Com. v. Arnold

• Decision Date: 21 August 2007
• Citation: 932 A.2d 143
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Lee ARNOLD, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

932 A.2d 143

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Lee ARNOLD, Appellant.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued November 29, 2006.

Filed August 21, 2007.

Michael O. Palermo, Jr., Carlisle, for appellant.

Daniel W. Stern, Asst. Dist. Atty., N. Bloomfield, for the Com., appellee.

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J., LALLY-GREEN and JOHNSON, JJ.

OPINION BY JOHNSON, J.:

¶ 1 In this case, we consider whether police officers may justify the search of a casual visitor to an apartment based upon the claim that the individual searched lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the apartment. Here, police officers, solely to investigate a noise complaint, entered the apartment without a warrant and without probable cause and exigent circumstances. While in the apartment, the officers observed the Appellant, Lee Arnold, pass a marijuana pipe to another person. The Commonwealth seeks to justify the subsequent search of Arnold's person based solely upon his lack of a reasonable expectation of privacy in the apartment. The Commonwealth contends that for this reason, it would not need to support the officers' warrantless entry with exigent circumstances.

¶ 2 Following a review of the circumstances at the moment of the intrusion, and applying the prevailing case law, we find the Commonwealth's reliance on Arnold's reasonable expectation of privacy in the apartment misplaced. The police officers did not search the apartment but instead searched Arnold's person to find the contraband. As the police officers did not have a warrant, failed to demonstrate the exigency of the situation, and did not form the probable cause necessary to arrest Arnold, we find the officers' entry into the apartment and the subsequent search of Arnold to be illegal. Hence, we conclude that the trial court erred in denying Arnold's motion to suppress the drug evidence. Accordingly, we reverse the order denying suppression and remand the case to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

¶ 3 The relevant facts of this case are as follows. In the early morning hours on August 28, 2005, the police received a noise complaint from an apartment building at 325 Market Street in Newport Borough, Perry County. Residents of a downstairs apartment complained about noise coming from an upstairs apartment. Two troopers, Trooper Fultz and Trooper Kline with the Pennsylvania State Police, responded to the complaint. After speaking with the downstairs residents, Trooper Fultz went upstairs and approached a separate and distinct door from the downstairs apartment. Trooper Fultz knocked on the door and rang the doorbell but received no response. After finding the door unlocked, Trooper Fultz opened it, entered the apartment, and went to the bottom of a flight of stairs. Trooper Fultz testified that he believed that he was in a common area of the apartment building at this point. Trooper Fultz then saw a female come halfway down the steps, see the police, and run back up the steps yelling the police are here. Trooper Fultz followed the female up the steps and upon reaching the top of the steps, he observed Arnold pass a marijuana pipe to David Amtower. The troopers arrested Arnold and Amtower. A subsequent search of their persons revealed that both men had small amounts of marijuana.

¶ 4 The Commonwealth charged Arnold by criminal complaint with possession of a small amount of marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia. See 35 P.S. §§ 780-113(a)(31)(i), (32) (respectively). On November 30, 2005, Arnold filed a motion to suppress the evidence, arguing that the officers entered the apartment without a warrant and without any articulable exigent circumstances. The trial court, the Honorable C. Joseph Rehkamp, P.J., denied the motion, finding that exigent circumstances and the officers' good faith belief that they were in a common area when they observed the marijuana pipe justified the intrusion. On February 16, 2006, President Judge Rehkamp presided over a bench trial and found Arnold guilty of one count of possession of a small amount of marijuana and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia. Immediately thereafter, President Judge Rehkamp sentenced Arnold to forty hours to thirty days' incarceration for possession of small amount of marijuana and one year of probation along with a fine of $250.00 for possession of drug paraphernalia. The sentences were to be served concurrently. On February 23, 2006, Arnold filed a post-sentence motion, arguing the trial court abused its discretion when it imposed a sentence in the aggravated range because it did not specifically state any reasons on the record for such a sentence. The trial court denied this motion on March 28, 2006.

¶ 5 Arnold now appeals, raising the following questions for our review:

A. Did the Suppression Court err in denying the omnibus pretrial motion to suppress all evidence seized from appellant and the residence in violation of his rights under the Constitutions of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the United States of America:

1. where there was no probable cause to enter the residence without a warrant and where no exigent circumstances existed?

2. where the officer presented contradictory testimony as to the basis of his entry into the residence and relied upon a "good faith" exception to [the] warrant requirement where no such exception exists under the Pennsylvania Constitution?

B. Did the sentencing Court err in sentencing Defendant to a term of imprisonment in the aggravated range without placing the reasons therefore [sic] immediately upon the record:

1. where the defendant had a prior record score of zero (0) and reasons for the sentence in the aggravated range were not placed upon the record?

2. where defendant was sentenced in accordance with the 41st Judicial District De facto sentencing policy of giving all those convicted of Possession of a Small Amount of Marijuana forty-eight (48) hours of incarceration?

Brief for Appellant at 8 (formatting edited).

¶ 6 In his first question on appeal, Arnold contends that the trial court erred in failing to suppress the fruits of the illegal search. Brief for Appellant at 17. Our standard when reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress is well-established:

In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, our responsibility is to determine whether the record supports the suppression court's factual findings and the legitimacy of the inferences and legal conclusions drawn from those findings. If the suppression court held for the prosecution, we consider only the evidence of the prosecution's witnesses and so much of the evidence for the defense as, fairly read in the context of the record as a whole, remains uncontradicted. When the factual findings of the suppression court are supported by the evidence, the appellate court may reverse if there is an error in the legal conclusions drawn from those factual findings.

Commonwealth v. Cornelius, 856 A.2d 62, 70 (Pa.Super.2004) (citation omitted).

¶ 7 Arnold argues that the drug evidence should be suppressed because the police officers' entry into the apartment was illegal as it was done without a warrant and without exigent circumstances. Brief for Appellant at 17. Arnold concludes that because the entry was unlawful, the fruits of the illegal search must be suppressed. Brief for Appellant at 17-18. After study, we agree and find that the disposition of this case is controlled by our Supreme Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Roland, 535 Pa. 595, 637 A.2d 269 (1994), and this Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Demshock, 854 A.2d 553 (Pa.Super.2004).

¶ 8 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Roland, set forth the principles and considerations expressed in the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions governing warrantless searches of the home:

In a private home, searches and seizures without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable[.] Absent probable cause and exigent circumstances, the entry of a home without a warrant is prohibited under the Fourth Amendment. In determining whether exigent circumstances exist, a number of factors are to be considered[:] (1) the gravity of the offense, (2) whether the suspect is reasonably believed to be armed, (3) whether there is above and beyond a clear showing of probable cause, (4) whether there is strong reason to believe that the suspect is within the premises being entered, (5) whether there is a likelihood that the suspect will escape if not swiftly apprehended, (6) whether the entry was made peaceably, and (7) the time of the entry, i.e., whether it was made at night. These factors are to be balanced against one another in determining whether the warrantless intrusion was justified. Other factors may also be taken into account, such as whether there is hot pursuit of a fleeing felon, a likelihood that evidence will be destroyed if police take time to obtain a warrant, or danger to police or other persons inside or outside the dwelling. Nevertheless, police bear a heavy burden when attempting to demonstrate an urgent need that might justify warrantless searches or arrests.

Where an offense being investigated is a minor one, a balancing of the foregoing factors should be weighted against finding that exigent circumstances exist.

* * * *

It is difficult to conceive of a warrantless home arrest that would not be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment when the underlying offense is extremely minor.

Roland, 637 A.2d at 270-71 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted, emphasis added).

¶ 9 In Roland, police officers received a call indicating an assault had been perpetrated against a nineteen-year-old male. See Roland, 637 A.2d at 270. The victim told the police that he had been assaulted while at a party at Roland's home. See id. The victim indicated that there was underage drinking as well as marijuana use at the party. See id. Based upon this information, the police proceeded to Roland's...