancy Allen had been married for fifteen years prior to their separation in 1982. After the separation, it became commonly known in the neighborhood where the Allens lived that Nancy Allen was dating John Vega, who lived across the street. The defendant was depressed and upset by the separation. He did not like Vega and did not like his wife's relationship with Vega. On several occasions he told friends and coworkers that he wanted to shoot Vega, his wife, and himself although the threats were not taken seriously.

On September 10, 1982, a neighbor saw the defendant's car pull into the driveway of the Allen home. At around 9 P.M., other neighbors heard shouting coming from the Vega house, followed by noises that sounded like firecrackers. The following day, the Allens's fifteen year old son returned home after spending the night at a friend's house. There was no one there. Both his father's and his mother's cars were in the driveway. He decided to go to Vega's house. He discovered the bodies of his mother and John Vega in the living room of the Vega house. He also found his father lying on a bed in one of the bedrooms. After dismantling his father's rifle, which he had found on the living room floor, he summoned the police. When the police arrived, they found the body of John Vega slumped over in a chair in the living room. He had been shot four times in the head or the neck. Nancy Allen's body lay on the floor near the chair. She had been shot eight times in the head, back, or hand. There were four bullet holes in the front screen door of the Vega house. There was evidence that bullets had been fired through the screen from outside the house.

The police found the defendant on a bed in a first floor bedroom. He had two black eyes and a small cut on his head. The officers testified that the defendant looked as though he had been in a fight, but that otherwise he appeared normal. The police brought the defendant into the kitchen, where they advised him of his Miranda rights. An officer then asked the defendant what had happened to him, and he responded that he had been in a fight. The officer asked the defendant whether he had shot the people in the other room, and he stated that he had. The defendant's responses to further questions seemed disjointed and confused, however, so the police stopped questioning him and brought him to a hospital.

At the hospital another officer again read the defendant his Miranda rights. He asked the defendant whether he had shot the people that were in the house. The defendant responded that he had. He said that he shot them in the head first, then the back. He also said that he fired through the screen door when he saw them and then went inside and "really opened up." The officer asked the defendant why he had done it, and he replied that he had never liked Vega and that Vega had taken his wife away from him and abused her.

The defendant was eventually examined by doctors who discovered that he was suffering from an apparently self-inflicted gunshot wound to the brain. The bullet had entered his mouth, traversed the eye cavity, severing the right optic nerve, traversed his brain, and exited at the right front of his skull. He underwent an emergency craniotomy during which the wound was cleaned and bone and bullet fragments were removed. He spent several days in the surgical intensive care unit of the hospital. Some time prior to September 17, he was transferred to the neurosurgical-neurology ward.

While the defendant was a patient at the hospital he was kept under twenty-four hour police guard. On September 17, 1982, shortly after 1 A.M., a nurse entered the defendant's room in order to check his vital signs. In addition to checking the defendant's blood pressure, temperature, and pulse, the nurse asked the defendant several questions in order to assess whether he was well oriented. She asked him his name and whether he knew where he was, and he responded correctly. He also knew what day it was. The nurse then asked him if he knew why he was there. He answered that he had shot his neighbor and then himself. The nurse asked him where his wife was. He said she was at home. She asked him whether he had any children, and he responded that he had a fifteen year old son. The nurse then asked the defendant why he had shot the man. The defendant responded, "he was always right and I was the bastard." He went on to say that his wife had sent their son to work on a farm during the summer so she could spend the summer with her boyfriend riding his motorcycle and smoking. The nurse then said to the defendant, "This kind of puts you in a jam," to which the defendant replied, "I know, but if I had to do it again I would use a [.44] Magnum, not a [.22]. I read a story about a young boy who smashed his father's car and then when he told his father, the father got very mad and the boy went upstairs and shot himself in the mouth with a [.22] and messed up his brain. That is why I would use a [.44] Magnum next time." Sergeant Earl Wagner, the police officer who was guarding the defendant at the time, overheard this conversation and wrote down what was said.

At trial, defense counsel admitted that the defendant had committed the killings, but contested the degree of guilt, arguing that the case was one of manslaughter, not murder. Counsel argued that there was evidence to suggest that the defendant had been in a fight with Vega and had shot the victims in the heat of passion or in self-defense.

1. Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion to suppress the statements he had made to the nurse on September 17, 1982. ² The trial judge conducted an evidentiary hearing on the motion at which several witnesses testified. He made extensive findings of fact, including the following: "I am satisfied beyond any reasonable doubt that the defendant did in fact make the statements to Nurse Gancarz that are attributed to him by her and by Sgt. Wagner; that Nurse Gancarz's questions and the defendant's answers were in no way prompted or suggested by the police or other governmental authority; and that in asking the questions the nurse was acting solely in pursuance of her professional responsibilities and not as a proxy or agent of the police....

"I am further satisfied beyond any reasonable doubt that the statements were completely voluntary on the defendant's part. There were no threats and there were no promises. The answers were given by him in willing response to the nurse's questions. No trickery was involved.

"Furthermore, the defendant's answers were the product of a rational intellect at the time when they were given. Despite his recent brain surgery, his answers were completely appropriate for the questions asked and he was well oriented at the time of the interview. I am satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that he was fully aware of what he was saying and of the meaning of his statements....

"I recognize the fact that the defendant told the nurse that his wife was 'at home,' even though she was the second victim of the double homicide. The fact that that statement was false, however, does not make it involuntary. I believe the defendant was simply not prepared to admit that he had shot his wife even though he did admit to shooting Vega." The judge denied the motion and the statements were introduced at trial over the defendant's objection.

The defendant argues that the trial judge erred in denying his motion to suppress for three reasons. He argues that the statements were obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination; that the statements were obtained in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel; and that the statements were not voluntary as a matter of law. We address each of these contentions.

The defendant argues that his statements were obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination because he was not informed of his rights prior to questioning as required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 461, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 1620, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). In Miranda, supra, "the Supreme Court formulated a series of prophylactic rules (see Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 443 [94 S.Ct. 2357, 2363, 41 L.Ed.2d 182] [1974] ), designed 'to secure the privilege against self-incrimination' from overreaching and coercion during custodial interrogation. Custodial interrogation was defined as 'questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or...