Com. v. Bagley

• Citation: 596 A.2d 811,408 Pa.Super. 188
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. Charles BAGLEY, Appellee.
• Decision Date: 27 September 1991
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

Page 811

596 A.2d 811

408 Pa.Super. 188

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. Charles BAGLEY, Appellee.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued Nov. 9, 1990.

Filed July 30, 1991.

Reargument Denied Sept. 27, 1991.

Ann Aschauer Osborne, Asst. Dist. Atty., Media, for Com.

Jeremy T. Ross, Philadelphia, for appellee.

Before WIEAND, KELLY and CERCONE, JJ.

WIEAND, Judge:

During an investigation into the suspicious death of the wife of Charles Bagley, police obtained and executed twelve search warrants. After Bagley had been arrested and charged with criminal homicide, he moved to suppress evidence seized pursuant to the execution of eight such warrants. After hearings thereon, the trial court suppressed evidence seized pursuant to four warrants. The Commonwealth appealed. It has certified that the suppression court's order, if allowed to stand, will effectively terminate the prosecution. See: Commonwealth v. Dugger, 506 Pa. 537, 486 A.2d 382 (1985).

At or about 1:00 a.m. on March 26, 1989, Easter Sunday, Charles Bagley arrived at the emergency room of Paoli Memorial Hospital, carrying the body of his wife, Yvonne. Bagley said that his wife had been electrocuted accidentally when an electrical appliance had fallen into the hot tub in which she had been bathing. He was overheard by emergency room personnel to say that he had torn apart the bathroom in which the accident had occurred and was considering the burning of his home. Bagley also said that he did not want police to be notified about his wife's death. Later the same day, the administrative nurse at the hospital notified Radnor Township Police of the incident and expressed the opinion that the circumstances were suspicious. She told police that she had observed a laceration above Mrs. Bagley's right eye and bruises on her body. She also narrated the statements which had been made by the defendant-appellee upon his earlier arrival at the hospital. Based on this information, Radnor Township Police and the District Attorney of Delaware County began an investigation which culminated in Bagley's arrest for the killing of his wife.

In reviewing an appeal by the Commonwealth from an order suppressing evidence,

we must consider only the evidence of the defendant's witnesses and so much of the evidence for the prosecution as read in the context of the record as a whole remains uncontradicted. Commonwealth v. Hamlin, 503 Pa. 210, 469 A.2d 137 (1983) (plurality opinion). While we are bound by the [suppression] court's findings of fact if supported by the record, we are not bound by the court's legal conclusions which are drawn from the facts of the case. Commonwealth v. Cortez, 507 Pa. 529, 491 A.2d 111 (1985).

Commonwealth v. Lagana, 517 Pa. 371, 375-376, 537 A.2d 1351, 1353-1354 (1988). See also: Commonwealth v. James, 506 Pa. 526, 532-533, 486 A.2d 376, 379 (1985); Commonwealth v. Person, 385 Pa.Super. 197, 200, 560 A.2d 761, 762-763 (1989). "We will ... affirm the decision of the suppression court 'if it can be sustained for any reason whatsoever, even if the [suppression] court offered an erroneous reason to support its action.' " Commonwealth v. Bowers, 400 Pa.Super. 377, 381, 583 A.2d 1165, 1167 (1990), quoting Commonwealth v. Reidenbaugh, 282 Pa.Super. 300, 309-310, 422 A.2d 1126, 1131 (1980). See also: Commonwealth v. Shaw, 494 Pa. 364, 368 & n. 1, 431 A.2d 897, 899 & n. 1 (1981); Commonwealth v. Nelson, 320 Pa.Super. 488, 493-494, 467 A.2d 638, 641 (1983).

Search Warrant No. 12504

Search warrant no. 12504 was issued on March 26, 1989, Sunday, and was executed the same day, at or about 1:30 p.m., by Detective Joseph Maguire of the Radnor Township Police Department. The warrant identified the criminal violation being investigated as "Suspicious Death" and authorized police to search the Bagley home for and seize "[a]ny items which may be related to the death of Yvonne Bagley." The affidavit of probable cause which supported the issuance of the search warrant stated:

On 26 March 89 at 0954 hours, Officer Antoini of the Radnor Township police Department received a phone call at the police station from a Janet Dragish, the administrative nurse at Paoli Memorial Hospital. Janet Dragish told Officer Antoini that at approximately 0100 hours on 26 March 89, a Charles Bagley brought his wife into Paoli Memorial Hospital wrapped in a wet blanket and stated that she was in a hot tub in their home and an electric light fell into the hot tub and electrocuted her. Janet Dragish stated that she felt that the death was suspicious and felt that the police should be called.

On 26 March 89, at 1110 hours, Sgt Leighton spoke to Janet Dragish by phone in which she states that she had viewed the body of Yvonne Bagley and saw a laceration above the right eye, and that there were other bruises on her body. Janet Dragish was told by Charles Bagley that he had torn the room apart where this incident took place and that he was thinking about setting fire to the house.

Based on the above mentioned facts, this affiant asks that a search warrant be issued to process the home for any evidence such as fibers, hair, prints and any other items which may have to do with the suspicious death of Yvonne Bagley.

The suppression court held that the search warrant was defective on its face because, in violation of Pa.R.Crim.P. 2006(e), it failed to identify any crime which had been committed and also because it did not particularly describe the property for which the warrant had been issued. The Commonwealth argues on appeal that, given the limited information possessed by the police concerning Yvonne Bagley's death, search warrant no. 12504 stated the items being sought as specifically as possible under the circumstances, thereby passing constitutional muster. The Commonwealth also argues that, to the extent the warrant may have technically violated Pa.R.Crim.P. 2005(b) and 2006(e), the violations were not of constitutional dimension and did not require suppression of the evidence seized.

"It is a fundamental rule of law that a warrant must name or describe with particularity the property to be seized and the person or place to be searched.... In addition, the search may not go beyond the scope of the warrant." Commonwealth v. Eichelberger, 352 Pa.Super. 507, 513, 508 A.2d 589, 592 (1986), citing Pennsylvania Constitution, Article I, Section 8; Pa.R.Crim.P. 2005(b) and (c); and Commonwealth v. Searles, 450 Pa. 384, 302 A.2d 335 (1973). See also: Commonwealth v. Reese, 520 Pa. 29, 32, 549 A.2d 909, 910 (1988), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1003, 110 S.Ct. 3237, 111 L.Ed.2d 748 (1990); Commonwealth v. Bleigh, 402 Pa.Super. 169, 174-176, 586 A.2d 450, 453 (1991).

The particularity requirement prohibits a warrant that is not particular enough and a warrant that is overbroad. These are two separate, though related, issues. A warrant unconstitutional for its lack of particularity authorizes a search in terms so ambiguous as to allow the executing officers to pick and choose among an individual's possessions to find which items to seize. This will result in the general "rummaging" banned by the fourth amendment. See Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 195, 48 S.Ct. 74, 75, 72 L.Ed. 231 (1927). A warrant unconstitutional for its overbreadth authorizes in clear or specific terms the seizure of an entire set of items, or documents, many of which will prove unrelated to the crime under investigation. The officers executing such a warrant will not rummage, but will "cart away all documents." Application of Lafayette Academy, 610 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1979). An overbroad warrant is unconstitutional because it authorizes a general search and seizure.

Commonwealth v. Santner, 308 Pa.Super. 67, 69-70 n. 2, 454 A.2d 24, 25 n. 2 (1982), cert. denied, 468 U.S. 1217, 104 S.Ct. 3585, 82 L.Ed.2d 883 (1984). In interpreting the particularity requirement set forth in Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, the Supreme Court has said:

The language of the Pennsylvania Constitution requires that a warrant describe the items to be seized "as nearly as may be...." The clear meaning of the language is that a warrant must describe the items as specifically as is reasonably possible. This requirement is more stringent than that of the Fourth Amendment, which merely requires particularity in the description. The Pennsylvania Constitution further requires the description to be as particular as is reasonably possible. See Commonwealth v. Reese, 520 Pa. 29, 31-32, 549 A.2d 909, 910 (1988) (Nix, C.J., dissenting) (Pennsylvania particularity requirement more stringent than that of the Fourth Amendment because Pennsylvania particularity requirement precedes probable cause requirement).

It is settled Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that a warrant must specifically list the things to be seized. Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 99 S.Ct. 2319, 60 L.Ed.2d 920 (1979); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 85 S.Ct. 506, 13 L.Ed.2d 431 (1965). "The requirement that warrants shall particularly describe the things to be seized makes general searches under them impossible and prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another. As to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant." Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196, 48 S.Ct. 74, 76, 72 L.Ed. 231 (1927). The more rigorous Pennsylvania constitutional provision requires no less.

Although some courts have treated overbreadth and ambiguity as distinct defects in warrants, e.g. Commonwealth v. Santner, 308 Pa.Super. 67, 68 n. 2, 454 A.2d 24, 25 n. 2 (1982), both doctrines diagnose symptoms of the same disease: a warrant whose description does not describe as nearly as may be those items for which there is probable cause. Consequently, in any assessment of the validity of the description contained in a warrant, a court must initially determine for what items probable cause existed. The...