Com. v. Bedsaul

• Citation: 444 A.2d 717,298 Pa.Super. 174
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Curtis BEDSAUL, Appellant.
• Decision Date: 16 April 1982
• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania

Page 717

444 A.2d 717 298 Pa.Super. 174 COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania
v.
Curtis BEDSAUL, Appellant. Superior Court of Pennsylvania. Submitted June 23, 1981.
Filed April 16, 1982.

[298 Pa.Super. 175] Howard Gallagher, Asst. Public Defender, Media, for appellant.

Frank T. Hazel, Dist. Atty., Media, for Commonwealth, appellee.

Before HESTER, CAVANAUGH and BECK, JJ.

HESTER, Judge:

Officer Kruczaj, a Chester County police officer, was summoned via the radio dispatch to investigate the presence of the appellant in the women's dormitory at Widener College. The appellant entered the dormitory without authority, invitation or privilege. The officer did not, at first, arrest the appellant because no serious criminal activity seemed to be afoot. Instead, he agreed to drive the appellant[298 Pa.Super. 176] to his home,

Page 718

especially since the latter appeared intoxicated and had no vehicle nearby. Before allowing the appellant to sit in the patrol car, Officer Kruczaj patted his outer clothing. The pat-down disclosed a small plastic vial containing pills and a hypodermic syringe. As a result, the appellant was tried and convicted for violating the provisions of The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act. Pa.Stat.Ann. title 35, § 780-113. This appeal was filed from his sentence of 18 months' probation.

The appellant asserts, first, that he was not tried within 180 days of the filing of criminal charges; therefore, the provisions of Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100(a)(2) were violated. The appellant was free on bail pending disposition of the criminal charges. He failed to appear for trial. Subsection (d)(1) of Rule 1100 excludes that time period from the 180-day calculation during which the defendant renders himself unavailable at any stage of the proceedings. By excluding the period of time during which the appellant was unavailable, there was no violation of the 180-day rule.

The appellant's second argument is rejected as well. He maintains that the vial and syringe were taken from him in violation of the search and seizure principles of the Fourth Amendment. Conversely, Officer Kruczaj wanted to make certain that the appellant possessed no dangerous weapons before permitting him to enter the back seat of the patrol car.

Warrantless searches are permissible where the officer observes the suspicious nature of the individual's behavior and reasonably concludes that the individual may be contemplating the commission of a crime and may be carrying a dangerous...