Com. v. Bailey
| Decision Date | 28 February 1995 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Oscar Lee BAILEY, Appellant. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
Albert J. Flora, Jr., Wilkes-Barre, for appellant.
Peter P. Olszewski, Jr., Dist. Atty., Wilkes-Barre, for Com., appellee.
Before POPOVICH, HUDOCK and HESTER, JJ.
This is an appeal from the judgment of sentence imposed on Appellant following a jury trial in which he was convicted of terroristic threats. 1 Appellant was sentenced to imprisonment for twelve (12) to twenty-four (24) months. This appeal followed the denial of his post-verdict motions. We affirm.
The facts surrounding this conviction involved statements made to jurors by Appellant immediately following a trial which concluded on May 5, 1993, on an unrelated criminal matter. 2 Immediately after the trial, Appellant entered a jury waiting room, went over to a telephone, and attempted to make a call. After hanging up the phone, he proceeded through the jury room and, as he passed several jurors seated there, stated to them, "... 'in a month from now ...' " N.T., 11/18/93, p. 25. He did not complete the sentence and proceeded out of the room. Two jurors, who had previously sat on a jury which convicted Appellant of a prior charge, overheard this statement and testified that Appellant looked directly at them when he made it.
After exiting the jury room, Appellant proceeded outside the courthouse and, while on the steps, stated: "... 'in a month a lot of people are going to die because of your decision.' " N.T., 11/18/93, p. 64. He looked directly at a group of other jurors who also sat on his jury earlier. Three jurors from his trial testified to the incident which occurred outside of the courthouse. Also, Leonard Krispin, Jr. testified to having passed Appellant on the steps at that time. Mr. Krispin testified that Appellant stopped next to him on the stairs and made the statement involved herein. Krispin had known Appellant from an employment situation they had in common. Krispin testified that the statement was not made to him, and that he did not speak to Appellant at that time. Appellant had, however, paused on the steps and Krispin thought perhaps Appellant would stop to say hello because they knew each other. Appellant, however, did not speak to him.
The jurors who testified to the statement made inside the courthouse each expressed fear as a result of the tone of voice used by Appellant in the incomplete statement made to them. Likewise, the jurors outside the courthouse expressed their shock and disbelief of what was said, and immediately re-entered the courthouse to report the incident. As a result, a police detective was called to the scene and interviews were conducted. Detective Yursha filed the charge involved here as a result of those interviews.
Appellant raises the following issue in his appeal:
Whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction of terroristic threats?
In evaluating a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, which has won the verdict. We then determine whether the evidence was sufficient to permit the finder of fact to determine that each and every element of the crime charged was established beyond a reasonable doubt. It is the function of the fact-finder to pass upon the credibility of the witnesses and to determine the weight to be accorded the evidence produced. The fact-finder is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence introduced at trial. The facts and circumstances established at trial "need not be absolutely incompatible with [the] defendant's innocence, but the question of any doubt is for the [trier of fact] unless the evidence 'be so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact can be drawn from the combined circumstances.' " Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 472 Pa. 129, 150, 371 A.2d 468, 478 (1977), quoting Commonwealth v. Libonati, 346 Pa. 504, 508, 31 A.2d 95, 97 (1943).
Commonwealth v. Campbell, 425 Pa.Super. 514, 519, 625 A.2d 1215, 1217 (1993) (citations omitted).
The crime of terroristic threats is defined in the Crimes Code as follows:
A person is guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree if he threatens to commit any crime of violence with intent to terrorize another or to cause evacuation of a building, place of assembly, or facility of public transportation, or otherwise to cause serious public inconvenience, or in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror or inconvenience.
18 Pa.C.S. § 2706. Campbell, 625 A.2d at 1218 (quoting 18 Pa.C.S. § 2706, Official Comment--1972). We further stated, quoting from Commonwealth v. Speller, 311 Pa.Super. 569, 573, 458 A.2d 198, 200 (1983), that Campbell, 625 A.2d at 1219. We further stated in Campbell:
It has been observed that " 'even a single verbal threat might be made in such terms or circumstances as to support the inference that the actor intended to terrorize or coerce.' " Commonwealth v. Ashford, 268 Pa.Super. 225, 229, 407 A.2d 1328, 1329 (1979), quoting Model Penal Code, § 211.3, Tent.Draft No. 11 at p. 9 (1960). See also: Commonwealth v. Chance, 312 Pa.Super. 435, 443, 458 A.2d 1371, 1375 (1983). Moreover, "it is unnecessary for [th...
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In re BR
...from the nature of the statement and the context and circumstances surrounding the utterance of the statement. Commonwealth v. Bailey, 440 Pa.Super. 286, 655 A.2d 566, 568 (1995),appeal denied 540 Pa. 593, 655 A.2d 982, (1995) (quoting Commonwealth v. Campbell, 425 Pa.Super. 514, 625 A.2d 1......