Com. v. Baseler

• Decision Date: 14 February 1995
• Citation: 645 N.E.2d 1179,419 Mass. 500
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. Bradley S. BASELER.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 1179

645 N.E.2d 1179

419 Mass. 500

COMMONWEALTH v. Bradley S. BASELER.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Worcester.

Argued Nov. 7, 1994.

Decided Feb. 14, 1995.

Thomas N. Turner, Northampton, for defendant.

Patricia C. Smith, Asst. Dist. Atty., for Com.

Before LIACOS, C.J., and WILKINS, ABRAMS, NOLAN, LYNCH, O'CONNOR and GREANEY, JJ.

NOLAN, Justice.

The defendant, Bradley S. Baseler, appeals from his conviction of assault and battery. In his assignment of errors, the defendant contends that the trial judge: (1) improperly shifted the burden of proof on the issue of self-defense to the defendant; (2) erred in his charge to the jury on the law of self-defense; (3) improperly provided the jury with a tape recording of his entire charge for their use during deliberations. The defendant's third claim presents an issue of first impression in the Commonwealth. We transferred the case here on our own motion. Because we conclude that the trial judge committed reversible error in his instruction to the jury on the law of self-defense, we decide only that issue. We shall, however, state our views on the third issue presented on appeal.

The criminal charges brought against the defendant were the result of an incident that occurred at the victim's home on June 13, 1992. ¹ The defendant testified that he had never struck the victim. According to the defendant, the victim initiated the assault on him. He testified that the victim began to slap him after he had called her a "slut" and had told her that he intended to go out with an ex-girlfriend that night. The defendant claimed that the victim had fallen against the stove while he was attempting to prevent her from slapping him. These facts provided the basis for the defendant's claim that he had been acting in self-defense.

A Worcester County grand jury indicted the defendant on the following charges: threatening to commit murder; assault by means of a dangerous weapon; assault and battery; and armed burglary and assault upon an occupant. A jury convicted the defendant on the assault and battery charge only. We reverse.

The defendant argues that the trial judge improperly instructed the jury on the law of self-defense in relation to the assault and battery charge. We agree. ²

We examine the trial judge's instructions in their entirety "to determine their probable impact on the jury's perception of the fact-finding function." Commonwealth v. Mejia, 407 Mass. 493, 495, 554 N.E.2d 1186 (1990), citing Commonwealth v. Albert, 391 Mass. 853, 858, 466 N.E.2d 78 (1984). We have stated that "[t]he right reasonably to use a nondeadly force, such as one's fists, in self-defense, arises at a somewhat lower level of danger ... than the right to use a dangerous weapon. See Commonwealth v. Houston, 332 Mass. 687, 690, 127 N.E.2d 294 (1955) (deadly force may be used only where the person has 'a reasonable belief that no other means would suffice to prevent such harm')." Commonwealth v. Bastarache, 382 Mass. 86, 105, 414 N.E.2d 984 (1980). See also Commonwealth v. DeCaro, 359 Mass. 388, 389-390, 269 N.E.2d 673 (1971). An individual may use nondeadly force in self-defense when he has a reasonable concern over his personal safety. See Commonwealth v. Bastarache, supra, 382 Mass. at 105 n. 15, 414 N.E.2d 984 (stating that "[r]easonable concern over one's personal safety [is] the proper standard when nondeadly force is used"). Thus, where a defendant is charged with both assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon and assault and battery, and the evidence is sufficient to raise the issue of self-defense, see Commonwealth v. Burbank, 388 Mass. 789, 794, 448 N.E.2d 735 (1983), the trial judge must instruct the jury on the law of self-defense relating not only to deadly force, but also to nondeadly force. See Commonwealth v. Bastarache, supra, 382 Mass. at 105, 414 N.E.2d 984.

In the present case, the defendant was indicted on charges of, inter alia, assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon and assault and battery. The trial judge properly gave an instruction on deadly force when he charged the jury on the law of self-defense regarding assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon. ³ Nevertheless, the judge used the same deadly force instruction that he had given for assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon when he charged the jury on the law of self-defense for simple assault and battery. ⁴ Thus, the judge charged the jury on deadly force when he should have given an instruction on self-defense relating to nondeadly force. See Commonwealth v. Bastarache, supra, 382 Mass. at 105, 414 N.E.2d 984. As a result, the judge's instruction lowered the Commonwealth's burden of proving that the defendant did not act in self-defense in relation to the assault and battery charge. Instead of having to prove that the defendant did not have a reasonable concern over his own safety, See id. at 105 n. 15, 414 N.E.2d 984, the Commonwealth only had to prove that the defendant did not have a reasonable belief that he was being attacked and in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury, or that he did not use all reasonable efforts to avoid combat, or that he used greater force than was reasonably necessary to defend himself. Commonwealth v. Harrington, 379 Mass. 446, 450, 399 N.E.2d 475 (1980). We conclude, therefore, that the trial judge's instruction on self-defense relating to the assault and battery charge constitutes reversible error because a jury convicted the defendant of assault and battery.

Although we do not address the remainder of the defendant's arguments on appeal, we consider the defendant's final assignment of error because it raises a novel issue in the Commonwealth. The defendant claims that the trial judge erred by providing the jury with a tape recording of his entire charge for their use during deliberations. ⁵ We disagree.

Several courts have permitted a judge to furnish the jury with a tape recording of the charge to them. See United States v. Holman, 680 F.2d 1340, 1354 (11th Cir.1982); United States v. Watson, 669 F.2d 1374, 1385-1386 (11th Cir.1982); Woodring v. State, 448 So.2d 529, 530 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1984); Dewitt v. State, 442 So.2d 1029, 1030 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1983). See United States v. Silvern, 484 F.2d 879, 883 (7th Cir.1973) (encouraging practice of furnishing jurors with taped recording of instructions during deliberations). In addition, courts have held that a judge could submit written instructions to the jury after concluding that the practice of providing the jury with a tape recording of the instructions was permissible. See United States v. Hewes, 729 F.2d 1302, 1316 n. 13 (11th Cir.), reh'g denied, 734 F.2d 1481 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied sub nom. Caldwell v. United States, 469 U.S. 1110, 105 S.Ct. 790, 83 L.Ed.2d 783 (1985). United States ex rel. Hancock v. McEvers, 619 F.Supp. 882, 886 (N.D.Ill.1985). Nevertheless, several courts have criticized the practice of providing the jury with a tape recording of the instructions, without labeling it as error, because a jury may overemphasize any one portion of the instructions by repeatedly replaying it. See Woodring v. State, supra, 448 So.2d at 530; Dewitt v. State, supra, 442 So.2d at 1030; Wagner v. State, 76 Wis.2d 30, 250 N.W.2d 331 (1977). See also United States v. Schilleci, 545 F.2d 519, 526 (5th Cir.1977) (criticizing practice of providing jurors with written instructions because of selective overemphasis by jurors). To avoid potentially prejudicial overemphasis on a particular charge in a tape recording, judges have cautioned the jury that they must consider the whole charge in reaching their verdict. See United States v. Holman, supra, 680 F.2d at 1354; United States v. Watson, supra, 669 F.2d at 1385-1386; Dewitt v. State, supra, 442 So.2d at 1030; Wagner v. State, supra.

Although we have never addressed the issue whether a judge may provide the jury with a tape recording of the instructions for their use in deliberations, we have stated previously that "[w]e would endorse any reasonable procedure by which all or portions of a judge's charge agreed to by the parties are made available in writing to a jury." Commonwealth v. Dilone, 385 Mass. 281, 287 n. 2, 431 N.E.2d 576 (1982). We think that a tape recording is not only a reasonable procedure by which to make the judge's instructions available to the jury, but also is comparable to written instructions. ⁶ In addition, furnishing a tape recording to the jury would satisfy our requirement that if a judge chooses to give written instructions to the jury, then the writing should be an exact reproduction of the judge's oral charge. Commonwealth v. Lavalley, 410 Mass. 641, 652 n. 15, 574 N.E.2d 1000 (1991). The tape recording, however, not only must be audible, but also must be a recording of the entire charge. ⁷ The agreement of the parties to provide the jury with a tape recording is not essential. Rather, the judge may send the tape into the jury room on the judge's own motion.

We summarize the procedure that a judge should follow when providing a jury with a tape recording of the instructions: (1) the judge must advise the counsel for both parties that the judge is going to do it; (2) the tape recording must be audible in its entirety and contain the whole instruction; (3) the judge shall give instructions to...