Com. v. Beauchamp

• Decision Date: 09 April 1997
• Citation: Com. v. Beauchamp, 677 N.E.2d 1135, 424 Mass. 682 (Mass. 1997)
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. Robert C. BEAUCHAMP.
• Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

Page 1135

677 N.E.2d 1135

424 Mass. 682

COMMONWEALTH v. Robert C. BEAUCHAMP.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Middlesex.

Argued Feb. 5, 1997.

Decided April 9, 1997.

John M. Thompson, Springfield, for defendant.

David W. Cunis, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth.

Before WILKINS, C.J., and LYNCH, O'CONNOR, FRIED and MARSHALL, JJ.

FRIED, Justice.

The defendant, Robert C. Beauchamp, was indicted for murder in the first degree in 1971. The jury returned a verdict of guilty of murder in the second degree, and the defendant was sentenced to life in prison. No appeal was taken from the conviction or from the denial of the motion for a new trial. In 1974, the defendant failed to return from a furlough. He was finally apprehended in California in 1981 where he was charged with Federal crimes. After serving Federal sentences in California and Illinois, the defendant was returned to Massachusetts on a Governor's warrant in 1987. See 413 Mass. 60, 595 N.E.2d 307 (1992). After a series of motions for a new trial, see 35 Mass.App.Ct. 1106, 619 N.E.2d 997 (1993), the defendant petitioned a single justice of this court for leave to file a late application to appeal from conviction. The single justice granted that motion, and we now review the defendant's conviction on direct appeal and under G.L. c. 278, § 33E. ¹ We reverse the conviction.

I

On August 5, 1971, the defendant called the police to report that he had just shot the victim. The police arrived to find the victim dead on the stairs outside the defendant's apartment. The victim had been shot four times at close range. Medical evidence suggested that at least one shot was fired from behind the victim. The victim was shot inside the apartment, turned to flee, and then fell and died on the stairs outside. The victim was found with his keys a few inches from his right hand, a can of mace in his jacket, and some cash and a considerable amount of travelers' checks.

At trial, the defendant admitted to shooting the victim, claimed self-defense, and gave the following account of the events: The defendant and the victim had known each other and been friends for a number of years, and they had just returned from a short vacation together about one month before the shooting. The turn of events leading to the killing began in 1966 when the victim stole a copy of the national merit scholarship examination and gave a copy to the defendant. The defendant scored very well and received a scholarship to the University of California at Berkeley. The victim, however, did not reap an advantage from the examination and was "stuck at W.P.I." ² The defendant compensated the victim with gifts, but the victim was dissatisfied and tried to extort money from the defendant. After the vacation they took together, the victim became more hostile and threatened to "cut [the defendant] up." On the day of the shooting, the defendant relayed a message to the victim that he would like to see him in a few days. The victim called back and demanded to come over immediately, and the defendant acquiesced. According to the defendant, the victim arrived under the influence of drugs, and demanded money. When the defendant refused, the victim began yelling obscenities and went into the kitchen. The victim returned with a large butcher knife. The defendant fired a warning shot to no avail. In the ensuing skirmish, the defendant fired and hit the victim four times. The defendant testified that within the course of the skirmish, he tried to get the knife from the victim, and he retreated as much as he could until he was backed against the wall in attempt to avoid shooting the victim.

When the police arrived, they found the gun and the knife in plain view. The knife had no fingerprints on it, but the defendant testified that the victim used a napkin to hold it. The defendant's mother testified to seeing a crumpled napkin, but the police officers did not see it, and it did not appear in any police photographs. In addition, there was a deep, crescent shaped indentation on the wall in the apartment, and the victim had an abrasion on his knee made shortly before his death that matched the indentation. The defendant was arrested and booked the day of the shooting. That evening, the police searched his apartment without a warrant, found spent bullets from the shooting, and took some photographs.

After being released on bail, the defendant fled to California where he was apprehended and returned for trial. The defendant was convicted of murder in the second degree and sentenced to life in prison. Shortly thereafter and before his appeal was perfected, the defendant escaped from prison. He was apprehended in 1981 in California where he was charged with committing Federal crimes. After serving prison sentences in Federal prisons in Illinois and California, the defendant was returned to Massachusetts on a Governor's warrant. The defendant then filed a series of motions for a new trial, alleging errors in the trial and claiming that his trial testimony was fabricated to conceal the fact that the killing was actually part of a cover-up of Federal Bureau of Investigation, Central Intelligence Agency, and White House involvement in an attempt to prevent the so-called "Pentagon Papers" from being turned over to the Soviet Embassy in Washington. ³ After those motions were denied, the defendant sought leave from the single justice of this court to file late an application to appeal from his conviction. The single justice granted leave to file this appeal.

II

The defendant's trial took place in 1973, slightly more than two years before the United States Supreme Court's decision in Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975). In that case, the Court held that the State must bear the burden of proving "beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of the heat of passion on sudden provocation when the issue is properly presented in a homicide case." Id. at 704, 95 S.Ct. at 1892. Shortly thereafter, we held that the principle in Mullaney applied with equal force to claims of self-defense, Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 370 Mass. 684, 687-689, 352 N.E.2d 203 (1976), and proposed a model instruction. Id. at 692 n. 10, 352 N.E.2d 203. The defendant's case is here on direct review. This case presents an anomaly. Had the defendant perfected his appeal in the normal course, it is possible he would not have been able to take advantage of Rodriguez, which might not yet have been decided. Ordinarily, a criminal defendant gets the full benefit of any changes in the law while on direct review, see Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 320-328, 107 S.Ct. 708, 711-16, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987), but after direct review, his ability to call his conviction into question based on new decisions is strictly limited. See Commonwealth v. Amirault, 424 Mass. 618, 677 N.E.2d 652 (1997). It is only because of his escape and subsequent incarceration that his appeal has been so long delayed, enough for the law to have changed in his favor. We are reluctant to conclude that where the defendant, by his own fault, fails to take a direct appeal in a timely fashion, he should nevertheless reap the benefit of changes in the law which occur between his trial and his direct appeal. Since we conclude that the defendant is entitled to a new trial in any event, we review the appeal based on the law at the time of the trial. The restriction on the application of new rules on direct appeal does not apply in this case because we have since held that Rodriguez applies retroactively and that failure to preserve the issue at trial does not constitute waiver because the law was not adequately developed before Mullaney and because the issue of burden of proof goes to the heart of the truth-finding function. Commonwealth v. Stokes, 374 Mass. 583, 588-590, 374 N.E.2d 87 (1978). See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989). The rule in Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 370 Mass. 684, 352 N.E.2d 203 (1976), has also been applied to cases on collateral appeal for the same reason, so that even if the defendant's conviction had been affirmed before Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975), had been decided, the conviction would have been just as susceptible to attack on collateral review as it is on direct review. Connolly v. Commonwealth, 377 Mass. 527, 387 N.E.2d 519 (1979). See Amirault, supra at 639-640, 677 N.E.2d at 666-667. We did, however, note in Stokes that the trial judge lacked the guidance of Mullaney and Rodriguez, and we therefore would not review the instruction in cases tried before with the "greater expectations" and "more careful scrutiny" with which we would review instructions given after those cases. Stokes, supra at 591, 374 N.E.2d 87. Because this case was tried before Mullaney, we review it with this lesser scrutiny, but the charge must still meet the minimum due process requirements. In our review, we shall consider the charge to the jury as a whole, id., and consider how a reasonable juror would have understood the charge to determine whether the constitutional requirements are met. Commonwealth v. Zezima, 387 Mass. 748, 751, 443 N.E.2d 1282 (1982).

In this case, the judge's instructions began with a lengthy and accurate general description of the presumption of innocence and explanation that the Commonwealth bore the burden of proving that the defendant committed the alleged crime. The judge then described malice aforethought and discussed the differences between the degrees of murder and the difference between murder and manslaughter. The judge then reached self-defense: "It is further the posture of the case that [the defendant] ... says that ... the killing of [the victim] was justified. He said it was excusable by reason of self-defense." He described self-defense not as negating an element of the offense, but as "an excuse and justification" for the...