Com. v. Barnes

Citation20 Mass.App.Ct. 748,482 N.E.2d 865
PartiesCOMMONWEALTH v. James BARNES.
Decision Date11 September 1985
CourtAppeals Court of Massachusetts

Marcy Cass, Asst. Dist. Atty., for the Commonwealth.

Isaac Prager, Boston, for defendant.

Before GREANEY, C.J., and CUTTER and DREBEN, JJ.

DREBEN, Justice.

This is an appeal by the Commonwealth, pursuant to Mass.R.Crim.P. 15(a)(2), 378 Mass. 882 (1979), from the allowance of the defendant's motion to suppress evidence. We conclude that the evidence should not have been suppressed.

We take our findings from the very meagre account given by the motion judge, supplemented by evidence elicited from the police officer who was the only witness at the hearing on the motion to suppress. During the course of an investigation of a fatal hit-and-run accident reported by witnesses to have involved a pick-up truck equipped with a snowplow bracket, the police learned that the defendant owned a similar vehicle. The defendant, interviewed by the investigating officer at the defendant's place of business, was asked whether he owned such a truck. He acknowledged that he did, informed the officer that the vehicle was in his backyard at home, and told the officer to "go down and look at it." On inspecting the truck, the officer noted the similarity between the license plate (66417) and the number given by a witness (6617). The defendant also showed him a snowplow bracket.

Suspecting that the truck had been involved in the accident, the officer asked the defendant if he would come to the station. 1 The defendant was not arrested or told that he was required to present himself. He proceeded to the station on his own, unaccompanied by the officer. Once there, the defendant was read his Miranda rights and was asked if he knew anything about the accident. The defendant replied, "I don't remember being in an accident. I was drunk. I would sooner talk to my lawyer."

We quote the judge's next finding which he considered crucial to his ruling on the motion: "The officer did not cease the questioning at this point, but went on and asked the defendant if the officer could tow the truck and plow to have paint analyzed; said permission was granted."

Following this brief interview, the defendant was allowed to leave the police station. After he returned home, he made no objection to the removal of the truck. Six days later, after laboratory analysis of the paint on the truck indicated that the truck had been involved in the accident, the defendant was cited for vehicular homicide, leaving the scene after causing property damage, and leaving the scene after causing personal injury.

On this evidence, the judge made the four rulings reproduced in the margin 2 and allowed the defendant's motion to suppress. The defendant's arguments, as did the rulings of the judge, assume that the safeguards protecting the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights established in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), apply in this case. 3 We conclude that the officer's request was not made during a "custodial interrogation" within the meaning of Miranda, and that the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights were therefore not implicated. We also conclude that since the defendant consented to the search there was no violation of the Fourth Amendment. While the protections of a person's rights under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments may be related, different standards apply to each amendment.

1. We turn to the question whether the procedural protections to secure the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution govern here. The defendant claims that the officer's request to tow the vehicle was an improper questioning of the defendant which took place after the defendant's request to consult with counsel. The exclusionary rule of Miranda applies, however, only if the defendant's procedural safeguards are violated during a "custodial interrogation." Miranda, at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 494-495, 97 S.Ct. 711, 713-714, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977).

While the judge did not explicitly rule that the interview was custodial, we assume from his rulings of law and his finding that the "investigation had already begun to focus on the defendant when he was requested to come to the police station," see note 1, supra, that he implicitly concluded that the interrogation was custodial. That conclusion, however, is open to reexamination by an appellate court, Commonwealth v. Angivoni, 383 Mass. 30, 33, 417 N.E.2d 422 (1981), and, in our opinion, is unsupported by the evidence.

"By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Commonwealth v. Bryant, 390 Mass. 729, 736, 459 N.E.2d 792 (1984), quoting from Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612. The inquiry is "whether, from the point of view of the person being questioned, the interrogation took place in a coercive environment--by reference to objective indicia." Commonwealth v. Bryant, supra, 390 Mass. at 736, 459 N.E.2d 792. A variety of factors establishes the framework for determining whether a custodial interrogation has taken place. 4 "Rarely is any single factor conclusive." Id. at 737, 459 N.E.2d 792.

Although some factors here weigh against the Commonwealth, we do not deem them conclusive. The fact that the defendant was read his Miranda rights when he arrived at the station may be understood to be only a step taken in an abundance of caution. See Commonwealth v. Bookman, 386 Mass. 657, 660-661, 436 N.E.2d 1228 (1982); Commonwealth v. Harris, 387 Mass. 758, 765, 443 N.E.2d 1287 (1982). Neither the fact that the focus of the investigation was on the defendant, Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 345-347, 96 S.Ct. 1612, 1615-1616, 48 L.Ed.2d 1 (1976), nor the fact that the interview took place in a police station is decisive. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495, 97 S.Ct. at 714. California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 3519-3520, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275 (1983). Commonwealth v. Best, 381 Mass. 472, 494, 411 N.E.2d 442 (1980). Commonwealth v. Bookman, 386 Mass. at 660, 436 N.E.2d 1228. Commonwealth v. Harris, 387 Mass. at 765, 443 N.E.2d 1287.

What is significant here is that the defendant voluntarily went to the police station and that he left the station without hindrance shortly after giving his consent to tow the vehicle. There is no evidence suggesting that his freedom to depart at any time was in any way restricted or that the questioning during the very brief meeting was aggressive. No charge was filed against the defendant until six days after he had been questioned at the station. In such circumstances "the interview involved here cannot be considered a custodial interrogation." Commonwealth v. King, 387 Mass. 464, 474, 441 N.E.2d 248 (1982). California v. Beheler, 103 S.Ct. at 3519. See Commonwealth v. Gill, 393 Mass. 204, 212, 471 N.E.2d 30 (1984). The encounter not being custodial, the defendant's request to speak to counsel does not render his statements (see part 2, infra ) inadmissible under the Miranda rule. Commonwealth v. King, 387 Mass. at 474, 441 N.E.2d 248. 5

2. The defendant's additional reliance on the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment is misplaced. As indicated in part 1 of this opinion, the defendant was not in custody and therefore had no right to counsel in the exercise of his Miranda rights. At this early stage of the proceeding, he clearly had no constitutional right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment. Commonwealth v. Stirk, 392 Mass. 909, 913, 467 N.E.2d 870 (1984). 6 See United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 104 S.Ct. 2292, 2298, 81 L.Ed.2d 146 (1984).

3. We turn, therefore, to the legal requirements for a valid consent under the Fourth Amendment, the only source of the defendant's constitutional protections here applicable. 7 A seizure does not offend the Fourth Amendment if the Commonwealth can establish that it was made with the defendant's voluntary consent. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2043, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). Commonwealth v. Aguiar, 370 Mass. 490, 496-497, 350 N.E.2d 436 (1976). A person does not have to be advised of his right to insist on a search warrant for his consent to be voluntary. Commonwealth v. Aguiar at 497, 350 N.E.2d 436. Commonwealth v. LaBriola, 370 Mass. 366, 367, 348 N.E.2d 758 (1976). Nor does the Commonwealth have the burden, urged by the defendant and imposed by the judge, see the first ruling in note 2, supra, of establishing a knowing and intelligent waiver by the defendant of his rights. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 232-233, 246, 93 S.Ct. at 2050-2051, 2057. Commonwealth v. Angivoni, 383 Mass. 30, 34 n. 4, 417 N.E.2d 422 (1981). This is so even if the defendant is in custody at the time he consents to a search. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424, 96 S.Ct. at 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976). Commonwealth v. LaBriola, 370 Mass. at 367, 348 N.E.2d 758. Commonwealth v. Aguiar, 370 Mass. at 497, 350 N.E.2d 436. 8

Whether a consent is voluntary is a question of fact to be determined from all the circumstances. Commonwealth v. Angivoni, 383 Mass. at 33, 417 N.E.2d 422. Although the police are not required to explain to the defendant that he has a right to refuse, such an omission is a factor to be taken into account in assessing the voluntariness of the consent, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 249, 93 S.Ct. at 2059; Commonwealth v. Cantalupo, 380 Mass. 173, 178, 402 N.E.2d 1040 (1980), as is, if applicable, the fact of a defendant's arrest or of his being in custody. Consultation with counsel is, of course, also a factor. Thus, consent given after such a consultation will usually be held voluntary. See Commonwealth v. Harris...

To continue reading

Request your trial
9 cases
  • Commonwealth v. Libby
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • June 26, 2015
    ...they are not conclusive. For example, "the fact that the focus of the investigation was on the defendant," Commonwealth v. Barnes, 20 Mass.App.Ct. 748, 752, 482 N.E.2d 865 (1985), and "[t]he fact that the defendant's interview occurred at the police station [are] not, by [themselves], dispo......
  • Com. v. Azar, 90-P-958
    • United States
    • Appeals Court of Massachusetts
    • May 27, 1992
    ...Mass. 615, 627, 500 N.E.2d 774 (1986); Commonwealth v. Buckley 410 Mass. 209, 217, 571 N.E.2d 609 (1991). Commonwealth v. Barnes, 20 Mass.App.Ct. 748, 752, 482 N.E.2d 865 (1985). Since the defendant was not in custody, it was not necessary to read him his Miranda rights at all. Trooper Wals......
  • Commonwealth v. Hilton, SJC-09292 (MA 3/9/2005), SJC-09292.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • March 9, 2005
    ...(1984); Commonwealth v. King, 387 Mass. 464, 474 (1982); Commonwealth v. Bookman, 386 Mass. 657, 661 n.5 (1982); Commonwealth v. Barnes, 20 Mass. App. Ct. 748, 749, 752 (1985). Thus, the fact that the defendant did not grasp the meaning of the Miranda warnings would not result in suppressio......
  • Com. v. Wallace
    • United States
    • Appeals Court of Massachusetts
    • November 29, 2007
    ...his consent to search his car. See Commonwealth v. Girouard, 436 Mass. 657, 665, 766 N.E.2d 873 (2002); Commonwealth v. Barnes, 20 Mass.App.Ct. 748, 752, 482 N.E.2d 865 (1985). Even were he in custody, the result would be no different. "The overwhelming weight of authority is that a police ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT