Com. v. Benton
Decision Date | 16 March 1995 |
Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Ronald BENTON, Appellant. |
Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
Ronald Benton, pro se.
John M. Morganelli, Dist. Atty., Easton, for Comm.
Before DEL SOLE, BECK and CERCONE, JJ.
In this appeal from the judgments of sentence for possession of cocaine with intent to deliver and conspiracy, we address the conclusions of the suppression court, specifically the propriety of the stop of appellant's vehicle. We conclude that the findings of the suppression court are not supported by the record, that the Commonwealth did not meet its burden of proving that the stop was lawful and that the court's denial of suppression was, therefore, erroneous.
In December of 1992, appellant was a passenger traveling in an automobile which was stopped by Pennsylvania State Trooper Gerard Walsh on Interstate Route 78. The purpose of the stop, as testified to by Walsh, was the presence of an object hanging from the rear view mirror of the car. Walsh described the item, later identified as an air freshener, as a thin object several inches long. Believing the existence of this object to constitute a violation of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4524, 1 Walsh signaled for the driver to stop his vehicle and provide identification and registration. Neither the driver nor appellant could produce a valid driver's license or registration. Further, neither man claimed ownership of the car or could identify the car's registered owner. Concluding that he could not permit appellant or the driver to remain in control of the vehicle under these circumstances, Walsh intended to impound the vehicle, issue a warning for traffic violations and transport both appellant and the driver from the highway to a telephone so that they could secure transportation from the scene.
Because he intended to impound the car, Walsh conducted an inventory search in order to identify and safeguard the contents of the vehicle. He also asked for and received permission from the driver to search the car. Upon searching, Walsh found a brown bag containing 289 grams of cocaine under the passenger seat.
Appellant was brought to trial on charges of possession, intent to deliver and conspiracy. Prior to trial, he filed a motion to suppress, alleging that the initial stop of the vehicle was unlawful and the evidence yielded must be suppressed. The suppression court denied the motion and appellant was found guilty of all charges. On appeal, he argues that the suppression court's decision was erroneous. 2 We agree.
When a defendant files a motion to suppress, it is the burden of the Commonwealth to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the challenged evidence is admissible. Commonwealth v. DeWitt, 530 Pa. 299, 608 A.2d 1030, 1031 (1992). When reviewing a suppression order in favor of the Commonwealth, we consider the evidence presented by the prosecution and so much of the evidence for the defense as, fairly read in the context of the whole record, remains uncontradicted. Commonwealth v. Monarch, 510 Pa. 138, 507 A.2d 74, 78 (1986). Our task is clear; we must determine whether the suppression court's factual findings are supported by the record, and whether inferences and legal conclusions drawn from those findings are legitimate. Commonwealth v. Davis, 418 Pa.Super. 318, 614 A.2d 291, 292 (1992).
With respect to factual findings, we are mindful that it is the sole province of the suppression court to weigh the credibility of the witnesses. Commonwealth v. Quiles, 422 Pa.Super. 153, 619 A.2d 291, 292 (1993). Further, the suppression court judge is entitled to believe all, part or none of the evidence presented. Commonwealth v. Williams, 411 Pa.Super. 586, 602 A.2d 350, 353 (1992). However, where the factual determinations made by the suppression court are not supported by the evidence, we may reject those findings. Commonwealth v. Burnside, 425 Pa.Super. 425, 625 A.2d 678, 680 (1993). Only factual findings which are supported by the record are binding upon this court.
Appellant's claim concerns the propriety of the initial stop of the vehicle. He argues, essentially, that the stop was pretextual, and that Trooper Walsh did not observe a violation of Section 4524, or even a perceived violation of Section 4524, when he noticed an air freshener hanging from the rear view mirror of the car.
Section 4524 does not prohibit the hanging of an object from a car's rear view mirror but prohibits the hanging only where such object serves to materially obstruct obscure or impair a driver's vision. See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4524 (emphasis added). As the Commonwealth notes in its brief, a police officer who has reasonable and articulable grounds to believe that a vehicle or driver is in violation of the Motor Vehicle Code lawfully may stop the vehicle. 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6308(b); Commonwealth v. McElroy, 428 Pa.Super. 69, 630 A.2d 35, 40-41 (1993). And, as noted by the trial court, an officer need not stop a vehicle only where he or she intends to issue a citation, but can effectuate a stop solely for purposes of issuing the driver a warning. Commonwealth v. Fisher, 294 Pa.Super. 486, 440 A.2d 570, 572 (1982).
In sum, a traffic stop must be the result of a reasonable belief on the part of the officer that the Vehicle Code is being violated. While an actual violation need not be established, a reasonable basis for the officer's belief is required to validate the stop. See McElroy, supra, 428 Pa.Super. at 69, 630 A.2d 35.
Following the suppression hearing in this case, the court specifically found that Trooper Walsh's testimony was credible and that he possessed reasonable and articulable grounds to believe a Vehicle Code violation occurred. Suppression Court Op. at 3, 7-8. Despite these findings, the suppression judge noted that the air freshener was not fully described at the hearing and "it [was] not easy to imagine a hanging air freshener which would materially impair a driver's vision." Id. at 7. We agree with the suppression court on both these points. With respect to his observations of the vehicle, the direct testimony of Trooper Walsh was as follows:
Suppression Hearing Transcript at 13 (emphasis supplied). On cross-examination, Trooper Walsh was asked how he came to observe the object and to describe its size.
Suppression Hearing Transcript at 27-31 (emphasis supplied). At this point the prosecutor objected to the line of questioning, asserting that it did not matter what the size of the object was. The suppression court...
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