Com. v. Boyd
Citation | 461 Pa. 17,334 A.2d 610 |
Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Kenneth BOYD, Appellant. |
Decision Date | 18 March 1975 |
Court | United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania |
F. Emmett Fitzpatrick, Jr., Dist. Atty., Richard A. Sprague, First Asst. Dist. Atty., Steven H. Goldblatt, Asst. Dist. Atty., Chief, Appeals Div., John H. Isom, Asst. Dist. Atty., Abraham J. Gafni, Deputy Dist. Atty. for Law, Mark Sendrow, Philadelphia, for appellee.
Before JONES, C.J., and EAGEN, O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY, NIX and MANDERINO, JJ.
In this appeal, appellant Kenneth Boyd presents a multifaceted attack upon the validity of his conviction of murder in the second degree. Boyd was tried before the court sitting without a jury on February 28, 1974. Post-verdict motions were filed but were later withdrawn. Appellant was sentenced to five to 20 years imprisonment. Subsequently, Boyd obtained new counsel and an appeal was mistakenly filed in the Superior Court and then properly in this Court. We remanded to the trial court for the filing of post-trial motions. Post-trial motions were filed accordingly and denied. This appeal ensued. 1 We affirm.
Appellant first contends that there was insufficient evidence to sustain a verdict of murder because the Commonwealth failed to establish that he acted with malice. The Commonwealth's evidence consisted almost entirely of appellant's statement to the police. Appellant related that he arrived at the clandestine gambling house where the shooting occurred at about 1:00 a.m. He continued:
At trial, appellant's testimony was virtually identical to his statement except that he denied having control of the gun when the fatal shot was fired. Two eye-witnesses called by appellant substantiated appellant's story in most respects; however, they apparently did not actually see the shooting. Appellant contends that this evidence does not establish that he maliciously shot James Blount. 2
Commonwealth v. Coleman, 455 Pa. 508, 510, 318 A.2d 716, 717 (1974). Commonwealth v. Chermansky, 430 Pa. 170, 175, 242 A.2d 237, 240--41 (1968). See Commonwealth v. Coleman, supra. Commonwealth v. Coleman, supra, at 510, 318 A.2d at 717; Commonwealth v. Chermansky, supra; Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 428 Pa. 188, 193, 236 A.2d 768, 771 (1968).
Commonwealth v. Robinson, 452 Pa. 316, 323, 305 A.2d 354, 358 (1973). In Commonwealth v. Whitaker, 440 Pa. 143, 269 A.2d 886 (1970), Whitaker admitted shooting the deceased while the two were alone. Id. at 145--46, 269 A.2d at 887--88.
Here, appellant admitted in his statement that at the moment that the fatal shot was fired, he had sole control over the gun. The trial court was entitled to infer from this fact and the fact that the gun was used upon a vital part of the body that Boyd acted maliciously.
The inference that Boyd acted with malice is also supported by appellant's failure to give aid to the victim after the shooting. In Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 428 Pa. 188, 236 A.2d 768 (1968), Lawrence and the victim fought when Lawrence refused to perform an act of homosexual sodomy upon the victim. As the victim prepared to rush Lawrence, Lawrence struck him with a blunt object and rendered him unconscious. Lawrence then dragged the unconscious body to a stream bed, apparently ripping the victim's clothing off in the process, and left him there, exposed to winter's elements. The Court concluded that malice was established.
Id. at 194, 236 A.2d at 771--72. 3
Appellant contends that the record does not establish facts that permit the inference made in Lawrence. While appellant testified that at the time of the shooting he did not believe the Blount had been hit, the court was entitled to disbelieve this testimony. 4 Appellant admitted that immediately after the shot was fired, Blount slipped to the floor and began to bleed from the mouth. Furthermore, according to appellant's statement, it seemed obvious to others present that Blount had been wounded. Therefore, we conclude that the trier of fact could permissibly believe that when Boyd carried Blount, who, Boyd testified, was still breathing, from the house and placed him in the car, he knew that Blount had been shot and was in need of medical attention. Thus, on this record, the court could infer malice from appellant's failure to attempt to obtain aid for the wounded man.
Appellant next asserts that his waiver of his rights to a jury trial, 5 to confront witnesses, 6 and to challenge the admission of his statement to the police 7 were not knowingly and intelligently 8 made because he was not advised on the record of the possible prison sentences which he might receive of convicted. Because the waiver of jury trial presents different considerations from those involved in the other waivers, the jury trial waiver will be analyzed separately.
In Commonwealth v. Williams, 454 Pa. 368, 312 A.2d 597 (1973), this Court held that a voluntary waiver of jury trial will not be found to be knowing and intelligent unless the record indicates that the defendant 'knew the essential ingredients of a jury trial which are necessary to understand the significance of the right he was waiving.' Id. at 373, 312 A.2d at 600. We then enumerated the 'essential ingredients' of which a defendant must be informed 'that the jury be chosen from members of the community (a jury of one's peers), that the verdict be unanimous, and that the accused be allowed to participate in the selection of the jury panel.' Id. Nowhere did we indicate that a defendant must be informed of the possible sentences he might receive.
In Commonwealth v. Henderson, 450 Pa. 122, 298 A.2d 891 (1973), the appellant asserted that his waiver of jury trial was not knowing and intelligent because the court failed to question him during the waiver colloquy about his claim of self-defense. This Court held that the failure of the trial court to so question the defendant was not error.
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