Com. v. Beam
Decision Date | 25 January 2002 |
Citation | 788 A.2d 357,567 Pa. 492 |
Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, Appellant, v. Troy BEAM, Appellee. |
Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Andrew S. Gordon, Robert John Shea, James M. Sheehan, Harrisburg, Steven I. Roth, Philadelphia, for Department of Transportation.
Lee A. Stivale, Springfield, for Troy Beam.
Before FLAHERTY, C.J., and ZAPPALA, CAPPY, CASTILLE, NIGRO, NEWMAN and SAYLOR, JJ.
The issue presented is whether the Department of Transportation may seek to enjoin the operation of an unlicensed airport where this is not specifically authorized by the controlling statute.
Appellee Troy Beam ("Beam") used a portion of his property in Hopewell Township, Cumberland County, to take off in, land, and house his private airplane. In 1999, the state Department of Transportation (the "Department") filed a complaint in equity and petition for a preliminary injunction, alleging that Beam was operating an airport without a license in violation of Section 471.3 of Title 67 of the Pennsylvania Code, 67 Pa.Code § 471.3, and after refusing the Department's invitation to apply for a license.1 In response, Beam denied that he maintained or operated an airport and asserted further that the Department lacked the authority to seek an injunction against him.
Following a hearing, the common pleas court denied the request for preliminary injunction and, on Beam's motion, granted summary judgment in his favor and dismissed the Department's complaint. The Department appealed, and the Commonwealth Court affirmed. See Commonwealth, Dep't of Transp. v. Beam, 756 A.2d 1179 (Pa.Cmwlth.2000). In their reasoning, the reviewing courts focused on the Department's capacity to seek injunctive relief in a judicial forum. While recognizing that the Department's enumerated powers included the authority to issue airport licenses, see 74 Pa.C.S. § 5301(b)(1), and that its regulations establish procedures for license revocation and suspension, see 67 Pa.Code § 471.3(g), the courts nevertheless found no statute or regulation conferring authority to commence a civil action.2 Stressing the precept that an agency charged with the administration of a statute can act only within the strict confines of that statute, and therefore can seek to enforce compliance only with specific legislative authorization, the Commonwealth Court and the common pleas court concluded that the Department bore airport licensing enforcement responsibility but presently lacked the means by which to compel compliance. See id. at 1181-82. We allowed appeal to consider this conclusion.3 Presently, the Department argues that the reviewing courts construed too narrowly the authority conferred upon it by the Legislature, as they failed to acknowledge that a statutory grant of authority consists not only of that which is expressly granted, but also of authority which is necessarily implied. One such aspect of implied authority, the Department asserts, is the capacity to institute judicial proceedings where necessary to the execution of its statutory responsibilities. The Department also maintains that a violation of the law is tantamount to a public nuisance, which is enjoinable at common law regardless of whether such an injunction is statutorily authorized. Beam contends that, to the contrary, the courts cannot ignore the Legislature's omission of a mechanism for enforcing the prohibition against operation of an unlicensed airport from the Aviation Code. As the General Assembly has elected to provide such mechanisms in other statutes and in other provisions of the Aviation Code, Beam argues, it must be presumed that the omission at issue was intentional;4 thus, it would be an inappropriate expansion of the courts' equitable jurisdiction to seek to remedy that omission. Nor, in Beam's view, is his airport enjoinable as a public nuisance, as it poses no danger to the public.5
This Court has long adhered to the precept that the power and authority exercised by administrative agencies must be conferred by legislative language that is clear and unmistakable. See United Artists' Theater Circuit, Inc. v. City of Phila., 535 Pa. 370, 389, 635 A.2d 612, 622 (1993) ; Commonwealth, Dep't of Envtl. Resources v. Butler County Mushroom Farm, 499 Pa. 509, 513, 454 A.2d 1, 3 (1982). At the same time, we recognize that the General Assembly has prescribed that legislative enactments are generally to be construed in such a manner as to effect their objects and promote justice, see 1 Pa.C.S. § 1928(c), and, in assessing a statute, courts are directed to consider the consequences of a particular interpretation, as well as other factors enumerated in the Statutory Construction Act. See Butler County Mushroom Farm, 499 Pa. at 516-17,454 A.2d at 5-6 (citing 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a))("[s]tatutory construction is not an exercise to be undertaken without considerations of practicality, precept and experience[,]" as ignoring such considerations may result in a forced and narrow interpretation that does not comport with legislative intent) that . Based upon such considerations, the rule requiring express legislative delegation is tempered by the recognition that an administrative agency is invested with the implied authority necessary to the effectuation of its express mandates. See Butler County Mushroom Farm, 499 Pa. at 513,454 A.2d at 4; St. Joe Minerals, 476 Pa. at 310, 382 A.2d at 736; Day v. Public Service Comm'n (Yellow Cab Co.), 312 Pa. 381, 384, 167 A. 565, 566 (1933). See generally 2 AM.JUR.2D ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 62 (1994) ( ).6
As noted, the Aviation Code contains the core authorization for the Department's regulation of airport operations. Section 5301(a) defines the Department's general aviation-related powers in pertinent part as follows:
Commonwealth, Pa. Game Comm'n v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Envtl. Resources, 521 Pa. 121, 128, 555 A.2d 812, 815 (1989).10 We also observe that pursuit of injunctive relief in a judicial forum represents a restrained and supervised form of administrative action, as compared, for example, to the issuance of some form of direct agency mandate, restraint, or sanction. Compare Scheble v. Missouri Clean Water Comm'n, 734 S.W.2d 541, 556 (Mo.App.1987)(determining that a state commission possessed implied authority to issue a mandatory injunction requiring a subdivision developer to utilize a centralized sewer system). Finally, we credit the Department's argument that a continuing violation of the legislatively authorized proscription here involved is injurious to the public interest and is therefore enjoinable by the proper authorities. Cf. Pennsylvania Soc'y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Bravo Enterprises, Inc., 428 Pa. 350, 360, 362, 237 A.2d 342, 348, 349 (1968).11
We hold, therefore, that the General Assembly has implicitly conferred upon the...
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